Executive Summary

• The Ba'ath Party elections on May 4, 2024, during the General Conference, were part of Assad's efforts to reshape and reorganize the power centers within the Ba'ath Party to align with the regime's requirements and challenges. These elections came after years of implementing new Internal Regulations, modifying the mechanism for selecting the party's candidates in the 2020 legislative elections, and establishing an election committee in preparation for the conference.
• The number seats on the Central Committee increased to 125 from 80, with General Secretary Bashar al-Assad appointing 45 members. The members invited by Assad competed against those elected from the branches. As a result, only 49 members from the branches gained seats on the Central Committee, compared to 18 invited members and 13 members from the Ba'ath Party bloc in Parliament. Additionally, Bashar al-Assad directly appointed 45 more
• Based on a comprehensive analysis of the Central Committee members, it was determined that 22 of them served on the previous committee, 77 are employed by state institutions, and there are also members from the militaryindividuals linked to militias and security and military networks, some of whom are under sanctions.
• The provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and Homs dominated as a place of origin for Central Committee members, comprisingwere elected to the Central Committee, 11 of whom were directly appointed by Bashar Al-Assad.
• The committee included 68 Sunnis, 40 Alawites, 10 Christians, 5 Druze, and 2 Ismailis. This sectarian distribution reflects the demographic makeup of the country to some extent but also shows deviations, particularly with the significant representation of Alawites, who constitute the core of the ruling elite.
• The elections resulted in an entirely new central leadership, consisting of 14 members plus Bashar al-Assad, including 13 members who work in state institutions, among whom 3 hold high-level government positions as Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, 3 military personnel, and 3 sanctioned individuals.
• The election results generally revealed that the party leadership engaged in misleading tactics and manipulated the branch representation percentages and results, marginalizing some popular cadres at the branch level by conducting the elections as a single electoral district to create a mechanism for central control.
• The elections, its details, and the dynamics of Bashar al-Assad's intervention suggest a re-engineering of power centers within the party and the regime's philosophy regarding the form of political power (Ba'ath) and its ability to overcome stagnation and dominate the new scene, regardless of any political context.
• This restructuring indicates an effort to integrate high-ranking state officials into the party's central decision-making body, ensuring close alignment between the state's executive functions and the party's leadership.

For More: https://bit.ly/3MuUZgx

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key political, security, and economic events in Syria during the month of July 2024, examining developments across various levels.

• Politically, the normalization process with the Assad regime advanced with Italy appointing an ambassador to Damascus. Additionally, seven countries submitted a "non-paper" to the European Union, urging it to abandon the Three No’s policy. The regime also expressed its readiness to establish a new relationship with Turkey.
• Security, instability continues to rise across Syria. In the northwest, protests escalated into violence and direct confrontations with Turkish forces, while the region witnessed the largest drone attack by regime forces against civilian targets in rural Aleppo and Idlib in 2024. In eastern Syria, the international coalition is strengthening its positions as Iran-backed militias increase their attacks.
• Economically, exports through the Nasib border crossing continued to decline, and the regime's economic policies have led to increased capital flight and a higher cost of living. The Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria (AANES) implemented economic policies that negatively impacted the agricultural sector.

Impact of Regional and International Normalization on Local Actors

Amid the ongoing normalization and restoration of relations with Bashar al-Assad, Italy announced the return of its diplomatic mission and the appointment of an ambassador in Damascus. This move coincided with efforts by Italy and six other EU member states to abandon the Three No’s policy that shapes the EU's stance on the Syrian issue. Meanwhile, the Syrian Regime’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement welcoming Turkey's calls to restore relations with Damascus, expressing readiness to establish a new relationship with Turkey based on clear principles, including the withdrawal of illegally stationed forces from Syrian territory and the combating of "terrorist groups" that threaten the security of both countries and linking the normalization of relations between the two countries to a return to the pre-2011 status quo.

The statement shows the regime's willingness to begin the normalization process and respond to Turkey's calls, dropping the precondition of Turkish troop withdrawal before the Erdogan-Assad meeting.

The regional and international normalization process with the Assad regime is progressing steadily, despite the differing motivations of the involved countries. These motivations are primarily security-driven or involve experimenting with alternative solutions under the guise of offering incentives to the regime, based on a step-by-step approach to gradually change its behavior. However, the normalization process is unfolding in a way that favors the regime and serves its interests. Bilateral agreements provide the regime with more maneuvering space, as they are tailored to each country's individual interests. Additionally, these agreements help the regime evade political obligations and the implementation of international resolutions, particularly Resolution 2245.

Domestically, the Assad regime held legislative elections for the fourth term since the adoption of the new constitution in 2012, following years of stagnation in the Syrian scene since the cessation of military operations under the de-escalation agreements. These elections come shortly after the Baath Party elections, which showed Assad's efforts to re-engineer power centers within the party and strengthen his absolute control to make it a disciplined political force aligned with Assad's direction and capable of interaction and leadership in any new political landscape. The regime's insistence on holding the elections aims to project an image of resilience and victory despite the conspiracies and international pressures, while also evading political solutions by claiming to strengthen its popular legitimacy through elections. Western countries considered the environment unsuitable for elections, while official opposition bodies called for genuine democratic elections in accordance with international resolutions, representing all segments of the Syrian people, unlike the current parliament. Additionally, popular and media campaigns opposed these superficial elections.

In northeastern Syria, the atmosphere of rapprochement between Turkey and the Assad regime has raised concerns among the AANES, considering it an existential threat and describing the process as a large conspiracy against the Syrian people. The administration realizes that Turkey's policy shift is strategic, not tactical, and that this rapprochement will reduce its available options and present it with difficult challenges, especially as it – if successful – would close the door to any future agreement between the administration and the regime. This explains the statement by Mazloum Abdi, the General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who affirmed that the Syrian crisis cannot be solved through violence and war, emphasizing the administration's readiness to engage in dialogue with all parties, including Turkey, to end the conflict and reach a political solution in Syria. To ease local tensions, the administration issued a general amnesty law in response to demands from the public, tribal leaders, and dignitaries. The amnesty includes hundreds of prisoners who committed crimes of terrorism and other offenses before the law was issued.

Rising Security Tensions: Popular Protests Increase Instability Indicators

In northwestern Syria, protests involved acts of vandalism against public and private property, including the burning of trucks, the removal of Turkish flags, and direct clashes with Turkish forces at several locations. This followed the acts of vandalism and attacks on Syrian refugees that occurred in Kayseri Province, Turkey, and in opposition to renewed talk of political normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime after Turkish officials' statements on rapprochement, which triggered the protests. Additionally, other factors led residents of these areas to express high levels of anger and frustration due to ongoing neglect of good governance issues, widespread corruption, security instability, and imbalanced civil-security relations, along with the lack of clear boundaries for the nature of relations with Turkey. Meanwhile, the Idlib region saw an escalation in military operations between regime forces and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with the regime launching the largest drone attack of 2024 on civilian sites in rural Aleppo and Idlib. HTS continued to carry out infiltration operations against regime forces, the most notable being operations along the Saraqib axis at the beginning of July.

In other areas, the reconciliation model remains characterized by security fragility across different regions. In the town of Kanaker, after the regime imposed a new security reconciliation aimed at enlisting draft dodgers into the army, opponents of the reconciliation attacked a regime headquarters. This reconciliation and the accompanying events come weeks after clashes between regime forces and local militants at the start of the previous month. In Suwayda, the leader of the Mountain Brigade, Marheg al-Jurmani, known for his support of the popular movement in the province and his responsibility for protecting demonstrations there, was assassinated. This assassination is the most significant incident in the province since the start of the popular movement, occurring shortly after the regime brought in security reinforcements to the province. In Daraa, clashes continued between two local groups in the city of Jasim in rural Daraa for over ten days following the assassination of a leader from one of the groups and accusations that the other was behind the attack. In the same province, fighters launched multiple attacks targeting various regime sites in the province, coinciding with roadblocks using burning tires, in response to the kidnapping of a family from the Al-Sanamayn area by a gang affiliated with the 4th Division in rural Homs. The attacks ceased after the family was released.

Meanwhile, 60 people, most of them civilians, were killed in areas controlled by the AANES due to security disturbances, killings, and tribal conflicts, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Additionally, ISIS operations continued in areas under the AANES influence, with 21 different security incidents involving shootings, killings with sharp objects, and planting explosive devices and landmines, resulting in six deaths. Meanwhile, the American base in the Koniko gas plant in rural Deir Ezzor was hit by rockets fired by Iranian backed-militias. American planes responded by targeting the surroundings of the seven villages in areas under the control of pro-Iranian militias in rural Deir Ezzor with heavy machine guns. New military reinforcements arrived for coalition forces in the area, including a short-range air defense system called Avenger. The international coalition has also begun constructing observation towers along the Euphrates River in eastern rural Deir Ezzor to monitor the area and control the security situation amid an increase in tribal attacks from the opposite bank on SDF positions and concerns of an Iranian escalation against the U.S. presence in the region.

Syrian Economy in a Vortex of Crises: Declining Exports and Increasing Living Costs

Syrian exports of vegetables and fruits to Jordan through the Nasib border crossing continued to decline significantly during July 2024 due to Jordan's restrictions on truck entry, following repeated incidents where the regime used trucks to smuggle drugs. This forced Jordan to upgrade the border infrastructure, modernize its equipment, and impose strict conditions on trucks coming from Syria. These measures result in significant losses for Syrian farmers and traders due to the spoilage of goods during the long wait at the border. These actions also negatively affect Syrian exports abroad, impacting foreign currency earnings and potentially straining relations with Jordan if drug smuggling into its territory and through it to the Gulf countries continues.

Regarding the ongoing economic stagnation in Syria and the regime's continued inability to develop the investment environment, figures indicate a 44% decrease in the number of registered companies in Syria during the first quarter of this year compared to the same period last year, along with continued capital flight due to worsening economic challenges. The number of registered traders in the Damascus Chamber of Commerce also dropped from 9,890 to 8,200 traders within one year, down from 17,000 traders before mandatory registration in social security. This decline is attributed to the rising costs of business, particularly energy costs and imposed taxes, difficulties in securing essential business supplies due to their high prices, declining competitiveness of Syrian products, and the lack of incentives and facilities offered by the government. These factors have driven many businesses to relocate to other countries.

Regarding the cost of living in regime-controlled areas, the cost of living for a family of five exceeded 13 million SYP in early July, according to the Qasioun Newspaper Index, while the minimum cost of living reached about 8.1 million SYP. Meanwhile, the minimum monthly wage was only about 278,000 SYP, which covers just 2.2% of the average cost of living in the first three months of 2024 and 2.1% in the following three months. This gap between low wages and high living costs exacerbates poverty and increases the number of people in need, further weakening the purchasing power of citizens, deepening the economic recession, and potentially leading to psychological effects on Syrian families, increasing social tensions, and worsening the humanitarian crisis.In the context of shortages of essential services such as gas and electricity, the waiting time for receiving a gas cylinder reached 85 days in Damascus and 100 days in Homs. This has led to a rise in prices on the black market, ranging from 250,000 to 300,000 SYP, adding to the living burden on residents, reducing their ability to meet basic needs, and increasing public dissatisfaction with government policies. Additionally, the growing reliance on the black market to obtain gas and other services contributes to further economic deterioration.

Regarding economic agreements with the regime's allies, the Syrian Battery and Liquid Gas Company in Aleppo signed a partnership memorandum of understanding with the Russian company Bogra Construction, committing the Russian company to supply, install, and equip a complete factory for the company. Despite a previously signed contract between the Syrian company and the Iranian company Tavan worth $41 million, the lack of progress under the contract indicates the fragility of Iranian investments in Syria and the competition from Russian investors in sectors entered by Iran. Reflecting the improvement in relations with Arab countries, the first Syrian Airlines flight arrived in Saudi Arabia after a year of the kingdom's approval to resume flights between the two countries. This move could open more avenues for cooperation between the two countries, positively impacting the regime's financial resources and encouraging other countries to resume air travel with Syria.

In northeastern Syria, the AANES decided to deprive summer vegetable farmers of their diesel fuel allocations, forcing farmers to buy it on the black market at high prices, which increased production costs and led to a 30% rise in local vegetable prices compared to previous years. These decisions are likely to reduce farmers' profit margins and their ability to continue farming. The lack of support could drive them to rely on the black market and pass on the increased costs to the prices of vegetables and fruits, adding to the financial burden on consumers and increasing poverty and deprivation among the population. This decision highlights the confusion in the administration's economic policies regarding planning and support for the agricultural sector, despite their adoption of socialist visions for regional management. In the same context, the quantity of wheat received this season in AANES areas has halved compared to the previous year due to the low purchase price set and farmers' reluctance to deliver their crops. The administration received only 766,000 tons of wheat, while expectations were around 1.5 million tons. The challenges facing farmers in Al-Hasakah have increased due to the lack of support and low local prices compared to the costs borne by farmers, forcing them to buy medicines and fertilizers in dollars on the black market, increasing costs and leading to a loss in the summer season. The decline in wheat received directly affects food security in the region. Farmers' reluctance to deliver their crops results in a growing trust gap between farmers and the "Autonomous Administration," reflecting the inefficiency of the administration's agricultural policies and its inability to meet farmers' needs.

In northern and eastern rural Aleppo, Syrian trucks resumed operations, transporting goods from border crossings with Turkey to northern Syria after a nearly complete halt lasting four years. Turkish trucks had stopped entering northern Syria due to the anger and protests in Syrian cities following the violence against Syrian refugees in Kayseri Province. The resumption of this activity is expected to create job opportunities for more than 700 Syrian truck drivers and around 500 workers in the region, helping to stimulate the local economy, reduce unemployment, and improve living conditions.

Summary

A new travel agency with offices in Damascus and Dubai recently announced direct flights from Damascus to European cities for the first time in over a decade. Our research reveals that the agency and its Greece-based “exclusive” partner airline are associated with drug kingpin Mahmoud Abdulilah al-Dj(1) who has been sentenced to death in Libya for drug trafficking. Al-Dj is also the exclusive agent of US-sanctioned Cham Wings in Libya, which has been accused of “[laundering] money throughout the region” and “[moving] weapons and equipment for the Syrian regime.” We’re concerned that the Greek airline, Air Mediterranean, could wittingly or unwittingly be doing the same. Air Mediterranean might havealso engaged in the unsafe aviation practice of switching a transponder off during a flight.

Recommendations

• In compliance with existing sanctions regulations, the EU, US, and other Western countries should sanction al-Dj and his affiliated persons and companies, such as his brother Abdulfattah and FreeBird Travel and Tourism.
• Due to Air Mediterranean’s connections to drug kingpin Mahmoud al-Dj and the Syrian regime, and its potentially unsafe aviation practices, the European Union (EU) should consider blocking the airline from operating in EU airports until an investigation is completed and, in accordance with EU regulations, threaten it with sanctions if it continues its affiliation with al-Dj.
• Western governments should coordinate with Emirati authorities to investigate FreeBird’s operations in Dubai.
• Western governments should coordinate with authorities in Eastern Libya to halt Air Mediterranean and Cham Wings flights to Benghazi.
• The report highlights the need for enhanced monitoring of the activities of drug kingpins and the affiliates of the Assad regime.

SECTION 1: “Hello, Europe – We Are Back”

On 5 March 2023, news began circulating about direct flights between Damascus and European countries, which has not happened in over a decade following the Syrian uprising. AFacebook post from a company called FreeBird Tourism and Travel (FreeBird) invited readers to guess which new destinations in Europe the company was about to announce.

The next day, FreeBird proclaimed in a new Facebookpost, “Hello, Europe—We are back.” In that same post, FreeBird named itself “the exclusive agent of Greek [airline] Air Mediterranean.” The post did not mention whether FreeBird is the exclusive Air Mediterranean (AirMed) agent in Syria alone or the exclusive agent for Air Mediterranean overall.

The response was generally shocked but positive, with over 150 comments on the post. A few people asked why someone in Europe would call a Syrian phone number to book a flight from Europe, but for the most part people seemed excited.

On 9 March, FreeBirdannounced that the first plane from Athens to Damascus had landed.

The “Contact Us” page on FreeBird’s website lists two branch offices, one in Athens and another in Dubai. While the physical office in Dubai is operational, our research showed no evidence of a FreeBird branch in Athens.

Photos (1&2): The Dubai branch of FreeBird Tourism and Travel

SECTION 2: FreeBird Travel’s Owner and His Link to Narcotics: Does He Also Ultimately Own Air Mediterranean?

2.1 FreeBird Travel and Tourism

According to itsFacebook page, FreeBird Travel and Tourism is a Syrian company based in the Free Zone in Damascus with one branchin Dubai.(2) It claims to be a Licensed General Sales Agent for AirMed, described as a Greek carrier. Because of strict business secrecy laws in the Free Zone of Damascus, we could not access the incorporation documents.

Photo (3): FreeBird Travel and Tourism Logo.

Source: Facebook Page “FreeBird Travel Agency Int.” profile picture

FreeBird maintains three Facebook pages:

• FreeBird Travel Agency Int.
• Freebird Dubai
• Freebird (FreeBird - Damascus) [the part in parentheses has been added since we began this report, as well as the address for a Damascus office]

The company’s booking website suggests that FreeBird’s work is limited solely to cooperation with AirMed. Flights are routed from Damascus to Athens and then on to 11 European cities, at least according to the Facebook page (from a graphic in one post). But the booking site lists only three European destinations from Damascus—Düsseldorf, Stockholm, and Athens itself—plus what appears to be an upcoming addition of a flight between Athens and Erbil, Iraq (site accessed 24 August 2023)⁽³⁾⁽⁴⁾

Our open-source research revealed that FreeBird is owned by Mahmoud Abdulilah al-Dj. His Facebook work page list includes FreeBird, AirMed, and Cham Wings, a Syrian air carrier currently underUS sanctions andsanctioned by the EU from December 2021 to 18 July 2022.

The US sanctions on Cham Wings were imposed because the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control claimed that Cham Wings continues to have ties to the country’s already sanctioned national carrier, Syrian Air (RB, Damascus), as well as the Syrian government at large. Cham Wings was further accused by the US Treasury of “[laundering] money throughout the region” and “[moving] weapons and equipment for the Syrian regime.”

EU sanctions on Cham Wings were lifted on 18 July 2022. They had initially been imposed in December 2021 because the EU had accused Cham Wings “of flying people to Belarus so they could then illegally cross the EU’s external borders in what flared up into a migration and humanitarian crisis.”

FreeBird is part of a commercial group called “ALDJ GROUP,” which is owned by Mahmoud Abdulilah al-Dj (Chairman of the Board of Directors). According to hisFacebook page, he has been the General Manager of FreeBird in Damascus, Dubai, and Athens since 2017, although we found no public evidence of the company’s activity in Syria before 2023.

But there may be more of a connection between al-Dj, FreeBird, and AirMed than a simple booking arrangement.

2.2 ALDJ Group

FreeBird commenced its activities in Syria in conjunction with the start of AirMed’s flights between Athens and Damascus on 8 March 2023. Additionally, on 22 June 2023, an obscure Facebook page called Watani Press published apost about a launch party of FreeBird that revealed key leads into the person behind the venture:

• FreeBird Travel and Tourism was introduced as an airline rather than a travel agency.
• A photo of the inauguration (below) showed a singer with ALDJ Group’s logo in the background.
• The post states that the launch was attended by representatives from “the embassies of Greece, the Czech Republic, Serbia, and Romania.”

Photo (4): ALDJ Launch Party for FreeBird.

Source: “وطني برس” (“Watani Press”) Facebook Page post 22 June 2023

As mentioned earlier, Mahmoud al-Dj states on his Facebook page that he is also theexclusive travel agent for Cham Wings in Libya (sometimes referred to as Sham or Al-Sham Wings). The promotionalphoto for ALDJ Group, published 20 February 2023, contains a Cham Wings plane and an AirMed plane, suggesting continuous relations between FreeBird and Cham Wings (although Cham Wings flights cannot be booked on the FreeBird website).

Tracking ALDJ Group online confirmed it is owned by Mahmoud Al-Dj. We also found a promotional header that appears to showcase all of ALDJ’s holdings or subsidiaries. Among them is AirMed

Photo (5): Promotional image for ALDJ Group. Note the Air Mediterranean logo on the plane on the left,

the Cham Wings logo on the plane in the center, and the FreeBird

logo atop the mountain peak just to the right of the Cham Wings plane.

Logos for other holdings are also visible in the image.

[Source: ALDJ Group Facebook post 20 February 2023]

• Works at Member and Businessman at the Arab League 8 June 2023–present;
• Owns Nasmet Sham Restaurant & Park on Airport Road, 8 June 2019–present;
• Exclusive Agent for Air Mediterranean, 8 June 2018–present;
• Director General of al-Tayr al-Hor (FreeBird) in Damascus, Dubai, and Athens 8 June 2017–Present;
• Chairman of ALDJ Commercial Holding Group, 8 June 2017–present;
• Exclusive Agent for Cham Wings in Libya, 8 April 2017–present.

Photo(6): The Work listing from Mahmoud Abdulilah al-Dj’s Facebook profile. English translation:

Source: “محمود عبد الاله الدج” (Google Translate: “Mahmoud Abdel-Ilah Al-Daj”) Facebook page, About: Work and Education, accessed 4 September 2023.

Of note in al-Dj’s work listing on his Facebook profile is that he lists himself as the exclusive agent for AirMed. yet lists himself as the exclusive agent in Libya for Cham Wings. This suggests that he considers himself the exclusive agent for AirMed everywhere. The fact that AirMed passenger flights cannot be booked on the airline’s website, but only through FreeBird, suggests the latter is indeed the exclusive AirMed agent everywhere.

2.3 Who is Mahmoud al-Dj?

Mahmoud al-Dj first appeared publicly in August 2013. Syrian state TV published aninterview with him after his arrest on charges of transferring money abroad without a license andfinancing terrorism through the al-Tayr “company” (more below). No information has been released about the time al-Dj spent in detention, if arrested at all, or whether he was tried for the crime in the first place. Al-Dj disappeared from public view until 2018.

Photo(7): Image from Mahmoud al-Dj’s interview on Syrian state television.

Source: Screenshot from a video of the interview

According to various sources, al-Dj is linked to drug trafficking, including hashish and captagon. He has been allegedly linked to a gang that receives smuggled narcotics for distribution; that gang was part of a notable drug seizure in 2018. However, the latest round of sanctions from the US, UK, and EU targeting individuals involved in producing and smuggling narcotics did not include al-Dj.

Areport by The New Arab from 2021 included a document obtained from a court case in Benghazi related to the “Noka shipment.” The Noka, as outlined in a subsequent OCCRP research report,  is a cargo ship that, in December 2018, set off from the port of Latakia destined for eastern Libya, but was seized by the Greek authorities before reaching its destination. It was loaded with large quantities of drugs. Detailed in the Libyan sentencing document was that al-Tayr International Trading, a company owned by al-Dj headquartered in Latakia, had rented a warehouse to receive the cargo and store the narcotics.

Photo (8): A copy of the Benghazi court decision

Source: Article from The New Arab, (in Arabic, Google Translate

“Syrian drugs...smuggled to Libya through the “al-Tayr network”) published 28 June 2021 

The court document details the operations of a gang allegedly led by “Mahmud Abdulilah Dajj,” a Syrian Libyan. On 21 July 2019, the Benghazi Court of Appeals handed down a verdict accusing al-Dj and his aides of involvement in the Noka shipment, as well as three other shipments seized in Libya: one in the Al Khums port near Tripoli in western Libya, one in Benghazi, and another in Tobruk in eastern Libya. The Benghazi court sentenced al-Dj, in absentia, to death by firing squad. Should al-Dj ever be caught on Libyan soil again, that sentence will be carried out.

Photo (9): Mahmoud al-Dj.

Source: “محمود عبد الاله الدج” (Google Translate: “Mahmoud Abdel-Ilah Al-Daj”)

Facebook page profile picture post 21 February 2022

In addition to his Syrian passport, Mahmoud al-Dj holds another passport, issued by Libyan authorities in the city of Misrata, which makes his Libya-Syria operations easier.

Also of note, Abdulfattah al-Dj works with his brother Mahmoud al-Dj at the FreeBird Company in Damascus (according to hisFacebook profile).

Photo (10): Abdulfattah al-Dj

Source: Facebook profile photo from “عبد الفتاح دج” (Google Translate “Abdel Fattah Dj”) posted 30 March 2021

SECTION 3: Air Mediterranean: Background and Operations

On its face, AirMed is owned by non-Syrian businessmen, but this report highlights its strong connections to al-Dj and perhaps to the Assad regime.

3.1 Background

Air Mediterranean is a small carrier operating from Eleftherios Venizelos International Airport in Athens, Greece (IATA: ATH). Incorporated in 2015, itbegan commercial flights in November 2017 to six destinations: London, Stockholm, Khartoum (Sudan), Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), Casablanca (Morocco), and Baghdad (Iraq). But less than three months later it suspended all flights, due to a disagreement between two of the shareholders(5) Grounded on 18 January 2018, AirMed thenannounced in February of the same year that it would cease all commercial flights and instead focus on charter operations⁽⁶⁾ 

AirMed’s various social media accounts went silent shortly thereafter. Its last Twitter/X post was on 6 November 2018 (though there was a like on apost from 4 Feb 2019), its last Instagram post was on 9 January 2019, and its last Facebook post on 25 December 2020. Given the internal dispute and then the decision to switch to charter operations alone, the lack of online presence is not surprising.

The reappearance of AirMed came in March 2023, when the Greek City Timesreported that “Greece’s Air Mediterranean will inaugurate the first flight from Europe to Syria in 11 years when one of their vessels lands at Damascus International Airport from Athens on March 9.”

In June 2023, The New Arabreported the first flights to Damascus from Düsseldorf and then from Stockholm, both via Athens. AirMed’s first flight between Düsseldorf Airport and Damascus International Airport (via Athens) took place on24 June 2023. Its first flight between Damascus and Stockholm’s Arlanda Airport (via Athens) was on29 June 2023.

The company’s ownership has changed over time, but it has always included Andreas and Fanti Ilias Hallaq⁽⁷⁾ More recently they have included their mother, Nanta, in the company. As of 28 August 2023, the listed administration on the company’spage at the Union of Hellenic Chambers of Commerce website (in Greek, English button available at the top right) are:

Photo (11): Screenshot of AirMed Administrative officers.

Source:https://bit.ly/480wVf9, accessed 28 August 2023

There are two reasons we make the assumption that at least the Hallaq brothers know what they’re doing and who they’re dealing with:

• ALDJ Group publicly introduces AirMed as an official part of their holdings.
• There is evidence that the Hallaq family has at least some access to the Assad regime (from the photo of George Hallaq, Andreas and Fanti’s father, with Syria’s Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Minister Faisal al-Mikdad, shown at the end of Section 4).

AirMed’s website currently indicates it offers commercial, cargo, and charter services. However, individual bookings for AirMed commercial flights can be booked only through FreeBird, further highlighting that al-Dj’s claim to be the exclusive agent of AirMed everywhere is correct. AirMed’s own website is outdated and has no direct booking option.

AirMed also appears to have done a number of “wet leases”⁽⁸⁾  to other airlines in the very few months it has been operating commercially, most recently for TunisAir (IATA: TU, national carrier of Tunisia) and AirSerbia (IATA: JU, national carrier).

3.2 Current Operations

An open-source history search on aviation tracking sites FlightAware andFlightRadar24 revealed that AirMed is currently operating flights to and from Athens, Benghazi, Damascus, Düsseldorf, and Stockholm, in addition to Prague in the Czech Republic, Craiova in Romania, Forli in Italy, and Zakynthos and Kefalonia in Greece.

Even though commercial flights have been announced and have taken place, AirMed’s website is still outdated and vague. Under theDestinations page, only Greece and Cyprus are listed as active airports, with “Coming Soon” marked for Israel, Denmark, Germany, and France. There is no mention of Damascus being or becoming a destination, nor are Libya or Sweden mentioned.

As AirMed, their one active plane (registered SX-MAT, See Appendix 1) has flown directly from Damascus (IATA: DAM) 52 times from 30 April 2023 to 28 August 2023, to just three cities:

• Athens (IATA: ATH) - 31
• Benghazi (IATA: BEN) - 16 (none since 28 July)
• Dubai (IATA: DWC) - 5 (none since 28 July)

SECTION 4: Should AirMed and FreeBird operations be halted?

The following facts suggest that the relationship between AirMed and al-Dj’s FreeBird is exclusive; they also suggest the two companies might be, in effect, one entity with al-Dj being the ultimate beneficiary.

1. AirMed’s commercial flights cannot be booked on any other site, including their own—only FreeBird’s.
2. FreeBird’s launch party introduced it as an airline, not a travel agency.
3. AirMed is listed along with FreeBird on ALDJ’s holdings promotion.
4. Mahmoud al-Dj introduces himself on his Facebook page as the exclusive agent for AirMed—not as the exclusive agent for Syria, as he did “for Libya” in his Cham Wings listing.

Given Mahmoud al-Dj’s background, running commercial flights into Europe and Libya poses multiple risks. Destination countries face a new potential narcotics supply route. Furthermore, pilots and flight attendants could face arrest if authorities discover contraband on flights—items the employees knew nothing about. Passengers as well could face security scrutiny.

The operation of a new airline between Damascus and eastern Libya is particularly risky. AirMed might engage in activities similar to Cham Wings, which the US Treasury accuses of providing material assistance to the Syrian regime and transporting weapons and fighters between the two destinations. The fact that al-Dj is the exclusive agent of Cham Wings in Libya increases the likelihood that his new partnership with AirMed may engage in similar activities.

Tracking the flights between Syria and Libya has also highlighted some safety concerns. On 31 May 2023, SX-MAT, one of AirMed’s planes, took off from Damascus at 9:16 am local time and landed in Benghazi at 11:20 am local time. It then took off from El Beida International Airport (also spelled Al-Bayda, IATA: LAQ) at 3:22 pm local time and landed in Damascus at 4:22 pm local time. However, there is no flight listed between Benghazi and El Beida, which lie 120 miles apart and in the same time zone. How did SX-MAT get to El Beida without showing up on radar?

Photo (12): The odd flight between Damascus and El Beida, Libya on 31 May 2023.

[Source: Screenshot from FlightRadar24 (seeing it from the link above will require a Gold subscription, as it’s more than 90 days back from the publishing of this report) showing the gap between landing at Benghazi and taking off at El Beida. In the column headers:  STD=the stated time of departure, ATD=the actual time of departure, STA=the stated time of arrival.]

The airplane might have flown from Benghazi to El Beida with its transponder off. Flying with the transponder off can pose safety risks as it makes the aircraft less visible to air traffic control and other aircraft equipped with collision avoidance systems. The transponder provides vital information about the aircraft, such as its position, airspeed, and altitude, which is crucial for air traffic controllers to ensure safe separation between aircraft. However, this research could not preclude the possibility that the tracking site failed to capture the flight due to a technical error.

It is not clear whether the official owners of AirMed have a direct connection to the Syrian regime. Andreas and Fanti Hallaq’s father, George, has no public-facing connection to AirMed, though he has been seen and identified in photos with his sons for AirMed promotions. George is known in Greek press circles as arepresentative of the Lebanese investment in the company (the linked article actually describes George Hallaq as the shareholder in dispute with another shareholder who later sold out to the Hallaqs).

However, he does have access to the Assad regime through another channel. On 11 June 2021, the Syrian official news agencySANA reported George Hallaq’s visit to Syria in his capacity as Assistant to the President of theCooperative Republic of Guyana, as Guyana’s Minister of Southern Europe (other news articles specify Greece), the Middle East and Africa, and as Special Envoy of the President. Hallaq met with Faisal Al-Miqdad, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. The two sides agreed to coordinate and consult on various issues of bilateral cooperation between the two countries and in international forums.

The earliest activity of George Hallaq as an official envoy of the President of Guyana dates back to 2006, according to what’s available from open sources. We could not find information on how Mr. Hallaq came to this position nor if he holds Guyanian citizenship.

Photo (13): George Hallaq with Faisal Al-Miqdad.

Source: Syrian Arab News Agency article (in Arabic–Google Translate “Mekdad is discussing with the Special Envoy of the President of Guyana bilateral relations and means of enhancing them,” published 11 June 2021, accessed 28 August 2023

Appendix 1: Air Mediterranean’s Fleet

Air Med is recorded as having three planes in its fleet, tail registrations SX-MAH, SX-MAM, and SX-MAT (Itsinitial registration with the Hellenic Chambers of Commerce indicates only two planes; SX-MAH appears to have been acquired later).

SX-MAH

According to FlightRadar24, SX-MAH is a Boeing 737-405 operated by Air Med, Type Code B734, Mode S 46B428, Serial No. (MSN) 24643, Age (May 1990) 33 years. It has no flight history for the past five months (from 30 April 2023).

SX-MAM

According to FlightRadar24, SX-MAM is a Boeing 737-405 operated by Air Med, Type Code B734, Mode S 46B42D, Serial No. (MSN) 28097, Age (Jul 1997) 26 years. It has made only one flight in the past five months, from Barcelona to Tel Aviv as Bluebird Airways (Greece). SX-MAM was also subleased at least once during January 2020–October 2021 to Felix Airways(Yemen).

Planespotters.net corrects the aircraft type to a Boeing 737-446, and adds that SX-MAM was leased from Air Med from June to October 2021 by Felix Airways, headquartered in Yemen. Felix Airways had also leased the plane once before from Air Med, from 12 October 2020 to 12 April 2021. But their website is dark now—they appear to have gone out of business.

SX-MAT

From FlightRadar24: SX-MAT is a Boeing 737-446 operated by Air Med, Type Code B734, Mode S 46B434, Serial Number (MSN) 28831, Age (Jul 1997) 26 years. Planespotters.net adds that it was delivered to Air Med on 1 November 2022 after being “not taken up” by Greece’s Aeolian Airlines.

Of AirMed’s fleet, only SX-MAT has any flight history at all since 30 April 2023 (SX-MAM had active flights until 14 April 2023, but none since), and in that time the plane has operated, probably under wet lease conditions, for other carriers as well as for Air Med:

• Air Mediterranean
• LEAV Aviation (a German regional airline)
• Sunclass Airlines (a Danish charter service)
• Smartwings (the largest carrier in the Czech Republic)
• AirSerbia (Serbia’s national carrier)
• TunisAir (Tunisia’s national carrier)

Appendix 2: Air Mediterranean Current Administration

Andreas “Andrew” Hallaq (ΧΑΛΛΑΚ ΑΝΔΡΕΑΣ | أندرياس حلاق) was listed as Director of Air Mediterranean on the carrier’s website in a Press Release dated 17 January 2017; he was also defined as the Director in an article by Times Aerospace around the same time. Per an announcement filed 4 July 2022 with the Hellenic Chambers of Commerce, he is now listed as a member of the Board of Directors, continuing as of 28 August 2023.

He is the son of Georgios (George) and Nada (Nadia, Nanta) Hallaq, born 1984 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is self-employed and a resident of Kuwait and temporary resident of Greece. The Hellenic Chambers of Commerce site lists him as “a foreign resident of Greek citizenship.”

Fanti Ilias Hallaq (ΧΑΛΛΑΚ ΦΑΝΤΙ ΗΛΙΑΣ | فادي الياس حلاق) was listed as CEO of Air Mediterranean on the carrier’s website—Press Release dated 6 December 2016.Per an announcement filed 4 July 2022 with the Hellenic Chambers of Commerce, he is now listed as a member of the Board of Directors, continuing as of 28 August 2023.

He is the son of Georgios and Nadia, born 1980 in Beirut, Lebanon. He is a “businessman” of Greek citizenship residing in Smyrni, Greece (an Athens suburb).

Nada (Nadia, Nanta) Hallaq (ΧΑΛΛΑΚ ΝΑΝΤΑ), mother of Andreas and Fanti, born 1958 in Lebanon and residing in Athens, holds the position ofChairman of the Board of Directors of the company, according to the Greek General Commercial Register as of 04 April 2022. Per an announcement filed 4 July 2022 with the Hellenic Chambers of Commerce, she is still listed as Chairman of the Board, but on the Hellenic Chambers page for Air Med she is listed as the president of the company.

Marios Sambrakos (ΣΑΜΠΡΑΚΟΣ ΜΑΡΙΟΣ), a Greek national, was born 1962 in Athens and resides there. Per an announcement filed 4 July 2022 with the Hellenic Chambers of Commerce, he is listed as a member of the Board of Directors

Dr. Ammar Kahf, Executive Director of the Omran Center for Strategic Studies gave his perspective on unpacks the new US sanctions on the Syrian regime on TRT WORLD channel.

In an interview with AFP,  Ayman al-Dassouky gives his analysis about the lucrative trade business across front lines between Syrian opposition held and regime territory

The crossings generated millions for the forces which contr it by businessmen who trade across them," and It brings mutual benefit to the warring sides who have allied themselves to boost trade..

Source: https://yhoo.it/2M6g54f

With unreliable allies and a lack of experience with local power dynamics, Russia’s influence in Syria is built on fragile foundations

With political control fragmented among local powerbrokers in Syria, Russia’s overreliance on the Assad regime to protect its interests is a strategic threat. Despite current intersecting interests, neither the regime nor its Iranian allies are reliable partners. Competing and conflicting interests may finally come to a head once a political solution begins to take shape and Syria embarks on reconstruction, particularly in light of new regional arrangements.

Belying Vladimir Putin’s claim during his surprise visit to Syria that Russia is pulling back, these factors have in fact driven Russia to work to develop new tools that will enable it to maximize its gains and safeguard its interests in Syria.

Russian strengths and weaknesses

Russia reportedly has seven military bases housing approximately 6,000 individuals in Syria, and an estimated 1,000 Russian military police spread throughout the de-escalation zones and areas recently reclaimed from the opposition as a result of reconciliation agreements. Russia has also entrusted several private security forces with the task of carrying out special missions ostensibly in its war against ISIS and with protecting Russian energy installations and investment projects; these include the paramilitary group, ChVK Vagner, which, according to sources, has around 2,500 individuals on the ground in Syria.

But Russia realizes that it is not strong enough to guarantee its interests in Syria on its own and that it must rely on local partners to do so. Hence, Moscow is making efforts on two separate fronts. One is vertical – aiming to establish lasting influence within state institutions, particularly the military and security apparatus – by investing in influential decision makers, such as General Ali Mamlouk, director of the Baath Party’s National Security Bureau, and General Deeb Zeitoun, head of Syria’s General Intelligence Directorate, two of the most prominent security men.

The other is horizontal in nature. Russia is keen to develop relationships with local powerbrokers directly in order to build inroads with local communities with a view to balancing Iran’s growing influence within Syrian society. These relationships could be used as leverage to sway political negotiations towards Russian interests, while also recruiting them as local partners and guarantors for Russian investments.

Reaching out

The Russian Reconciliation Centre for Syria at Hmeimim Airbase plays a key role in communications with local powerbrokers; however, the communication mechanism and those responsible for it vary according to who controls the relevant areas. In coordination with the National Security Bureau, Russia has been able to engage with local powerbrokers in regime-controlled areas, including various political parties, local dignitaries and religious and tribal leaders, through Reconciliation Centre staff. It has also been able to communicate with the Kurds via military and security channels like Hmeimim Airbase and the Russian Ministry of Defence or via political channels managed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with Hmeimim.

But Russia faces a dilemma communicating with local powerbrokers in opposition controlled areas and dealing with the influence of multiple regional actors. To overcome those challenges, it has employed several mechanisms to communicate with these groups in an attempt to co-opt them, using important political figures such as Ahmad Jarba to communicate with local leadership in besieged areas like Homs and Eastern Ghouta, and resorting to local reconciliation committees (primarily made up of local dignitaries and technocrats associated with the regime) that possess their own communication channels that can be used to communicate with the local opposition, as was the case in Al-Tel shortly before the Free Syrian Army’s withdrawal.

According to an activist from northern Homs, Russia is also very much dependent on cadres of Chechen Muslim military police, fluent in Arabic, to communicate with local leaderships. In addition, Moscow has used Track II diplomacy to network with local powerbrokers and open up back channels through relationships with regional powers.

Russia has so far employed the ‘carrot and stick’ model when communicating with local powerbrokers to ensure its influence, offering up benefits like security protection and financing, while guaranteeing them a place at the negotiating table and a share of reconstruction revenue. But based on past form, more heavy-handed measures to pressure local powerbrokers, such as making them targets of future military operations or playing on local rivals to marginalize or giving preference to one group over another in a political solution and reconstruction arrangements, remain on the table.

Enduring challenges

Although it has made strides stabilizing its military presence and legitimizing its security arm in Syria, Russia still faces challenges generating leverage within state institutions and Syrian society where Iran opposes Russia's efforts. The regime’s many centres of power, reliance on militias and weak institutions limit Russia’s efforts to consolidate its influence in the rest of Syria. Similarly, Moscow is finding it difficult to communicate with Syria’s many powerbrokers and differentiate between their demands, references and allegiances to other regional powers – making Russia’s strategic pillars in Syria all the more fragile.

Published in Chatham house, 13 Dec.2017,

This article aims to provide a set of recommendations to the Syrian opposition’s decision makers about how to deal with the leaked images of war crimes committed by the Syrian regime in its prisons. They should take into consideration that they should take a series of steps to establish a committee of international forensic experts and diplomats to present the file to the International Criminal Court.

At the start of Geneva II talks between the Syrian regime, the Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNC-ROF) and other Syrian opposition members, a significant number of photographs were released.  These photographs display deceased Syrians bearing the marks of systematic torture and killing; all seem to be detainees held in Bashar al-Assad’s regime prisons. Three former international prosecutors confirmed that the Syrian regime has systematically killed and tortured around 11,000 detainees. They released their report after they examined some 55,000 pictures smuggled out of Syria by a former military police photographer known by the alias “Caesar”; “Caesar’s testimony played a key role in verifying the contents of the photographs.

The report along with the leaked photos came into the public sphere after a long process, professionally orchestrated by International Criminal Law experts. The Syrian National Current (Attayar Alwatani Alsouri), one of the main SNC-ROF parties, sponsored “Caesar” and his valuable material. Financial and technical assistance from the State of Qatar made the legal examination and the evidential authentication process possible, thus bringing into effect the presentation of a final report to the three former international prosecutors.   

The process of revealing such strong evidence of war crimes and human rights violations committed by Bashar Al Assad’s regime reached a climax on 7 August 2014 when “Caesar” delivered his in person testimony to a congressional committee. “Caesar” revealed previously unreleased photographs to US lawmakers showing prisoners who were brutally beaten, starved and murdered. The hearing also included expert testimonies delivered by: International War Crimes scholar Dr. Cherif Bassiouni who helped create the International Criminal Court, International War Crimes prosecutor David Crane, and Frederic Hof, a former State Department senior official dealing with Syria.

Caesar’s photos gave US lawmakers a rare glimpse into the human tragedy resulting from the Assad regime’s practices. Violence in Syria throughout the duration of the ongoing conflict has claimed more than 170,000 lives. Caesar’s testimony comes at a time when some in the Obama administration are advocating "a de facto alliance" with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to fight ISIS extremists. In response, Frederic Hof, former special adviser for transition in Syria at the US Department of State, recently wrote, "Those who counsel cooperation with Assad should think things through very, very carefully with their own reputations in mind”. Hof told members of the committee hosting the hearing that the photos should compel the Obama administration not to work with the Assad regime, noting that “this briefing eliminates the moral admissibility of any collaboration with the Assad regime,” adding that the only other plausible option was to drastically increase American support to the Free Syrian Army.

Regardless of the hearing’s significance and its essential role in advancing the struggle against Assad’s regime, we must take further steps to increase the possibility that Bashar Al Assad, his inner circle of accomplices, and other implicated actors are held accountable for their crimes. The following are three recommendations to reach the best possible outcomes:

1- Establish a committee of legal, diplomatic, and other relevant experts to present available evidence implicating those responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity or human rights violations in Syria to the Committee against Torture (CAT) in Geneva, and recommend the Committee take more concrete actions about such crimes. Also, coordinate the same effort with the International Commission of Inquiry formed by the Human Rights Council.

2- Coordinate with The Friends of Syria to draft a resolution at the Human Rights Council’s upcoming September 2014 session a that pushes for a strong condemnatory language with a clear recommendation to the United Nations’ General Assembly (in line with the HRC mandate) to hold the perpetrators of these crimes accountable and to put an end to impunity.

3- Increase media and diplomatic pressures recommending that the United Nations General Assembly should pursue with all available and possible means either: a) referring the file of any and all war crimes, gross human rights violations, and crimes against humanity in Syria to the ICC; or, b) establishing a special tribunal for Syria (similar to the ones formed for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) to deal with all cases of such violations. The next United Nations General Assembly meeting begins September 16, 2014.