Following its “defeat” in 2019, the Islamic State (ISIS) adapted in response to both the new scope of its capabilities and the intensified determination of its adversaries. by transitioning from consolidation of power and territorial dominance under a centralized leadership, to a decentralized strategy, relying on autonomous cells and rapid, agile operations. These operations vary in their intensity, patterns, and frequency, depending on the geographic regions and the nature of the forces in control. Operations for which ISIS officially claimed responsibility coincided with other ambiguous operations carried out under its name without an official claim of responsibility. The latter operations targeted both civilian and military individuals and groups through kidnappings and killings.

Although various areas of control have witnessed this type of ambiguous operations, the Syrian desert represented the main stage for it. The period between the 2019 and 2024 saw an increase in operations targeting civilian groups from Arab tribes, especially in the southern desert of Aleppo, which is connected to the desert of Hama, the desert of Homs, as well as the deserts of Al-Rusafa in Al-Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor. Some of these attacks resulted in mass killings that claimed the lives of hundreds of members of tribes in the region, such as Bani Khalid, Al-Amoor, Al-Dulaim, Al-Boshaban, Al-Hadedeen, Al-Gomlan, and Al-Uqaydat tribes. Furthermore, sporadic attacks targeted individuals and groups of shepherds and their livestock, and truffle hunters, rendering the truffle season in the desert deadly.

Several factors contributed to the ambiguity surrounding these operations, notably: the presence of various controlling forces and militias with divergent interests, including ISIS cells that utilized parts of the desert as sanctuaries for launching rapid assaults. The majority of these mass killings transpired on the main highway networks, which is either controlled by Iranian backed militias or is located within areas of their strategic interest, especially in proximity to various energy resources (such as oil, gas, and phosphate) within the region. Moreover, ISIS did not claim responsibility for most of these operations, and their nature differed from what those that ISIS has previously claimed. in terms of tactics and the nature of the targets. Notably, local tribes have accused other forces of being involved in these attacks, particularly the Iranian-backed militias in the region.

The following map highlights the main areas of control in the Syrian desert, as well as key transportation routes, vital energy fields, and areas that have seen ISIS cell activity, and attacks, massacres, and ambiguous operations carried out in ISIS' name between 2019 and 2024.

and to view the map in high resolution: https://bit.ly/44fzTuI

Access the full study (in Arabic) via the Omran Center here: https://bit.ly/3VmhdXC.

Introduction

The Autonomous Administration of Northeastern Syria, established in 2013, governs a vast swath of Syrian territory, notable for its ethnic, religious, and social diversity. Adopting a federal structure, this administration significantly influences local governance dynamics. This summary reviews a research paper published in Arabic by the Omran Center, titled “الأداء السياسي للإدارة الذاتية منذ عام 2019: دراسة في آليات التحكم والاستحواذ”. The paper aims to explore the political strategies employed by the Autonomous Administration, particularly through its governing bodies: the Syrian Democratic Council and the Syrian Democratic Forces. It assesses the effectiveness of these strategies in light of shifting global interests in Syria, with a special focus on the northeastern region. The analysis, presented in this English summary, includes several critical evaluations:

• Examination of the Autonomous Administration's public communications and political actions to assess their alignment with its stated mission of managing diversity through a federal governance model. This includes scrutinizing official statements, event participations, and the consistency of these actions with the administration's goals of proposing an alternative governance model.
• Analysis of the legal frameworks that define political life under the Autonomous Administration, identifying the extent of influence exerted by the Democratic Union Party on these frameworks. The study explores the proposed social contract and the administration's party law to delineate the legal boundaries of political engagement.
• Evaluation of political freedoms within the Autonomous Administration's territory by examining the operational realities of political parties and movements within the aforementioned legal frameworks, highlighting the discrepancies between theoretical principles and practical application.,
• Investigation of the decision-making mechanisms within the Autonomous Administration, identifying key figures, influential factors, and the Democratic Union Party's strategies for maintaining control over political decisions.
• Articulation of the Autonomous Administration's political philosophy and vision, assessing its position on various issues including Kurdish dialogues, relations with the Syrian regime and international actors, and its standing in the local and international geopolitical landscape following the 2019 ceasefire announcement.
• Future projections for the Autonomous Administration in the context of the ongoing political deadlock and efforts toward territorial consolidation within Syria.

Key Factors in the Autonomous Administration's Political Performance Since 2019

By analyzing significant political statements, declarations, and both local and international meetings that occurred after the ceasefire announcement at the end of 2019 until the end of June 2023, over 120 outputs were observed, including official statements, press releases, and meetings.

These outputs can be analyzed based on three criteria: quantity, content, and targets. In terms of output type, a significant reliance on media statements was noted, indicating active engagement and communication with various media outlets, leveraging media interest during battles with ISIS. International meetings, indicating the vigor of their external relations office and interactions with Syrian components, followed.

Regarding content, the administration’s approach is evident through its intensified discussion on relations with Russia, especially after Russia became a new actor in Eastern Syria post the “Peace Spring” operation, notably in facilitating negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian regime. The results also highlighted a marked increase in statements about relations with the Assad regime, aiming for partnership in managing and protecting the region, alongside criticisms of the regime's strategy towards the Kurdish issue and attempts at normalization with Turkey. Numerous statements condemned Turkish attacks and called for international intervention to protect their controlled areas, showing a tendency towards rapprochement with Arab countries.

Concerning the targeted audience, the administration held over 30 meetings inside and outside Syria, with Syrian components and political parties, aiming for understanding agreements. This was attributed to ongoing challenges in entering the Syrian Negotiation Committee and participating in the Constitutional Committee, in addition to diverse international meetings with representatives from various European countries, the United States, and Russia.

Analysis of the official statements and press releases reveals the administration's political stance during the specified period on several issues: stance towards local actors, the regime and negotiations with it, Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue, the Syrian political process, and international actors, including Turkey, Russia, the United States, and Arab countries.

Engagement with Local Issues and Political Entities

The approach towards local matters and political factions is discernible through the Autonomous Administration's political ideology, its interactions with the Syrian regime, its relations with opposition groups, and its involvement in Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue.

• Political Ideology of the Autonomous Administration: The administration underlines its adherence to Abdullah Öcalan's “Democratic Nation” concept, which champions “decentralization, equality, and pluralism,” while expressly not pursuing the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state within Syria. This declared political ideology is said to mirror the regional populace's aspirations for Syria's future, encapsulated in initiatives like the one proposed for Syria's resolution last April. Such initiatives, with their leftist orientation, aim to resonate within Syria's culturally and politically diverse landscape. The SDF has consistently emphasized its commitment to respecting all societal segments, particularly engaging with Arab tribes through numerous dialogues, reinforcing its political alliances. However, the tribal uprising in Deir Ezzor in September 2023 underscored the disparity between theoretical commitments and practical application, with the SDF facing criticism for not meeting the tribal demands for better living conditions and more representative governance structures, as well as for its forceful suppression of tribal dissent.
• Kurdish-Kurdish Dialogue Dynamics: The representation of Syrian Kurds remains a contentious issue, marked by ongoing rivalry within the Kurdish political sphere. This rivalry is especially pronounced between the Democratic Society Movement (Tev-Dem) and the Kurdish National Council. Initial dialogues initiated in Erbil during 2012 and 2013 have seen limited progress, hindered by a lack of implementation of agreed outcomes. The Syrian Democratic Forces’ call for dialogue among Kurdish factions in November 2019, buoyed by American support, aimed at forging a complex consensus to enhance local empowerment, engage with the Syrian opposition more effectively, and mitigate Turkish tensions. However, dialogues have been stymied by disagreements over full administrative, financial, and military partnership and the persistent affiliation with the PKK, alongside demands for clear stances on inter-Kurdish military conflicts and coalition withdrawal requests.
• Interactions with the Syrian Regime: In February 2020, the Assad regime expressed willingness to engage in substantial negotiations with the SDF, prompted by Russian mediation. The SDF advocated for a revision of local governance laws to ensure their involvement in regional administration while the remaining part of the regime's military structure rejected the Sochi and Astana negotiation tracks. However, by December 2021, the head of the SDF Council announced the failure of these talks, highlighting Russia's inability to facilitate a successful dialogue with the regime.
• Relations with the Syrian Opposition: Having been excluded from official opposition frameworks, the Autonomous Administration sought alternative alliances with the Syrian opposition, embarking on earnest efforts marked by several meetings in Syria and abroad. Despite these endeavors, tangible outcomes were elusive, largely due to perceptions of the SDF's dominant stance and unwillingness to relinquish significant positions or authority. The administration's diplomatic efforts have struggled due to its team's rigid approach and failure to introduce potentially more acceptable and negotiable figures to the international community.

Engagement with International Entities

The Autonomous Administration's interactions with global entities, whether allies, adversaries, or neutral states, exhibit a nuanced spectrum of diplomatic strategies and positions.

• Interactions with Turkey: The SDF has repeatedly signaled its willingness to negotiate a mutual understanding with Turkey, sidestepping the contentious issue of its links with the PKK—a point of contention leading to Ankara's firm rejection. This stance places SDF and Autonomous Administration leaders in direct opposition with Turkey, where they are viewed through the prism of PKK affiliations, a group Turkey deems terrorist. In light of changing political climates within Turkey, the SDF showed keen interest in the 2023 elections, supporting the People's Party and Green Left Alliance with public demonstrations in Syria's east, anticipating the outcomes might favor their position. However, Turkish military strikes against SDF positions have been consistently condemned by the SDF, which calls for international intervention to halt Turkey's military actions in northern Syria. The aftermath of Turkey's “Peace Spring” operation notably constrained the SDF's maneuverability, highlighting the impact of Turkish-Russian and Turkish-American agreements on the SDF's operational capacity.
• Relations with Russia: The SDF's rapport with Moscow is multifaceted, viewing Russia as both a mediator with the Syrian regime and a counterbalance to Turkish threats. However, the expectation for Russia to leverage its influence over the Syrian regime for productive dialogue has not been met, with Russia and the regime potentially using Turkish aggression as leverage against the SDF. Tensions have also risen from Russia's non-compliance with maintaining observation points and pressuring Turkey to cease drone attacks. A significant point of contention remains Russia's push for the SDF to cede border control to the Syrian regime and withdraw southward, a proposition the SDF outright rejects despite recognizing Russia's role as a deterrent to Turkish advances.
• Engagement with Europe and the United States: Western delegations visiting eastern Syria focus primarily on counterterrorism efforts and the situation in Al-Hol camp, where the administration has capitalized on the international concern over ISIS detainees to bolster support. The administration also emphasizes the ongoing need for the international coalition's presence to maintain regional stability. It advocates for a reevaluation of Western relationships with Syrian opposition bodies and calls for increased Western pressure on Turkey to safeguard Autonomous Administration territories from potential military incursions. The Ukrainian conflict has notably influenced Western diplomacy, necessitating concessions to Turkey for broader strategic goals, such as NATO expansion.

In summary, the Autonomous Administration's international stance is characterized by efforts to maintain balanced ties with major powers like the U.S. and Russia, leveraging its anti-terrorism credentials while seeking broader engagement with regional actors. The administration's main challenge remains navigating Turkish opposition to its political legitimacy and regional influence.

Future Results and Trends: Identification with Syrian File Scenarios

Governance Legitimacy: The Autonomous Administration has undertaken legislative initiatives to build its governance credibility within its jurisdictions. Despite these efforts, the legislative frameworks have faced criticism over their development and enactment procedures, marked by structural weaknesses and lack of societal acceptance. This discord arises from a misalignment with local societal values. The implementation of these legislative measures has largely faltered, hindered by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its ideological counterpart, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which exert centralized control over the administration’s political, service, and security mechanisms.

• Political Efficacy: The “Peace Spring” operation has notably shifted the ideological leanings within the PYD, leading to an increase in right-wing influence and the centralization of decision-making processes around a select few leaders. Despite the interference from the PKK in political and security areas, this military endeavor required the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to make strategic concessions to forge new alliances.
• Engagement with Local Forces: Attempts by the SDF to engage in broader Syrian political frameworks, such as the Syrian Negotiation Committee and the Constitutional Committee, have been impeded by Turkish resistance. This resistance prompted a strategy of openness towards diverse Syrian political groups. However, the monopolistic control over decision-making by the PYD's leadership, without meaningful compromises or the establishment of authentic partnerships, has hampered effective communication and collaboration efforts, notably with entities like the Kurdish National Council.
• International Engagement: Following the “Peace Spring” military operation, the SDF subtly modified its approach to international relations, strengthening ties with Western allies while exploring alliances with Russia and the Syrian government. This shift resulted in certain concessions being made. Despite active efforts, a significant diplomatic breakthrough has yet to be achieved, affected by the changing dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations and the broader geopolitical consequences of the Ukraine conflict, prompting Western nations to approach Turkish concerns with increased caution.

Future Prospects and Political Efficacy

The future of the self-governing entity in northeast Syria is intricately linked to both internal policy decisions around governance and external geopolitical dynamics. Despite a foundation built on control, regulation, and centralization, vulnerabilities exist, particularly around issues of representation, political freedom, and the broader civil and political milieu.

• Regime Influence Expansion: The prospect of the Syrian regime reasserting control over the northeast is a complex scenario with both facilitating factors and significant barriers. Factors suggesting this could happen include the regime's gradual expansion of control, shifts in international politics favoring increased regional cooperation with the regime, and normalization efforts. However, challenges such as the American military presence, creating a security buffer, and the regime's resource limitations due to economic and security crises, serve as substantial roadblocks. Despite these challenges, there have been notable attempts at rapprochement between the self-administration and both the Syrian regime and Russia, aimed at securing recognition and negotiating for resources and administrative autonomy. Yet, major hurdles remain, notably the regime's reluctance to decentralize power significantly and Turkey's opposition to any empowerment of the self-administration.
• Maintaining the Status Quo: The persistence of a weakened central regime alongside strengthened local authorities suggests a continued trend towards de facto decentralization. The self-administration has undertaken reforms, such as amending its governing framework and proposing new structures to bolster its position in this scenario. However, opposition from Turkey, which rejects unilateral moves towards decentralization, along with skepticism from Russia and the Syrian regime, poses significant challenges. The strategy of sustaining the current state of affairs, bolstered by strategic leadership adjustments and the balancing of relations with both Russian and American forces, appears to be a pragmatic short-term approach, likely to prevail in the near term.
• Engagement in a Broader Syrian Political Process: The potential activation of a comprehensive political process for Syria, particularly in light of stalled UN Resolution 2254 implementations, opens up discussions for decentralization as a viable path forward. The self-administration, through the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has prepared for such an outcome, leveraging Western support and acknowledging the deadlock and risks associated with the resurgence of extremism and increased Iranian influence. To be considered a genuine stakeholder in this process, the SDF must demonstrate negotiation flexibility, confront threats from Iranian militias effectively, adopt a less adversarial stance towards Turkey and Syrian opposition groups, and progress in Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue. However, entrenched positions within the leadership, particularly ties to the PKK and adherence to its political agenda, make this scenario challenging, hindering the self-administration's ability to pivot towards a more inclusive and flexible political strategy.

Concluding Insights

The English summary of the full Arabic paper aim to highlights the Autonomous Administration's efforts to maneuver through a multifaceted landscape of both local and international hurdles. In its quest to establish and maintain a viable governance framework, it faces the daunting task of navigating geopolitical tensions and internal challenges. By capitalizing on the shifting allegiances and regional power plays, the administration's continuity and effectiveness hinge on its capacity to evolve within this dynamic political climate. The uncertain future of this governance model is intricately linked to potential political resolutions and its adaptability to the ever-changing global stage.

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For further insights into the governance and political dynamics within Syria's self-administration regions since 2019, the full study (Arabic Version) is accessible through the Omran Center: Click here for the study.

Introduction

Since the onset of the Syrian conflict, marked by a scenario of geographical entrenchment, it has witnessed a plethora of interactions and developments. These range from the structural reorganization of local actors to shifts in the global security and political landscape. The security dynamics in play challenge established boundaries and may lead to either the contraction or expansion of influence zones. Expanding parties will find opportunities to bolster their negotiating positions within the context of political settlements. The political consequences of these dynamics warrant continuous analysis and anticipation, especially considering their implications for international events, including the February earthquake and the Israeli offensive on Gaza.

This report delves into the political, security, and economic trends in Syria, highlighting the strategies of both local and international stakeholders ⁽¹⁾.

Between International Isolation and Normalization: A Vague Arab Initiative

Throughout 2022 and 2023, efforts by Iran and Russia to facilitate the Syrian regime's re-engagement with regional countries and its re-entry onto the international stage have intensified. This includes collaboration with Turkey through a tripartite track involving Moscow, Damascus, and Ankara, which Tehran later joined, potentially extending to Arab nations. Despite enhanced security coordination, this path remains fraught with uncertainty due to conflicting interests, such as the regime's reluctance to afford electoral advantages to the Turkish president before elections and disputes over the Turkish military presence in Syria.

The thaw in relations between Arab nations and the Syrian regime has made significant strides, aligning with a regional inclination towards containing conflicts and restoring stability, albeit at the expense of comprehensive solutions. This trend is reinforced by the Arab-Turkish détente, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, and steps towards Arab-Israeli normalization.

The February 2023 earthquake in Turkey and Syria catalyzed a political shift that favored the regime by enabling it to solicit international aid and economic support while demanding sanctions relief. The regime's dominance over humanitarian aid delivery points, despite opposition from the United Nations and several countries, highlighted the challenges in aid distribution. This scenario also provided countries seeking normalization with the regime, driven by the “Arab Initiative,” which advocates for dialogue with Assad to achieve a comprehensive solution. This wave of Arab openness began with security and ministerial exchanges leading to the reopening of diplomatic missions in Arab capitals and culminating in Bashar al-Assad's invitation to the Jeddah summit and the restoration of Syria's Arab League membership. The “Arab Ministerial Liaison Committee,” formed under this initiative, focuses on security, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian issues, alongside advancing the political process in accordance with UN Resolution 2254. However, the impact of the Arab initiatives was limited by a lack of strategic vision and effective leverage over the Syrian regime, leading to the suspension of committee meetings due to Arab dissatisfaction with the regime's inaction. This shift towards bilateral engagements has favored the regime, enabling it to sidestep significant commitments while alleviating its isolation.

The year 2023 marked a turning point in the regime's diplomatic engagements, despite opposition from Western nations to normalization efforts. Western responses, including legal actions against Assad for war crimes, highlight the challenges of any normalization attempt, underscoring the complexities of reintegrating Syria into the global community.

A Faltering Political Process and Local Actors Trying to Establish Their Presence

The complexities of the Syrian situation are compounded by the stalled political process, with only the Constitutional Committee remaining active. Despite the stagnation of its proceedings, the committee has been in limbo since its eighth session in mid-2022, obstructing the organization of its ninth session scheduled for July 2023. Efforts by the Arab Liaison Committee to advance the political dialogue have led to the announcement of resumed sessions at the year's end, relocating from Geneva to Amman in response to Russian claims of Geneva's “lack of neutrality.” The regime's stubbornness, its indifference to the Arab initiative, and its refusal to make concessions particularly in light of the Arab rapprochement it perceives as a victory have brought the political process to a crossroads, according to Geir Pedersen.

Two sessions were conducted in the Astana format, with the twentieth potentially being the last in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan asserts that Astana has fulfilled its aim of gradually ending Syria's regional isolation a view not shared by the trio of involved countries and instead mirrors the regime's preference for a quadripartite path excluding the opposition delegation. The concluding statement emphasized finalizing the normalization roadmap between Turkey and the regime, focusing on the northeast and de-escalation zones, opposing sanctions, broadening humanitarian aid, depoliticizing it, and acknowledging the regime's permission for its entry. This was followed by the twenty-first round on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, which concluded without a final statement.

The regime faces escalating public unrest due to dissatisfaction with its governance, economic decline in its territories, and rampant chaos and smuggling networks. Assad's indifference was evident in a CNN interview, where he downplayed the Arab initiative's significance, asserting that political relationships are inadequate without substantial support for the Syrian state to control its borders. He insisted that linking early recovery and reconstruction efforts, and thus the returnee issue, to security and political situations is unnecessary, viewing them instead as economic necessities. His continuous emphasis on economic sanctions as a direct crisis cause, coupled with the removal of government subsidies on essential goods, has transformed public frustration into opposition movements in the Sahel, protests in Daraa, and ongoing demonstrations in Suwayda with explicit political demands backed by influential religious and social figures. The regime's attempts to quell public discontent in the Sahel involved replacing the governor, enforcing security control, or manipulating economic networks. In Suwayda, the focus was on preventing the movement's spread beyond the governorate, relying on demonstrators' fatigue and the potential for economic siege if needed. Regarding legislation and laws, the regime abolished the Military Field Court, issued decrees concerning military service, and announced a general amnesty that excludes most political prisoners. These actions are perceived as superficial, intended to appear as “reformist” steps without necessitating real guarantees.

In northwestern Syria, official opposition entities have seen their operational scope diminish due to the political process's deadlock and the regime's recognition as the sole official Syrian representative by several countries. Their activities this year were confined to opening political horizons, diplomatic endeavors following the report condemning the regime's use of chemical weapons in Douma in 2018, support tours for earthquake-affected areas, and limited efforts to curb normalization or advocate for the application of Resolution 2245, restricted to the available margins. Visits aimed at halting military escalation in Idlib were conducted, while the Sweida movement represented a significant opportunity to rejuvenate the issue, albeit not addressed adequately. Internally, opposition groups faced challenges related to their structure, elections, and the circulation of prominent figures among positions, sparking popular discontent. Additionally, the interim government's performance was weak, and the independence of these bodies' decisions was compromised by country-specific determinants.

In northeastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration's efforts were marked by pragmatism. On one hand, it sought to preemptively co-opt opposition forces in anticipation of potential Turkish normalization with the regime at their expense. It collaborated with the Syrian National Alliance Party, which established offices in its territories, and with the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change Forces to form an opposition front endorsing the “National Democratic Change Project.” This initiative, based on five fundamental principles for a successful political resolution involving “national democratic political forces” in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2254, did not alter the administration's stance. Conversely, it expressed willingness to dialogue and cooperate with the regime on its terms, with the potential integration of its forces into the Syrian army under agreeable conditions. However, according to Mazloum Abdi, the regime's rigidity obstructs this possibility. Internally, the Autonomous Administration faced protests concentrated in Deir Ezzor and spreading among Arab tribes in various “civil administrations” regions. Demonstrations were against the SDF's dominion over the area and resources, mismanagement, exclusion of the Arab component, and marginalization of its demands, represented through figures affiliated with the administration. At the Fourth Conference of the SDF, a new council was elected under co-chairmanship, considering tribal balance, represented by “Mahmoud al-Muslat,” with the presence of PYD-endorsed figures and the elimination of the “CEO” role held by Ilham Ahmed since the council's inception in 2015.

The “Democratic Autonomous Administration's social contract in the northern and eastern Syria region” was ratified, designating SDF-controlled areas as a “region” within a confederation, to be followed by general elections in 2024. The contract, more a constitution than a social agreement, was imposed by the ruling party, reflecting its views rather than local perspectives, without consultations representing societal components among local populations. Additionally, the disparity between the articles' text and their implementation, even regarding decentralization a key demand of the Autonomous Administration remains unenforced in its centrally governed areas.

The Gaza War and Its Regional Implications: Open Possibilities

Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” presented an unexpected turn of events, causing disarray locally, regionally, and internationally. Contrary to the regional trend of containing conflicts and mitigating issues irrespective of solutions, the operation reignited concerns over the potential for war expansion, the reemergence of non-state actors, the advent of new organizations, and the ensuing humanitarian crisis requiring decisive regional responses.

In Syria, the Gaza conflict raised fears of escalation spreading to Syrian or Lebanese territories or drawing any party into participation, particularly with Iran and its affiliated militias and thus the regime considered part of the “resistance axis.” However, Iran's stance remained detached, limiting its involvement to statements, threats, and announcing support for adversarial movements such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah, which satisfied itself with ineffective missile strikes, alongside a few missiles launched from the Golan for appearances. The regime adhered to Iran's position, responding to Israeli threats with cautious, disciplined statements regarding the Palestinian cause's legitimacy, brutal aggression, and a conspiring world. It notably disregarded “Hamas,” maintaining a steadfast stance despite normalized relations, viewing it as unrepresentative of the broader issue. The regime's participation in the Riyadh summit on Gaza was confined to delivering a speech without objecting to any final statement items, including the two-state solution, civilian casualties on both sides, and establishing normal relations with Israel. Other countries, such as Tunisia, Iraq, and Algeria, expressed reservations, while Iran objected to recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole Palestinian representative. The regime also prevented public demonstrations condemning the war in its territories, deviating from the norm, settling for specific vigils organized by unions under Baath Party and security service supervision, possibly fearing demonstrations could turn against it.

The official opposition's response was characterized as weak, hesitant, and delayed. The coalition issued general statements of solidarity with victims and condemnation of Israeli attacks, particularly following the targeting of the Baptist Hospital, condemned by the interim government. Meanwhile, the negotiating body largely overlooked the conflict, save for a mention in a final statement from its regular Geneva session and a tweet by the body's head. This cautious approach is attributed to apprehension over potential backlash and the loss of Western support the last remaining political backing for the Syrian cause additionally influenced by Hamas's stance, which had recently reestablished relations with the regime. The position of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was more pronounced at the official level, issuing statements supporting the Palestinian cause without mentioning Hamas, alongside official events and fundraising through endowments. Opposition-controlled areas in northern Aleppo and Idlib witnessed significant public demonstrations in support of the Palestinian cause.

The SDF did not articulate an official stance on the conflict, except for a neutral statement by former SDF executive Ilham Ahmed, expressing solidarity with victims on both sides without taking a definitive stand on the aggression. This was despite the historically pro-Palestinian stance of Kurdish organizations, attributed to concerns over the American ally's position, Hamas's proximity to Turkey, and reluctance to express opinions unrelated to the consolidation of the self-administration project.

The Regime’s Systemic and Functional Security Crises

With the escalation of the Gaza conflict into a pivotal international juncture, its repercussions resonated deeply within the Syrian landscape, primarily serving as a conduit for message exchanges and score-settling between Israel and Iran. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime maintained a cautious distance from the conflict amidst Israeli cautions to Iran about the repercussions of its involvement. In this backdrop, international coalition bases faced recurrent assaults, paralleling a series of attacks by Iranian proxies in the region against US and Israeli interests from Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, including selective strikes targeting southern Syria near the Golan Heights. Concurrently, Israel ramped up its attacks on the infrastructure and command echelons of regime forces and Iranian militias, notably executing the assassination of Reza Mousavi, a leading Iranian official in Syria. This move was part of Israel's strategy to weaken the efforts of Iranian militias to fortify their positions following the assault on Gaza, showcasing their military prowess and readiness across multiple fronts.

Domestically, the Syrian regime's security infrastructure grappled with multiple challenges, including bombings and assassinations in supposedly secure regions, such as the Homs and Damascus countryside. A significant incident was a drone attack on a military academy, claiming the lives of 123 regime personnel, including several brigadier generals. This event highlighted substantial security lapses, challenging the regime's security framework and the air supremacy claimed by Russia and the regime west of the Euphrates, as well as contesting the aerial dominance of regional powers amid the advancing military capabilities of non-state actors utilizing drones in Syria and the wider region.

Within territories under regime control, As-Suwayda governorate witnessed an insurrection and popular movement, posing a severe challenge to the regime's narrative of stability and control. The movement in Suwayda, carrying both national and local dimensions, underscored the governorate's strategic significance owing to its proximity to al-Tanf and its role as a conduit for smuggling operations. The regime's strategy to counter this movement involved demonizing it in the media as separatist or foreign-driven, aiming to isolate it on a national level. Moreover, the regime leveraged the strategy of time, withholding services and exacerbating the already dire living conditions to pressure the movement, while attempting to fragment it by exploiting differences among religious and social factions within Suwayda. Despite the movement's impact being confined primarily to Suwayda, its importance lies in challenging the regime's narrative centered on “minority protection,” emphasizing Suwayda's strategic significance in security discussions, particularly regarding smuggling and its proximity to critical security locales.

The ISIS threat persists despite the assassination of its fourth leader by Turkish intelligence, as the organization continues to pose a security risk in Syria and globally. This is manifested by an escalation in the number and quality of operations it conducts, especially in the last quarter of the past year, leading to a marked Russian air escalation, representing a significant counteraction against the organization in 2023. While Jordan has revised its rules of engagement in response to the escalating threat from drug and arms smuggling networks supported by the regime and Iran along its northern border. This adjustment reflects Jordan's growing concerns over the sheer number of these groups, their technological and military capabilities, and the ineffectiveness of Jordanian dialogue with the regime in securing tangible security outcomes. Jordan, since May, has resorted to force, conducting air raids within Syrian territory, and requested Patriot missile systems from the United States to counter the drone threat.

Beyond the Regime's Control: Attempts at Governance and Resistance

In areas under the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) encountered several challenges, notably a tribal uprising following the detention of Abu Khawla, the leader of the Deir Ezzor Military Council. This uprising reflects deep-seated structural problems within the SDF's capacity to assimilate the Arab component and redress tribal grievances due to the dominance of the Workers' Party within the SDF's administration. The absence of American initiative to induce changes within the SDF, along with internal tribal challenges and apprehensions regarding potential encroachment by Iranian militias, collectively shape the future prospects of the tribal movement in the region. Turkey has maintained its aggressive posture towards the PKK, designated as a terrorist organization, especially following an incident in Ankara in October. This prompted Turkey to intensify its aerial bombardments targeting SDF military leadership and infrastructure, highlighting Turkey's strategic reach and its reliance on sophisticated drone technology in its counterterrorism strategy.

In northwestern Syria, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has launched an unparalleled campaign of internal arrests, detaining members from its administrative, security, and media wings on charges of espionage for the regime, Russia, or the United States. This move signifies HTS leadership's ongoing efforts to consolidate control and neutralize prominent figures, while also capitalizing on factionalism within areas controlled by the National Army to expand its influence.

The Regime's Economic Policies: Burdening Society and State

In January 2023, the Syrian regime initiated a series of bold economic reforms, characterized by a significant reduction in social support mechanisms, placing an increased burden on the market and exacerbating the poverty and living crisis of its citizens. The commencement of 2023 saw the average cost of living in Syria surge to over 4 million SYP for a family of five, with the number of individuals in need of humanitarian assistance soaring to more than 15 million at the start of the year. The devaluation of the Syrian pound continued, with the exchange rate exceeding 7,500 SYP to the dollar by the end of the previous year and recorded at 6,825 SYP by the end of January 2023. The regime's government increased the price of gasoline, marking the second hike within three weeks amid a significant scarcity of petroleum derivatives. Additionally, the Ministry of Economy raised customs duties on all imports by 15-20%, contributing to increased prices for imported goods.

These trends persisted and even escalated in the following months, with the average living costs for a family of five in Syria reaching more than 10.3 million SYP by August, according to the “Qasioun Newspaper” index, up from 4 million SYP in January. Despite salary increases, the average wages, post-increase, did not surpass 200,000 SYP. The regime's economic policies led to a continuous decline in the value of the Syrian pound, surpassing 15,000 SYP against the dollar, with the central bank pricing the exchange rate for remittances at 10,900 pounds. This ongoing devaluation significantly reduced the citizens' purchasing power, rendering salary increases ineffective and exacerbating the population's poverty and living hardships. These developments also underscore the ineffectiveness of the regime's economic management, which addresses the crisis with unproductive solutions.

A significant and economically indicative trend was the increased rate of merchant emigration, especially among traders from Aleppo and Damascus. This included the relocation of significant gold reserves, estimated at around 300 kilograms (approximately 1% of the country's total gold reserves), by top jewelers including (Bashoura, Said Mansour, and al-Jazmati), who moved their entire stock abroad.

Regarding trade relations between the regime and Arab countries, the regime showed considerable interest in economic openness towards Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Syrian regime appointed an ambassador to the Arab League and conducted visits to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, agreeing to resume economic cooperation with Arab states. Iraq allowed Syrian trucks to enter its territory again at the beginning of the year following agreements between the Syrian Ministry of Transport and the Iraqi side, leading to a 35% increase in trade between Syria and Iraq. Moreover, Jordanian exports through the Nassib crossing in the previous year, 2022, were 23 times the Syrian exports, which only amounted to $20 million.

On the other hand, the regime allowed merchants to import from Saudi Arabia, signing a contract for sugar imports and working on mechanisms to facilitate the movement of Syrian and Saudi trucks in the coming period. The regime stated that there is “no political objection” to importing goods from Saudi Arabia, permitting the import of sugar, chemicals, and petrochemicals. After a hiatus in investments in Syria since 2011, the regime granted licenses in August to two companies owned by Saudi investors to invest in the phosphate, fertilizer, and cement sectors in Syria. The regime's exports of vegetables and fruits amounted to between 500 to 600 tons, with 90% directed to Saudi Arabia, amid almost daily price hikes in the local market due to production shortages and rising costs of raw materials, including fuel, seeds, transportation, and labor. After potato prices surged by 150% in local markets, the Ministry of Economy halted its export when the price per kilogram reached 5,000 SYP, up from 2,000 SYP per kilogram in August, despite the regime's prior approval to export 40,000 tons of potatoes.

In regard to Iran economic activities in 2023, it didn’t spare no effort in 2023 to increase its influence and consolidate its presence in the Syrian economy, with the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Mehrdad Bazrpash signing agreements with the Syrian regime during an April visit in various sectors including economy, trade, housing, oil, industry, electricity, transport, and insurance. In addition to scheduled plans for stablishing an oil refinery with a capacity of 140,000 barrels per day, adjacent to the existing refineries in Homs and Baniyas, as announced by the Iranian Oil Minister Jalil Salari, to augment the income of Iranian companies. This plan is alongside numerous others set by Iran in Syria over the past years, though sanctions on the Syrian and Iranian oil sectors stand as barriers to maintaining and implementing oil projects in Syria that could fund the regime.

During a visit by the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Mohammad Reza Farzin, to Damascus, both sides agreed on a mechanism for using local currencies in trade exchanges between the two countries and establishing communication channels between the central banks to evade sanctions. In the context of bolstering banking and trade relations and joint investments, the Iranian official mentioned Iran's intention to soon open its first bank in Syria.

In December, a Syrian regime delegation in Tehran, led by Prime Minister Hussein Arnous, signed memorandums of understanding in banking, finance, tourism, sports, culture, reconstruction, trade, and the operation of power plants in Syria by Iranian investors. They agreed on zeroing customs duties between the two countries, and the Syrian Central Bank governor discussed with his Iranian counterpart ways to develop trade relations, establish mechanisms for trade exchange in local currencies, and set up a joint bank in Syria. This also includes executing a series of projects by the “Bonyad Mostazafan” foundation, Iran's second-largest investment entity, encompassing 200 factories and financial companies, including a bank and real estate companies, which is internationally sanctioned and directly affiliated with the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This step aims to fulfill Tehran's goal of acquiring a broader share in the Syrian economy.

Aftermath of the February Earthquake: An Alarming Economic Scene

February 2023 witnessed a devastating earthquake that struck northern Syria and southern Turkey on February 6th, affecting over 1.8 million people in northwestern Syria. The catastrophe resulted in the loss of 4,256 civilians' lives, approximately 12,000 injuries, and displaced 300,000 individuals, with children, women, and special needs cases constituting more than 65% of the displaced. The economic losses amounted to $1.95 billion, affecting the public and private sectors and other facilities, while over 13,000 families lost their income sources. The earthquake damaged infrastructure, including 433 schools, 73 medical facilities, and 136 housing units, with over 2,000 buildings collapsing immediately.

The Assad regime saw the earthquake disaster as a lifeline to boost economic activity within its control zones, launching donation campaigns and “for earthquake victims” and receiving financial donations from industrialists in Homs and businessmen estimated at 1.5 billion SYP. Additionally, pro-regime parties and groups exploited the earthquake to campaign for the flow of aid to the Syrian regime and lifting sanctions imposed on it due to crimes committed over the past decade, which restricted its economic activities. The Cross-Border Humanitarian Fund for Syria announced the release of at least $50 million for humanitarian response following the disaster, and the Omran Center for Strategic Studies reported that 23 countries and the United Nations sent approximately 11,772 tons of humanitarian and logistical aid through regime-controlled airports in Damascus, Aleppo, and Latakia. The regime received about 435 trucks of aid from several Arab countries through the Arbaeen, Jadidah, Nassib, and al-Bukamal crossings.

In opposition-held areas in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib, the region significantly suffered from a lack of aid in the first week of the disaster. The Omran Center for Strategic Studies reported that around 590 trucks, carrying between 5,300 and 7,000 tons of aid, entered from the Bab al-Hawa, al-Salam, and al-Raee crossings between February 9 and 27.

In northeastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration attempted to exploit the earthquake's aftermath to make a breakthrough in its relationship with the opposition by offering a convoy of fuel and medical supplies to the affected areas, which the opposition rejected for reasons including the Administration's insistence on branding the aid with its logos. The Administration announced the opening of all its crossings for humanitarian aid coming from outside its control areas to reach the earthquake victims. In the context of civil and popular initiatives, several civil organizations and social activities in northeastern Syria launched public campaigns to collect financial and in-kind donations from the region's residents and send them to the victims in the affected areas, including the “Tribal Solidarity” campaign, which collected 146 trucks loaded with clothing, household furnishings, food, baby milk, and medical supplies, along with financial donations, and entered the affected areas in northwestern Syria. However, the region later saw a clear decline in humanitarian response operations for the earthquake victims by 35% compared to the end of February, leaving thousands of families unable to secure even one meal a day amidst rising poverty rates and decreasing purchasing power among the population.

Methods of addressing economic impacts varied across influence zones, including periodic salary increases for employees, decisions to regulate markets, and increased control by de facto authorities over economic life. In terms of economic governance, the Autonomous Administration issued two laws to regulate exchange and remittance businesses and the trade and manufacturing of precious metals. The Administration also prohibited the export of dollars from its areas to those controlled by the regime and the opposition, as part of measures to restrict money transfers in and out of its areas, indicating increased financial or cash outflows abroad through smuggling operations, the rise of illegal activities, money laundering, tax evasion, and the Administration's preventive stance towards the available foreign currency reserves.

The Salvation Government in Idlib established a commercial court headquartered in Sarmada city, aimed at addressing disputes and cases arising between traders registered with the chambers of commerce. The court operates in 8 specializations, including intellectual property, bankruptcy, and disputes related to commercial papers, exchange, currencies, commercial remittances, and banking activities. This court's establishment follows a series of decisions, including one to regulate contracting procedures, contributing to the institutionalization and governance of the economy in the region, especially given the multitude of commercial activities and complex trade relations with the existence of the Bab al-Hawa crossing linking Idlib to Turkey. The Salvation Government's efforts aim to attract investors to its controlled areas. While the Interim Government also focused on encouraging investments in its controlled areas, with the Ministry of Finance and Economy announcing the launch of the first Investment Conference in cooperation with Aleppo University in the liberated areas, the Economists Syndicate, and the 2020IDEA foundation. The conference aims to economically develop the liberated areas, improve living standards, increase job opportunities, and resume the entry of UN aid into northwestern Syria through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Syrian scene remains largely static, with no significant changes expected from international actors or de facto authorities. Despite the regime's political breakthrough following regional normalization and partial restoration of international legitimacy, significant challenges persist, including maintaining influence, navigating ongoing negotiations without concessions, and addressing deteriorating living conditions that could lead to potential unrest. The dynamic security landscape, further complicated by the Gaza war's implications, highlights the intricate interplay between regional actors, local dynamics, and the enduring threats to national security for countries like Turkey and Jordan. This complex scenario emphasizes the evolving nature of the conflict, strategic shifts among local actors, and the continuous need for adaptation to both internal and external pressures.

^([1]) For access to the Omran Center's monthly briefings during 2023, see the following link: https://bit.ly/3VXM9hi

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key events in Syria during the month of March 2024, focusing on political, security, and economic developments. It examines the developments at different levels.

• Politically, in its 13^th year, the Syrian revolution is mired in political flux. Arab nations strive for reconciliation with Assad's regime, facing opposition from Western and the U.S. insistence on sanctions and normalization rejection. Amid these tensions, Assad's invitation by Bahrain to the Arab summit in May stands out. Concurrently, the push for the Syrian committee's ninth round of meetings by the international envoy is hampered by a location dispute between the regime and opposition.
• Security, the security environment in Syria, shadowed by the Gaza conflict, witnesses an upsurge in violence unprecedented since the halt of broader military operations. In Idlib, Russian airstrikes and regime artillery bombard rural and residential areas, escalating the use of suicide drones against civilians and military targets alike. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham escalates its assault across Aleppo, Latakia, and Idlib. Meanwhile, the rise in ISIS activities in eastern Syria underscores the SDF's struggles against the group.
• Economically, despite a marginal uptick in the SYP's value, commodity prices soar, unaffected by the currency's stability. A landmark development is Iran's central bank's agreement to establish a joint Syrian-Iranian bank, marking a significant step towards deepening Iranian economic influence in Syria.

Decade Plus Three: Syrian Revolution and the Quest for Resolution

As the Syrian Revolution enters its 13^th year, it continues to be marked by some Arab countries' attempts at rapprochement with the Assad regime, contrasted by Western countries' resistance to normalization and the ongoing lack of a viable political resolution. A united stance from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany has been articulated, showing firm opposition to normalizing relations with Assad's regime. They stress the importance of upholding sanctions and the need for a political settlement before beginning reconstruction efforts. Regionally, Bashar al-Assad's invitation to the upcoming Arab summit in Manama, Bahrain, on May 16, along with Faisal Mekdad (the regime's Foreign Minister) meeting his counterparts from Egypt, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and Tunisia, indicates a shift towards nuanced Arab engagement.

Despite Assad's readmission into the Arab League at the 2023 Jeddah summit and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with several Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, there seems to be minimal readiness on his part to make meaningful concessions that would promote a political settlement or address security issues stemming from Syrian territory.

On the other hand, the Opposition's Syrian Negotiations Commission (SNC) has accepted an invitation from the UN special envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, to reengage in the Constitutional Committee's discussions. Despite agreeing to partake in the committee's 9^th round next April, disputes over the meeting's venue persist, highlighting the deep-rooted divisions that complicate progress.

In Northwestern Syria, in Idlib, there has been an upsurge in public protests and civil demonstrations against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with demands for improvements in security, administration, and services, as well as the release of detainees. These protests have been partly triggered by a series of arrests for alleged collusion within the ranks of HTS, including the death of a detainee due to torture. In an effort to address the unrest and bolster its internal legitimacy, the group has implemented several measures, including the declaration of a general amnesty and the introduction of structural reforms aimed at pacifying public dissent.

In Northeastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has begun preparations for local elections, aiming to strengthen its legitimacy. The ratification of the High Electoral Commission law by the Syrian Democratic Council is a pivotal move toward affirming the administration's role as a legitimate authority over the region's population. However, the integrity of these elections hinges on the establishment of a system for independent and impartial monitoring and judiciary, an infrastructure the administration does not currently possess. Moreover, the decision of numerous political groups to boycott the elections, refusing to acknowledge the ANNES’s authority, suggests that the forthcoming elections may serve more as a symbolic gesture than a meaningful democratic process. This strategy seems to be an effort by the administration to divert attention from security and political dilemmas, alongside public calls for significant organizational reform. The pressing need for reform is underscored by increasing concerns over corruption, nepotism, and ideological control within its bodies, coupled with persistent appeals for the administration to distance itself from the PKK.

Gaza War Echoes: Rising Security Challenges and Internal Conflict

The ongoing conflict in Gaza is influencing Syria's security dynamics, with Israel launching strikes against Iranian forces and their allied militias. These strikes have included targets such as IRGC Military Advisor Riza Zirae in Baniyas, Tartus. The strikes have also hit several sites controlled by Hezbollah, including ammunition depots near Yabroud, Damascus, close to the Lebanese border. Moreover, Israeli operations have been concentrated in the south, particularly in Daraa and al-Quneitra, areas known for the activity of Iranian-backed militias. For a detailed overview of Israeli airstrikes in Syria since the beginning of 2024, please see Map (1).

Map (1): Map (1): Israeli Airstrikes Targeting Areas with Significant Iranian and Allied Presence & Influence – January 1, 2024, to April 1, 2024

Simultaneously, US airstrikes continue to target Iranian-backed militias in Deir Ezzor and the surrounding regions, resulting in injuries to individuals such as Haj Askar, a commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. These persistent attacks highlight how Syrian territory is being used by regional and international powers to settle disputes and compete for influence. This dynamic is likely to further destabilize the already precarious security situation in Syria amid this power struggle.

Southern Syria is embroiled in a state of security turmoil and targeted violence, with Daraa particularly affected by the assassination of regime officers and security personnel via IED’s and shootings. The region has also experienced civilian deaths due to attacks by unidentified gunmen, underscoring the prevailing lawlessness. Efforts by local forces to target groups suspected of ISIS affiliations and individuals engaged in drug trafficking have been reported, including the notable killing of Shaker al-Shuwaier in Salkhad. The resurgence of drone technology for assassination purposes adds a layer of complexity to the already challenging security situation in southern Syria. These incidents of violence are part of a larger narrative involving ongoing reconciliations and the interaction between various local entities, such as regime forces, factions involved in settlements, and criminal organizations.

In Northwest Syria, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has intensified its military actions against regime forces, resulting in both casualties and equipment losses. This increase in hostilities occurs alongside escalated Russian and regime airstrikes in the region, leading to a spike in violence. This includes the deployment of suicide drones by the regime, targeting both military and civilian objectives.

Eastern Syria has witnessed a surge in attacks by ISIS cells, challenging the Syrian Democratic Forces' (SDF) strategy to counteract them. In response, the SDF has executed targeted security operations to mitigate this threat. Notably, a recent operation by the Asayish forces against ISIS cells in al-Hasakah led to multiple arrests. Moreover, disturbances within SDF-administered prisons in al-Raqqa, including riots that resulted in casualties, signal underlying issues of discontent, and demands for improved treatment of detainees, particularly those linked to ISIS.

Inflation Outpaces Syrian Pound's Exchange Rate Improvement

In the Regime held-areas, the Syrian Pound (SYP) saw a modest increase in value against foreign currencies in March, driven by a combination of factors:

1. A significant 50% rise in foreign remittances during Ramadan alleviated some of the pressure on the currency.
2. A reduction in foreign trade activity led to a decreased demand for dollars.
3. The demand for the SYP increased as individuals sold foreign currency to manage Ramadan expenses.
4. The regime's government lowered the exchange rate for remittances by 100 liras, aiming to bridge the gap between the official and black-market rates and promote the use of formal channels for foreign currency inflows.

These factors collectively led to a temporary strengthening of the Syrian Pound. However, it's important to understand that this improvement is temporary and not due to monetary policy adjustments by the regime's Central Bank or improvements in production and foreign exchange reserves. The value of the lira is anticipated to fall after Ramadan.

Despite the lira's improved exchange rate, the cost of essential goods and materials continued to rise, with price increases exceeding 100% compared to the previous Ramadan. This indicates that the purchasing power of the population remains significantly compromised, largely due to the regime's policies, such as repeated increases in energy prices, prompting traders to guard against these hikes. Additionally, the regime continued to export vital crops and agricultural products, including staples like potatoes, garlic, and onions, despite domestic demand. The regime has decided to permit the export of various agricultural products, regardless of destination.

Iran is further expanding its influence within the Syrian economy, with the Central Bank of Iran authorizing the establishment of a joint Syrian-Iranian bank. This new bank is expected to facilitate financial transactions and enhance trade between the two countries. This move is in line with amendments to the Syria-Iran free trade agreement, which reduced customs duties on traded goods from 4% to 0%, likely increasing the presence of Iranian products in the Syrian market.

In the Opposition held-areas, the Salvation Government (SSG) in Idlib has eliminated certain fees for residential construction to ease recent protests against HTS. The SSG's Health Ministry also introduced regulations for the health sector, requiring licenses for pharmacies and medical supply stores.

In the countryside of Aleppo, basic commodity sales have plummeted by 50% due to skyrocketing prices and reduced purchasing power, in stark contrast to the previous Ramadan. Notably, meat and vegetable prices have surged, with meat prices increasing as regional traders buy up large quantities of sheep for smuggling. Additionally, investors have begun a project to build an earthquake-resistant residential city near al-Ra'i, which will include /1,500/ apartments.

In the SDF held-areas, the AANES has halted the export of sheep and cattle in response to a rise in local meat prices. Furthermore, fuel prices have skyrocketed by 170% without any formal announcement from AANES officials. Bread prices have also doubled, and vehicle registration fees have been adjusted to reflect the vehicle's year of manufacture, placing additional financial strains on residents, and diminishing their quality of life.

Dr. Ammar Kahf appeared on TRT World's "Strait Talk" to mark the 13th anniversary of the Syrian revolution. In the discussion, Dr. Kahf outlined the transformation of the Syrian uprising over the past 13 years to a regional and international conflict. He described the current situation as one where Syrian territory is fragmented with a threatening expansion of local and rogue non-state actors. Politically, the Syrian political process is witnessing a deadlock among its international backers. Furthermore, Bashar Al-Assad continued to prove himself as a source of instability to regional security order and to borders of neighboring countries especially Turkey and Jordan. Assad has not adhered to regional expectations for stabilization and has not responded positively to diplomatic overtures, with Arab normalization efforts so far failing to alter his stance significantly on security and the peace process.

Watch now: https://youtu.be/p9IjGHxrp1g

In Istanbul, on March 8, 2024, the Omran Center for Strategic Studies hosted an event featuring 17 students from various American universities. These students, now part of the School for International Training in Amman, Jordan, were under the guidance of SIT Jordan Academic Director Dr. Raed al Tabini. Dr. Ammar Kahf, executive director of Omran, along with his team, facilitated sessions aimed at enhancing the students' comprehension of the Syrian refugee crisis, with a particular focus on Turkey's role as a host nation.

The program delved into the myriad dimensions of the crisis, including the overwhelming figure of over 3.15 million Syrian refugees residing in Turkey and the personal narratives that these numbers entail. The discussions provided a holistic view of the global displacement scenario, underscoring the severe impact of the Syrian situation on refugee demographics, while also addressing the challenges faced in terms of education and integration in Turkey.

This policy paper could not have been possible without contributions provided through the courtesy of:

Executive Summary

For decades the Syrian government has proclaimed that the demarcation of subnational administrative divisions was an apolitical process based on purely administrative and developmental considerations. A constant drive to homogenize the Syrian identity as part of a greater pan Arab identity has meant that local identity was hardly a subject of discourse, formal or otherwise. Beyond superficial references to folklore as a generic form of local identity, the subject was a political taboo.

Yet, the demarcation of administrative divisions was never entirely neutral. The management of the intricate procedures of delineating internal boundaries among governorates, districts, subdistricts, and municipalities, assigning nomenclature and toponymies, and determining the hierarchical status of administrative units was intertwined with manipulating local identities to build patronage networks for the central authorities and national elites at the local level. The haphazard process of creating new administrative boundaries in Syria developed divergent modes of accessing national development resources and fostered heterogeneous interplay between the national and local levels. Rather than consolidating a unified national identity, the rigid, non-transparent and highly centralised process of administrative design led to the creation of divergent identity markers and irreconcilable social solidarity models, which stand as key conflict drivers today.

This policy paper examines the impact of administrative-territorial subdivisions on the formation of local identity in Syria, the relationship between local and national identity, and, hence, the impact of administrative divisions on national identity. Based on extensive interviews with 76 key informants in all of Syria’s 71 districts, this policy paper draws on the data and results of a more comprehensive research published recently⁽¹⁾ It aims to track the construction and evolution of local identities as it relates to the process of demarcating administrative divisions from the initial moment of creating the Syrian state in the wake of the Sykes-Picot agreements to the aftermath of the conflict that erupted in 2011. It argues that the emergence of strong local identities is strongly related to the degree of connectivity the localities had to the centre. Contrary to common fears expressed by many in the central government and the opposition, strong local identities were not an antithesis to the emergence of a unifying national identity. Quite the reverse, the evidence points to the fact that the stronger the local identity, the more likely it was intertwined with the national one. What affected national identity negatively was marginalization and a centralized approach to enforcing national identity formation.

Historical Background

The Syrian administrative subdivision system follows a general tradition witnessed in many countries of the region since the Ottoman period. Two types of administrative hierarchies were deployed. On the one hand, there was the territorial order that divided the country into governorates, districts and subdistricts (mohavaza, mantiqa, nahiyeh). On the other hand, there was a municipal order of cities, towns, and townships (madinah, baldeh, baladiyeh). The jurisdictions given to each category shifted over time; however, the basic nomenclature and structure remained almost the same since independence in 1946.

Since the issuance of law 107, in 2011, the territorial order was scaled back considerably at the sub-governorate level, reducing it to policing and support functions to the governor. Thus, only the governorate (mouhavaza) level retains an elected council; the districts and subdistricts have no legal personalities, and the chief administrators are appointed centrally. The municipal order, by contrast, gained significance, and municipalities were imbued with legal personalities and had elected councils and mayors. The point of juncture between the two orders is the office of the centrally appointed governor, who chairs the elected governorate council and directly manages the administrators of the district and sub-district administrations. He also retains considerable oversight over the work of the elected municipal councils.

Figure 1: Schematic description of the administrative hierarchies in Syria today.

As it stands today, there are, 14 governorates, 71 districts and 288 sub-districts. On the other hand, the municipal composition as per the last adjustments done before the local elections of 2022 comprises 156 cities, 520 towns, and 754 townships. The evolution of this current administrative architecture was gradual, and emerged in waves. However, changes to the system involved not only the number of units but also the changing of toponomies and the authorities and accountability of each layer. Furthermore, the distribution of these units remained highly heterogenous as some governorates had a much larger number of subdivisions than others even when adjusting to per capita populations of the governorates.

The re-districting process was not part of a formal policy that emerged from free and open public debate. Indeed, until the issuance of the latest version of the National Framework for Regional Planning in 2022, there was not any formal recognition of the unbalanced distribution of cities and towns across the territory⁽²⁾ Over the years, the dialogic relationship between local and national governance layers emerged in a haphazard manner and created heterogenous identity formations. The fear of opening debate on sectarian, ethnic, regionalist and ideological identities in Syria casted a long shadow over the subject of identity. Discussing local identity was equated with discussing sectarian and ethnic identities, a topic that was seen as an antithesis to a unified national identity. The demarcation of administrative boundaries was supposed to be a purely administrative process. The subsequent laws of 1956-1957-1971-2011 defined clear criteria for the hierarchy of administrative units based on population counts, socio-economic factors (defined primarily in economic and developmental terms) and proximity concerns. However, these laws were ambiguous on how boundaries are to be drawn. The process of demarcation of administrative units remained a prerogative of the executive branch of government without recourse to parliamentary oversight or referendum⁽³⁾.

The process of consolidating the administrative divisions of Syria operated on different levels:

1. The designation of governorate level provincial units (mouhavaza): these were negotiated gradually during the French mandate on the traces of the old Ottoman Vilayet and Sanjak boundaries. When the French eventually abandoned the prospects of creating a federal state and negotiated the Franco Syrian Treaty in 1936, Decision No. 5 of 1936 was issued on the principle of drawing administrative units on purely administrative concerns. Governorate units (mouhavazat) thus had no political representation of their own. The order was codified in the post-independence era in the law of 1957. The number of mouhavazat increased gradually from 7 to 14; the last one being the designation of the capital city as a mouhavaza in 1972. There were no formal justifications given for ordinances to create new mouhavazat. However, our previous research suggests that the bulk were motivated by highly political interests to manage local identities and secure patronage for the central authorities. The central government was keener to create smaller provincial units with direct links to the capital than to decentralize power to larger governorates to allow them to serve their citizens in a better way^(4).

2. The transformation of the nomenclature and toponymies of settlements, and territorial units: Here the drive was clearly ideologically driven to Arabize Kurdish, Syriac, Phoenician and other non-Arabized names starting during the union with Egypt but increasing in force from 1961 onward after the session from the union, and then later under the Baath. In addition to changing the names of cities, districts and sub-districts, most governorates lost their traditional names and were named after the major city in the mouhavaza. In border zones, the nomenclature was changed to provide a clear distinction and re-orientation of peripheral areas from their traditional connections to place names across the borders in neighbouring states towards the Syrian interior.

^{3. The demarcation of sub-governorate districts and sub-districts: The Syrian peripheral districts had to be disentangled from other territories of the Ottoman vilayets that were not incorporated into the Syrian territory in 1918. The French mandate focused on redefining these peripheral zones. A few changes happened in the immediate post-independence era. However, the main changes took place after the session from the union with Egypt and expanded during the early period of the Baath period into the presidency of Hafez Assad. Another, wave of new districts was created between 2007-2010. A few districts were created sporadically in between. The data from the research suggests that the initial waves of demarcating new districts was politically motivated either to segregate communitarian groups, or for nepotism purposes (to strengthen the personal patronage networks of leading Baath party leaders(5)} Later districts created during Bashar al-Assad’s presidency seem to be more utilitarian in nature and focused on developmental and service objectives and less motivated by clear political or identitarian concerns.

4. The demarcation of municipal units: These were more fluid and were often created and changed at will. The orders for their creation came from different levels of authority, not necessarily linked to the letter of the law. The number of municipal units (cities, towns, and townships) remained more or less proportional to the population count in every governorate up till the year 2010. With minor variations, larger municipal units incorporated smaller units into their jurisdictions following the same pattern across all governorates. That process, while often reflecting some personal and identitarian biases remained generally administrative in nature till the issuance of law 107 for the year 2011. Subsequently the government seems to have manipulated the aggregation of smaller units into larger cities and towns following political and identitarian purposes. Zones of the country with rural populations that were loyal to the central state were rewarded with an increased number of towns and townships to allow for more chances of linking to national and provincial patronage networks. While rural zones of the country that were more hostile to the central government were annexed to the nearest cities and towns that remained more loyal to the central government.

Figure 3: The number of smaller municipal units in proportion to the total number of units in the governorates. Note that before 2010 there was a clear attempt at harmonizing the distribution of municipal units across all the governorates. Starting in 2011 there was a concerted effort to favour certain governorates with more small municipal structures and hence more access to political patronage of the State. (Data sources: the Syrian Statistical Abstracts for the Years 1983 and 2011; the Ordinance Number 1378/2011 and the Ordinance Number 1452/2022 issued by the Ministry of Local Administration and the Environment in Syria).

Political motivations for administrative changes in Syria often revolved around the strategic control of communities. A notable tactic in this regard is gerrymandering, employed to manipulate the political landscape in favour of specific parties, especially the Baath Party after 1963. This was exemplified by the reassignment of towns like Harem in Idlib and Al-Qardaha in Latakia from one district to another despite their relatively small demographic size at the time. Additionally, political motivations can be traced to clientelist relationships maintained by key national elites or influential individuals – such as the transformation of the Al-Qadmus area into a district perhaps to consolidate the role of the influential Khawanda business family and to create a balance between the Ismaili and Alawi communities in the district. Another instance of this logic of redistricting was the establishment of six districts in Tartous to develop strong patronage networks to local communities; by contrast Al-Hasakah, several folds larger in surface area than Tartous and having double its population, has only four districts. In other instances, administrative subdivision was stalled in order to appease powerful figures, such as the decision not to elevate Manbij to a governorate status, likely to maintain the goodwill of the influential business and military elites of the Al-Shihabi clan who had a strong presence in the nearby city of Al-Bab, and which would have become annexed to its rival town of Manbij. The preference was for the two towns to remain in the sphere of the city of Aleppo as equal satellites rather than subordinating al Bab to Manbij.

Historical inertia also played an important role. In most cases once changes in administrative divisions were implemented, they tended to be irreversible or hard to reverse, even when the conditions for their formation were no longer warranted.  Some towns lost their central economic and demographic role within their districts, yet they were maintained despite no longer adhering to the norms of establishing administrative subdivision. For example, Jarabulus was designated as a district during the French Mandate era (as it emerged from subdividing the border districts in northern Aleppo). Yet, it continues to hold this status, notwithstanding its relatively small area and population. This historical inertia in administrative districting underscores the enduring impact of past decisions on contemporary governance and regional identity. It also points to the strength of the patronage networks that are hard to dislodge once formed.

It seems though, that after 2000, the central government has reduced its reliance on the governorate and district levels to control political patronage in favour of municipal politics. Nonetheless, the establishment of new governorates, as well as ongoing modifications at the sub-governorate levels (regions and districts), and the reorganisation and redistribution of administrative units within cities, towns, and municipalities, significantly influenced the formation of local identities across Syrian territories. These changes have considerably impacted the stability of the communities within these units. In the subsequent part of this paper, the focus will be on the impact of these demarcations on the formation of local identity.

The Formation of Administrative Divisions and the Question of Identity

Consequently, examining such phenomena in the Syrian context is paramount, particularly considering the ongoing conflict since 2011and the current de facto division of the country. In the future, this importance is underscored by various factors: the sectarian and ethnic dimensions of the conflict, the fragmentation of Syrian governorates among different controlling entities, the imperative of establishing administrative frameworks to reinvigorate development amidst a deteriorating economy, the challenges of rebuilding societal cohesion and peace, the complexities in determining the original domicile of populations displaced by conflict since 2011 (or urban migration before 2011), and the criticality of considering decentralisation as a strategic approach to resolving the Syrian political stalemate.

The issue of local identify in Syria is particularly problematic. While the law speaks of the socio-economic dimension as the basis of defining administrative divisions and localities, in practice, as has been demonstrated in the first part of the paper, the central government resorted to demarcating local boundaries by manipulating intra-local sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and other forms of identities. Thus, rather than working to strengthen the cohesion of communities by facilitating the intermixing of divergent identity groups at the local level, the State (ever since the formation of the Syrian State and not just under the Baath) constructed new administrative structures in a non-transparent manner to foster these secondary identities while preventing localities from creating their own expressions of solidarity that would have transcended the identitarian divides. Thus, the local identity as a discursive construct is an unspoken contested field. It was supposed to produce a new political economy and social reality that would transcend Syria’s sectarian and ethnic divides, but in reality, it ended up subtly manipulating them and deepening the rifts.

Nonetheless, as shall be seen in the following sections, the construction of administrative boundaries did create new forms of identity and solidarity, perhaps not the intended ones, and certainly, as the research has demonstrated, they did not create homogenous results either. The findings of the qualitative survey that assessed the evolution of local identity will require careful verification through a more thorough quantitative analysis. However, the research, that the following findings were based upon, was rich with detailed information on the substance of local identities; and, more importantly, on the factors that lead to strong solidarity at the local level. The qualitative key informant interviews covering all 71 districts in Syria (as well as the sub-divisions of major cities) were based on questions related to the emergence of collective identity markers, standard toponyms and nomenclature, economic interests, managing and negotiating local differences, managing, and negotiating differences with adjacent districts, as well as managing the relationship with the governorate and the national levels with regards to social and identity problems. Qualitative results were translated into a set of criteria to define a basic barometer for the strength of identity markers and the sense of solidarity that communities had at each local, provincial (governorate), and national level.  The initial research findings were presented in an Arabic language publication; however, a more thorough coding of the findings and a stronger correlation with quantitative data is in the works for future research.

While the study of local identity and its relationship with national identity could have focused on any of the various local scales, the researchers made an initial assumption based on previous work on the issue. They assumed that the provincial (mouhavaza) level administrative units were not proper vessels of local identity. In search of finer granularity for assessing the spread of local identity, they decided to select the district level as the basis of the study. At this scale, the relationship of cities to their hinterlands is still visible, and the socio-economic solidarity networks were perhaps the most visible. The research results confirmed a positive correlation in most cases with that scale of administrative demarcation on the formation of local identities. The team opted to avoid the municipal level at this research stage. The municipal level does not reflect the local rural-urban dynamics. It was also a system in constant flux, as shown above. While the governorate and district-level administrative demarcations were also constantly being modified, the rate of change was slower, allowing for more stable dynamics to form. The gradual impact of the administrative subdivisions could be traced more visibly at this level.  

The Formation of National Identity

The constant shifting of the identity markers at the national level and the lack of universal adherence of local communities to a national identity framework is attributable to an amalgamation of both objective circumstances and political determinants.

Objective factors can be explained as follows:

• The nascent nature of the Syrian state: coupled with its origins in the post-Sykes-Picot order. This colonial pact is viewed unfavourably by most Syrians as an attempt at subdividing a larger national realm extending to other Levantine and Arab countries. This attitude perpetuates perceptions of Syria as a transient, diminutive entity born from a colonial project. Furthermore, there is a general societal distrust of the idea of administrative subdivision, as another colonial attempt at fragmenting the national realm. The legacy of the French mandate to divide Syria into small statelets plays into that fear.
• Supranational ideologies: Stemming from the point above, supranational political movements, encompassing Pan-Islamic, pan-Arab, and other ideologies advocating for the natural unity of Greater Syria (the Levant), or the Socialist International, have historically overshadowed Syrian political life. These movements have generally not prioritized cultivating a distinct Syrian national identity within its contemporary borders.
• Legacies of past identities: The social interconnectedness of Syrian communities with neighbouring communities in adjacent countries (Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan) has fostered affiliations extending beyond national boundaries, especially for some border communities, further complicating the identity narrative.

Figure 4: Strength of belonging to the national identity and its identity markers. Qualitative responses to the survey were evaluated against a set of indicators and transcribed onto a heat map to show where a sense of strong belonging to a national order was manifest.

Political determinants were intricately linked to the strategies of successive political regimes, and they changed accordingly:

• Efforts by ruling elites to foster a supranational Arab identity to enhance their legitimacy in leading Syrian polity: This inadvertently undermined the significance and visibility of distinct Syrian identity markers (flags, personalities, slogans, etc). National identity was experienced by society through the prism of allegiance to the ideological tenets of the ruling elites, creating a sense of state-defined national identity rather than one grown organically through the cultural innovation and genius of the society. Thus, the general populace's sense of national identity is profoundly impacted by people’s interaction with State institutions and policies and was confounded by perceptions of weak governance and corruption. Or conversely it was perceived strongly when local communities had strong direct patronage ties to the national elites or national institutions. Thus, it is not uncommon to see some small islands of adherence to national identity among communities such as Al-Bab and Raqqa city. Both are examples of localities that had strong connections of patronage or business with the centre.
• The constant leveraging of external political projects: including the constant focus on the regional Arab-Israeli conflict de-legitimized local priorities and concerns and led to a systematic weakening of the concept of citizenship to a national order. Dissent was discouraged and at times violently put down, thereby diluting a strong sense of national allegiance, as the central state was seen as synonymous to the repression by national elites. This was clearly the case in the cities of Hama, Jisr al-Shougour, Lattakiyah, and Haffeh for instance.
• The deliberate marginalization of certain regions: notably Northwest and Northeast Syria, left many groups feeling disenfranchised. The same goes for many rural and desert areas that were subservient to the economy and patronage of major cities. Empirical evidence from the research suggests that geographical proximity to the capital was a significant factor in consolidating a sense of national identity. This phenomenon may be attributed to the symbolic role of the capital in national identity construction and the employment of a substantial number of residents from neighbouring governorates in state institutions located in the capital. The town of Harem and many parts of Dara’a and Sweidah fall into that category.
• The centralization of the political system: and a lack of encouragement for forming cross-provincial networks of local councils and civil society left all attention focused on the directives and priorities of the capital. The main exception would be unions that were predominantly controlled by the Baath Party. They provided some chances for networking and interaction between localities but as they were under the ideological control of the Baath, they did not encourage organic expressions of national identity. However, connection to the Baath afforded a higher level of social mobility and allowed for physical contacts and even internal migration to other parts of the country, encouraging a stronger appreciation of the national territory. 

The Complex Dynamics of Local Identity

The research methodology used, and the data collected for the research relied on a clear distinction between social and local identities. The former pertains to identification with a social category, such as ethnicity, religion or sect, class, clan, family, or other social groupings. Conversely, local identity is intrinsically connected to a specific geographical locale, encompassing various social groups interacting in the same space. Further, the research team differentiated between local political identity, which confers specific political rights upon its bearers, and local cultural identity, intimately tied to its adherents' customs, traditions, practices, and adoption of specific identity markers. The researchers’ focus was on local cultural identity, conceptualized as the individuals' emotional and conscious connection to a specific geographical area rather than belonging to a specific social or identitarian group. It was deemed essential to correlate the spatial designation of supposedly neutral administrative divisions with the local cultural praxis that ensued in those local units.

The local connection is fostered through economic and social bonds established via unique modes of production, customs, and traditions that differentiated them from other locations with whom they may have shared other common social affinities. However, the research team was clear not to rigidly confine the definition of the “local” when investigating local cultural identity. People interviewed were for the most part not limited in their responses to a fixed spatial boundary when they described their localities. The “local” may be specific to a small city, such as Salamiyah in Hama Governorate, or extend to a geographical region, exemplified by the cities and towns of Qalamoun, including Deir Atiya, Al-Nabak, Jairud, and Yabroud. In some cases, it extended for beyond the governorate level for certain respondents.

Figure 5: Strength of local identity markers. Qualitative responses to the survey were evaluated against a set of indicators and transcribed onto a heat map to show where a sense of strong belonging to a local order was manifest.

The determinants of local identity included the respondents’ cleat to conceptualise the geographical extent of their “local” area, identify local symbols and identity markers (such as prominent figures, landmarks, or significant events), recognize dialects, adhere to certain cultural expressions, as well as the appreciation of the customs, traditions, and rituals practiced within that area.

Several factors were found to contribute to strengthening local identity:

• Social homogeneity: The degree of social homogeneity within a society (in terms of clans, sects, classes, etc.) is directly proportional to the strength of its local identity. While some heterogenous localities seemed to have strong local identities resulting from long traditions of managing and negotiating their differences, the general stability of the social order in the locality is key to the emergence of a strong identity.
• Legacies and renown: The prominence of a locality and the fame of its identity markers, whether due to historical events such as being the birthplace of the Great Syrian Revolution for Dara’a, archaeological or natural landmarks such as the Aleppo Citadel and the Ugarit alphabet, or distinctive regional traits like the humour in Homs, amplifies their local identities.
• Institutional thickness: Regions with a longer history of institutional development tend to have stronger local identities. For instance, the identity of modern Raqqa (one of the late governorates to be created) is less pronounced than that of Aleppo or Latakia. By contrast a place like Raqqa tends to have a stronger national identity as it had stronger connection to the centre directly and resolved its administrative problems via a more direct access to central patronage. Newly created districts were the clearest examples of weak local identity as they were formed by extracting their communities from other previous administrative districts, often creating heterogenous social groupings and confusion of connection to administrative services, such as in the case of Tal Dao.
• Production and transportation connectivity: The extent to which the dynamics of economic production and the existence of value chains necessitated interaction with external entities and a loss of economic centrality inversely affects local identity. Similarly, limited transportation connectivity with surrounding areas can at times reinforce local identity in a negative sense. By contrast areas and district that still depended on agriculture as the main stipends for economic wealth tended to have very strong local identity.

Figure 6: Strength of identity markers at the governorate level. Qualitative responses to the survey were evaluated against a set of indicators and transcribed onto a heat map to show where a sense of strong belonging to a local order was manifest.

The general hypothesis that the governorate level was not a strong lever for local identity was in evidence at this stage of the research. When asked about the governorate level as a harbinger of local identity, the results were often clearly negative. The governorate level which is the most powerful level in the Syrian hierarchy of local government, seems to have failed to foster a sense of community. While some of the more recent districts have failed to foster a strong sense of locality, most governorates have manifestly failed to do so, Homs being one strong exception, at least for the western parts of the governorate. There are other minor exceptions, like Dara’a, Deir Zorr and Sweidah, who maintain strong governorate level identity, perhaps as a result of their sectarian or tribal structures.  Governorate-level identity is generally strong in larger cities, especially the city centres of the governorates. However, in most rural areas, the subjugation of the local level to the hierarchical administration of major cities has created a reverse sense of belonging.

It should be noted however, that the pre-conflict dynamics are quickly changing. Idleb that was once one of the least developed in terms of its governorate level dynamics before 2011 is showing a strong tendency to develop a strong governorate level identity since. The prospects for how the identity formations have been transformed during the conflict awaits new research and falls outside the scope of this paper.

On the Relationship Between Local and National Identities

The interplay between national and local identities can be conceptualised along six distinct dimensions: predominance of local over national identity, predominance of national over local identity, parity between national and local identities, concurrent weakness in both national and local identities, exclusivity of national identity, and exclusivity of local identity. Empirical findings from the study suggest that, in most instances, one identity has a pronounced presence coupled with a secondary importance for of the other. Notably, instances of exclusive national or exclusive local identity were not evidenced in the sample. Likewise instances of mutual exclusivity are very limited. The case of Shaddai is the exception that proves the rule, as a substantive part of that local consisted of people that were moved from the areas that were flooded after the construction of the Euphrates dam. Their affinity with the central government that displaced them and the new hard geography where they were displaced created a negative appreciation of both identity levels.  

The interview data indicated a strong correlation between strong local and national identities. This implies that individuals often perceive themselves as belonging to their localities and to Syria simultaneously. A robust local identity is indicative of a deep emotional attachment to one's place of origin or settlement, conferring a sense of uniqueness to the inhabitants of that locality. Concurrently, it seems to also signify an emotional bond with the nation, embodying a sense of protection and belonging. Thus, integration of the two levels emerges as a salient characteristic in the nexus between local and national identities. Although this matches the findings of the theoretical literature and evidence from other countries, this cannot be taken as a fact and should be tested quantitively in more detail in the future.

Another finding is that the conflict between local and national identities arises predominantly when the latter is perceived as undermining or threatening the former. In such scenarios, local identity challenges the national identity when there is a perception that national identity seeks to subsume or replace it (the case of Lattakiyah, of Haffeh and Hama discussed above). In that sense, national identity shifts from being a protective umbrella to be perceived as threat or imposition on local communities, while local identity transitions from a source of pride to a bastion of self-defence. Such situations are also indicative of populist discourses on identity. Identity markers may gain in relevance but mitigating measures to manage difference between social groups and ensure stability and cohesion recede in importance.

In contexts where local identity is weak, adopting national identity becomes transactional. The potential for adopting a national identity in that case is clearly contingent on perceived benefits from the government and its patronage networks, as the case of Raqqa exemplifies. Conversely, both identities may remain underdeveloped without such incentives, as observed in Al-Shaddadi above. Peripheral zones sometimes exhibit such conditions. Some frontier and border districts demonstrated a lack of attachment to the national identity as proximity to State favours and patronage was limited. In some incidences connection to social and economic networks across the border were more prominent. This worked against both the local and national sense of belonging. The localities along the border with Lebanon are a case in point, where the economy is tied to smuggling networks across the border. The same was observed in other non-peripheral areas; national identity appears to be more diminished in areas with a weaker local identity. The evidence at hand does not allow for drawing strong statements of causality. However, a principle initial finding of the research is that proximity to the political, or geographical centre, bolsters national identity. This is largely due to transactional and pragmatic considerations perhaps more than other factors such ideological ties and cultural affinities.

In that regard, identity formation should not be seen as a natural process; it cannot be taken for granted as it is constantly being re-constructed. The creation of administrative divisions is perhaps one of the most instrumental factors in putting localities on the radar of the capital. While primarily designed to foster political clientelism and patronage networks for the central government and its elites, it has also allowed for trickling of resources from the centre to the local level for developmental purposes creating a leverage for a strong national identity. By contrast, geographically or politically marginalised areas often correlate with a weakened national identity. The main conclusion for the research is that a forced centralisation of the ideological construction of national identity coupled with marginalization has undermined national identity rather than reinforced it.

Recommendations

This paper has reviewed conditions in Syria from before the conflict. Many of its arguments must be revisited after 13 years of hostilities. Yet, the evidence is clear: The reconstruction of a national identity for a post-conflict Syria will have to be considered very carefully from the bottom up, and not just from the top down. Many factors will come to play in re-negotiating the relationship of the local to the national level to ensure stability and non-recurrence of violence in the future. The fine tuning of the design of the administrative divisions will have to be considered as a key factor. The demarcation of administrative boundaries is essential not only to balance the distribution of antagonistic social groups but to effectuate a fair and equitable distribution of resources and access to national polity. The process must be transparent and mutually acceptable to Syrians to avoid the manipulation of central/local relations on the basis of patronage and clientelism. National and local identities are not at odds as many have come to conclude as a result of the war, indeed, their mutuality is the corner stone to sustain peace in the future.

In fostering a cohesive national identity and a balanced co-creation of local and national identities in Syria, this paper proposes the following recommendations to address national identity formation through various constitutional, institutional, and socio-political dimensions. 

The Parameters of Syrian National Identity: It is imperative that Syrians should work to consolidate the building of a social compact among them as citizen living in one State that recognizes their full and equal citizenship with all that entails of rights and obligations. Defining the parameters of citizenship as a balance between individual rights and group rights will not be an easy task. Syrians are advised to consider the following:

• Accepting the Syrian state in its current borders as the harbinger of national identity: Syrians will always have aspirations for belonging to a supranational identity. This will not likely change over the short time. But Syrians need to understand that failure to build a mutually acceptable Syrian national identity today will not lead to the formation of their supranational dreams. Quite the reverse, the fragmentation of national identity today will only lead to the permanent and irreversible division of the country based on the su-national de facto division of the country.
• Inclusivity in national identity: While the State needs a unifying national identity, this should not happen at the expense of the diversity of local identities. The two are not mutually exclusive. National identity should recognise and celebrate the diverse tapestry of Syrian communities, their identity markers, and their values.
• Respect for local identities: The focus of the debate concerning the plurality of identitarian groups (religious, sectarian, ethnic, class, clan, etc.) has diverted attention towards irreconcilable differences. By contrast, shifting the focus to the local identity that encompasses and aggregates diverse identitarian groups and works to bridge the gaps between them could provide a workable alternative.  Localities have complex dynamics of interaction among different social groups. They have evolved tried and tested mechanisms for the reconciliation of differences. Social cohesion will be fostered through reviving local collective identities rather than the populist portrayal of Syria as a stagnant mixture of distinct and irreconcilable identitarian components or groups. 

National and Constitutional Dialogue on National Identity: The current construction of national identity, as defined by the Syrian political and constitutional order, will recreate conditions of exclusion as identity is perceived as an a priori and predefined construct, is heavily controlled and proscribed from the top down, and is limited to a rigid definition of national identity markers. This definition of identity fails to adequately reflect the diverse social and local nuances of Syrian identitarian groups and even the differences inside each group. But more problematically, it also heeds little to the need for balancing the relationship between the centre and the local levels politically, administratively, economically, and socially. Key Issues to consider:

• A national dialogue focused on the national identity is imperative: This needs to be fostered both in the track 1 process but perhaps the debate needs to also be opened to other tracks. The debate should go beyond the pre-determination of national identity markers as envisioned by the Government nominated delegation to the Constitutional Committee, or the creation of a more inclusive construct of national identity that resonates with identitarian groups, as envisioned by the delegation of the Opposition Negotiation Commission. Very rich alternatives are possible when considering the local level as place for resolving identity tensions.
• Unpack the complex relation between the centre and the local: through a comprehensive revision of the issue of decentralization in Syria, the design of the administrative order, the distribution of resources and the creation of transparent relations between the central and local levels. This should be an essential entry point for the constitutional debate in the Syrian political process.

Institutional Levers for National Identity: National and local identities are not simple by-products of constitutional design. In fact, the most relevant factor for identity construction is the daily praxis of institutions and not their normative design per se. Institutional functions, administrative structures, and the day-to-day work of formal and informal governance bodies are of utmost importance. The reform of institutions to enhance their ability to reflect a transparent process of sustaining national identity and creating the balance with local identities will be of utmost relevance in the post-conflict period. The institutional design should encompass:

• Economic empowerment and decentralization: Strengthen the economic capabilities of localities and launch a process of decentralisation that fosters transparent allocation of authorities and responsibilities on the basis of subsidiarity. Preventing economic marginalization is essential to bridging the divide between the local and national identities.
• Allow for local-to-local interaction: It is posited that extreme centralisation poses a greater threat to social cohesion and the emergence of a unified national identity than a carefully designed process of decentralisation that fosters possibilities for the local administrations to enhance their collective bonds and work closely with each other and with the centre to resolve problems of local identity. The experience demonstrates that these issues, left to the prerogative of the centre alone, did not create a better adherence to national identity. To the contrary it allowed for central elites and their ideology to play with local patronage networks and increase social and identitarian tensions at the local level.
• Administrative division planning: The design of the administrative divisions in Syria is at the core of conflict dynamics. The conflict has fostered new territorial divisions. There is a need to formulate a strategic plan for transparently managing administrative divisions respecting local identities and their sensitivities. A careful balance should be struck between the need for creating new administrative divisions to better manage local identity and the need to avoid administrative divisions as a tool for rentier distribution of resources to foster patronage and clientelist networks for national elites. New governorates may be in order such as Qalamoun, Ghouta, Palmyra, Qamishli, Manbij, and potentially Salamiyah.
• Avoiding the populist definition of identity: The process of administrative demarcation should be entirely distinct from the calls for managing identity issues through negotiations among identitarian groups (or identitarian components) at the national level. Such an approach is only likely to replace national level elites with a new crop of sectarian, ethnic and tribal populist leaders.
• The socio-economic logic of administrative design: The feasibility of new administrative units from an economic point of view should be considered to avoid the creation of redundant layers of governance that can only work to foster corruption and clientelism. Moreover, aggregating local economic resources and social capital in a transparent manner is vital in creating sustainable and stable local identities. Social capital will be one of the most important resources in the reconstruction of the country in the post conflict.

Preservation of local identities: At a first instance this should entail avoiding actions that could erode local identities, such as altering the names of localities or modifying their administrative boundaries without proper consultations and agreement among the local communities. But beyond that, there is a need to designate resources, to support communities to generate positive expressions of their local identity, to protect their identity markers, preserve their heritage assets, and to ensure that identity is constantly being allowed to represent the living spirit of the local communities.

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Introduction

The landscape of Middle Eastern conflict underwent a notable evolution in the aftermath of the Gaza War, with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) emerging as a significant player in the matrix of Iranian-backed military operations. This report scrutinizes the pattern of IRI-initiated strikes on U.S. installations in Syria and Iraq and evaluates the corresponding U.S. military responses within the framework of the broader geopolitical contest that unfolded post the Gaza War.
The data compiled within this document have been meticulously sourced from the following authoritative resources:
1. Official Statements and Bulletins: Data was sourced directly from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's official Telegram channels, associated Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) factions, formal press releases from the United States, and attack chronologies developed by Dr. Hamid Hamed, a recognized expert on IRGC and PMU activities in the region⁽¹⁾.
2. Strikes Specifics: Detailed strike coordination’s were obtained by the author of the report using ArcGIS.
3. Report Visual: Map, Charts, Data Tables, were created by the author of the report using ArcGis, Power Pi, and Adobe Illustrator.

The Emergence of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq: Coordination and Operations

The term “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” first came to prominence following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, initially serving as an umbrella term for various Sunni armed factions known for their production of visual media and official statements. This collective identity waned as Shiite militant groups, backed by Iran, gained dominance. On October 21, 2023, the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” reemerged in the spotlight when armed factions under this banner executed missile and drone strikes on U.S. military installations in Syria and Iraq. These attacks were a direct response to the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip in October 2023, which received U.S. support.
Unlike its initial formation in 2003, the reconstituted Islamic Resistance in Iraq, also referred to as Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, has evolved into a formidable coalition of militias with deep ties to Iran. Operating actively within Iraq and extending its influence into Syria, this alliance has become a pivotal force in the regional geopolitical arena. It challenges U.S. interests and presence through a sophisticated network of operations, employing military tactics to assert its influence and achieve its objectives across the Middle East⁽²⁾. During the October 2023 conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq demonstrated its strategic capabilities and intentions by launching coordinated strikes against U.S.-aligned targets. These operations underscored the coalition's role as a significant actor in the broader regional conflict, capable of conducting complex military actions across borders. The group's involvement in these strikes aligns with Iran's regional goals and its commitment to countering U.S. military influence and policies in the Middle East.

Figure (1): Islamic Resistance in Iraq Structure at the Time of Formation

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq's command structure showcases an advanced level of organization and coordination, significantly influenced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the IRGC-QF plays a crucial role in orchestrating the activities of the coalition, bringing together various Iraqi militia groups under a unified command for strategic purposes ⁽³⁾.
The strategic operations carried out by the coalition during this period were characterized by their high degree of coordination and sophistication, highlighting the group's ability to mobilize and execute military strategies effectively. These actions were not only aimed at challenging U.S. interests in the region but also demonstrated the coalition's capacity for significant military engagement. The ability of the coalition to extend its operations to Syria further exemplifies its broad reach and the transnational nature of its objectives.
The adoption of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” as a collective term is particularly noteworthy, echoing the nomenclature historically used by Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups. This branding strategy not only strengthens the collective identity of these militias but also acts as a unifying label that embodies their shared ethos of resistance. Prominent groups within the coalition, such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, have refrained from claiming separate operations within their usual areas of influence. This suggests a strong sense of unity within the coalition, emphasizing its role as a comprehensive representation of Iran-backed resistance efforts in Iraq ⁽⁴⁾.

Overview of Attacks Against U.S. Bases in Syria and Iraq by the IRI

Between October 18, 2023, and February 28, 2024, a total of /190/ attacks were reported against U.S. military bases in Syria and Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claimed responsibility for the majority of these incidents, showcasing a blend of conventional and innovative tactics in their operations. The group's arsenal featured medium-range missiles (al-Aqsa 1), drones (Qasef-2K/Shahed 101), and suicide drones, reflecting a strategic evolution and experimentation in their approach to combat. While the bulk of these assaults took place in Iraq and Syria, a handful were also recorded in Jordan, targeting vital strategic assets such as airbases, oil fields, and critical locations housing U.S. forces. These sites, heavily fortified with advanced defense mechanisms and artillery, underscore the strategic significance of the targets chosen by the IRI.

Map (1): Locations of the Attacks on U.S. Bases in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan – 18 Oct 2023 to 28 Feb 2024

Post-Gaza War Attacks on U.S. Bases

In the aftermath of the Gaza conflict, the IRI launched its initial assault on October 18, 2023, executing simultaneous strikes on the Ain Asad Airbase and the Harir US Base in Iraq. The Ain Asad Airbase emerged as a focal point, enduring /37/ documented attacks. The Harir US Base and Erbil Airport also ranked high on the IRI's target list, suffering /15/ and /5/ attacks, respectively. The IRI's tactics were marked by diversity and sophistication, employing Iranian-manufactured drones, artillery, and long-range missiles to execute their strategic objectives^(5-6-7) Shifting focus to Syria, the al-Omar Oil Field and Conoco Gas Field were subjected to a combined total of /49/ attack. This strategic focus on targeting facilities near the border between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and areas controlled by the Syrian regime “Area of Iran high presence and influence” in Deir Ezzor highlights the IRI's strategic priorities. Military bases such as the Shadadi US Base and the al-Tanf US Base were also significantly targeted, receiving /17/ and /10/ attacks, respectively, further emphasizing the strategic pattern of the IRI's operations across the region. A detailed breakdown of the targets can be found in the Appendix.
This period of heightened activity by the IRI against U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq not only demonstrates the group's operational capabilities and strategic intent but also highlights the evolving landscape of military engagement in the region, with implications for both regional stability and international security dynamics.

Table (1): IRI Attacks Breakdown 18 October 2023 to 28 February 2024

Strategic Dynamics and Retaliatory Patterns in U.S.-IRI Conflict: A Timeline Analysis

Late October to Mid-November 2023: Retaliatory Dynamics in Deir Ezzor

The initiation of U.S. strikes on October 27, followed by further actions on October 30 and November 9, 2023, marks a period of increased military activity, notably during weeks 42 to 45. This escalation aligns with the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State on November 5, suggesting a deliberate pattern of engagement and possibly an effort to demonstrate U.S. determination. The temporal correlation between these U.S. military operations and the surge in attacks indicates a retaliatory dynamic, highlighting the conflict's reactive nature, where U.S. actions prompt immediate countermeasures by opposing factions.

December 2023 to January 2024: Escalation Following U.S. Airstrikes

A NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN ATTACKS IN WEEK 49 AND CONTINUING INTO EARLY JANUARY 2024 CORRELATES WITH U.S. AIRSTRIKES ON DECEMBER 23 AND SUBSEQUENT JANUARY OPERATIONS TARGETING NUJABA ATTACK CELLS AND THEIR LEADERS. THIS PATTERN SUGGESTS A CYCLE OF REPRISAL FOLLOWING U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS. THE FLUCTUATING ATTACK RATES IN RESPONSE TO U.S. ACTIONS REVEAL A CONTINUOUS LOOP OF ACTION AND RETALIATION, EMPHASIZING THE DIFFICULTY OF SECURING A LASTING DE-ESCALATION THROUGH MILITARY MEANS ALONE.

Late January 2024: The Rukban (Tower 22) Attack and Its Aftermath

THE SIGNIFICANT UPTICK IN ATTACKS DURING WEEK 04, CULMINATING IN THE RUKBAN ATTACK ON JANUARY 28 THAT RESULTED IN SEVERAL U.S. CASUALTIES, FOLLOWED BY KATAIB HEZBOLLAH'S SUSPENSION OF ATTACKS ON JANUARY 30, REPRESENTS A CRITICAL JUNCTURE. THIS PAUSE IN HOSTILITIES MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A DECREASE IN ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. BASES, AS OBSERVED IN THE SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN WEEK 05. THIS SERIES OF EVENTS UNDERSCORES THE INTRICATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECT CONFRONTATIONS WITH CASUALTIES AND THE STRATEGIC DECISIONS BY MILITANT GROUPS TO TEMPORARILY CEASE OPERATIONS, EITHER FOR REASSESSMENT OR AS A TACTICAL PAUSE IN ANTICIPATION OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE (TOWER 22) INCIDENT.

Early February 2024: U.S. Airstrikes and Strategic Implications

In early February 2024, the United States launched airstrikes on over /90/ locations in Syria and Iraq, targeting the operational capabilities of Iran-backed militias. Among the key figures targeted were two commanders from Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, including the military operations director, Abu Baqr al-Saeedi. These actions are part of a broader U.S. strategy aimed at countering Iranian influence and militia activities in the Middle East, reflecting the intricate balance of military power, strategic interests, and regional dynamics. The U.S. justified these strikes as self-defense measures to protect its forces from Iranian-backed group attacks, emphasizing a focus on terrorist entities supported by the IRGC and avoiding Iraqi state forces to minimize collateral damage and prevent an escalation with Iraqi authorities.

Late February 2024: Strategic Pause by Militant Groups

A significant development occurred when Akram al-Kaabi, the General Secretary of al-Nujaba within the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, announced a temporary cessation of hostilities against U.S. bases by his group and other IRI factions. This pause, described as a tactical repositioning rather than an end to hostilities, indicates a strategic recalibration by the militias in response to U.S. military pressure. This move suggests a nuanced interplay of tactics, signaling, and strategic adjustments by both U.S. forces and Iranian-backed groups, highlighting the ongoing complexity and unpredictability of the regional security landscape ⁽⁸⁾.

Pattern of the Attacks: IRI's Leading Role in Targeting U.S. Bases

Between October 18, 2023, and February 28, 2024, U.S. military bases located in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan were subjected to a total of /190/ attack. The IRI has been identified as the primary perpetrator, claiming responsibility for /158/ of these incidents. This represents approximately 83% of the total attacks, highlighting the IRI's dominant operational presence and its aggressive posture towards U.S. forces in the region. Additionally, Hezbollah al-Nujaba has acknowledged their role in /5/ specific events, which accounts for nearly 3% of the overall attacks. These targeted operations by Hezbollah al-Nujaba were reportedly in direct retaliation to U.S. strikes on their leadership and facilities.
The emergence of the “Son of Al-Jazeera” armed group, responsible for /8/ attacks or about 4% of the total during this period, marks a notable development. Although their involvement is relatively minor, these attacks were distinctly aimed at SDF personnel at U.S. bases or checkpoints within Deir Ezzor. Insights from sources in Deir Ezzor suggest that these incidents are linked to the ongoing tensions between Arab tribes and SDF/Asayish forces in the region. The volatile security environment, further destabilized by the IRI's actions, has led to several significant assaults, particularly near the Al-Omar oil field and Conoco gas field in Deir Ezzor, resulting in numerous SDF casualties.⁽⁹⁾ However, /19/ incidents, accounting for 10% of the total, remain unclaimed. The absence of attribution for these attacks might reflect a strategic choice by certain groups to maintain operational secrecy or a deliberate decision to avoid recognition to prevent potential retaliatory or political consequences ⁽¹⁰⁾.

Chart (1): Analyzing Responsibility for Attacks on U.S. Bases - 18 October 2023 to 28 February 2024

Overall Implication and Strategic Assessment

The intricate geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, marked by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's (IRI) calculated strikes on U.S. interests, showcases a nuanced Iranian strategy of employing proxy groups to extend its sphere of influence across the region. From October 2023 to January 2024, the IRI's assertive military operations have underscored its pivotal role within Iran's broader strategy of exerting pressure across the Middle East. This approach mirrors the tactics of other Iranian-backed militias in southern Syria against northern Israel, Hezbollah's activities in the same area, and the Houthi campaigns in Yemen and against Israeli targets. The synchronized efforts of these proxies, under Tehran's direction, represent a multifaceted campaign aimed at bolstering Iran's bargaining position against the United States. The uniformity of these operations across various fronts highlights a coherent Iranian strategy designed to project power and gain leverage⁽¹¹⁾.
In response, the United States has adopted a containment strategy aimed at mitigating IRI attacks and curbing broader Iranian influence, favoring management of regional tensions over escalation. This measured military response reflects a strategic choice to maintain the status quo while avoiding the onset of a larger conflict that neither the U.S. nor Iran desires. ⁽¹²⁾ The U.S. strategy extends beyond direct military engagements to include collaborative efforts with regional allies. From October 7, 2023, to March 5, 2024, Israel executed /41/ strikes on Iran-affiliated targets, significantly undermining their operational capabilities. These operations resulted in the destruction of several key locations and the assassination of /15/ high-ranking IRGC commanders, with the IRGC's War-Media unit confirming the deaths of /10/ of these figures. Moreover, Jordan's initiatives against armed groups in southern Syria, alongside joint UK-U.S. operations targeting the Houthis in Yemen, play a crucial role in the overarching U.S. strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region. These collaborative actions underscore a comprehensive approach to mitigating the challenges posed by Iran and its proxies, emphasizing the importance of international partnerships in addressing regional security concerns ^(13-14).
This multilateral approach underscores a concerted effort to challenge Iranian interests from multiple angles, thereby bolstering the effectiveness of U.S. containment strategies. Through both independent and coordinated actions, a comprehensive U.S.-led initiative aims to limit Iranian expansion without precipitating a wider conflict. In this complex environment, both Iran and the U.S. leverage their respective alliances and capabilities to exert influence and secure advantages, setting the stage for a potential return to diplomatic negotiations. Both nations, recognizing the risks of escalating a sustained pressure campaign into a more significant conflict, seem inclined towards dialogue. This strategic perspective acknowledges that while pressure tactics can be maintained temporarily, they do not serve the long-term interests of either party and pose the risk of sparking a broader confrontation that both sides are eager to avoid.

Conclusion

In summary, the activities of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) from October 2023 to February 2024 mark a critical juncture in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, characterized by a nuanced blend of military actions, strategic positioning, and diplomatic efforts. The IRI's bold initiatives, including numerous attacks on U.S. interests and its synergy with Iran's regional goals, underscore its pivotal role in the complex geopolitical tapestry of the Middle East. These events not only pose challenges to the U.S.'s strategic interests in the region but also mirror the larger power struggle between the U.S. and Iran, a contest played out through proxy groups and tactical military engagements.
The IRI's advanced organizational structure, strategic operations, and unified branding as a resistance movement reflect a deliberate strategy of military and political engagement. This strategy is emblematic of Iran's broader aim to utilize proxy forces as tools of regional dominance, seeking to assert influence and gain strategic advantages over the United States. The sequence of assaults followed by U.S. and allied counteractions highlights a persistent cycle of action and reaction, emphasizing the difficulties in securing enduring peace and stability in the region solely through military means.
This era of heightened conflict and strategic interaction between the IRI, the U.S., and their allies accentuates the need for a comprehensive approach that goes beyond conventional military responses. Such an approach must integrate diplomatic initiatives, political solutions, and regional collaborations to adeptly address the multifaceted challenges facing the Middle East. The primary objective should be to de-escalate tensions, avert a wider conflict, and strive for a lasting peace that tackles the root causes of the ongoing cycle of violence and retribution. The events spanning late 2023 to early 2024 serve as a vivid reminder of the delicate power equilibrium in the region and the paramount importance of strategic diplomacy in reducing the risk of further escalations and ensuring long-term stability.
 

^([1]) Islamic Resistance in Iraq and other affiliations accounts on Telegram Platform. (To better understand how the present any positive/negative developments for their followers)

^([2]) The Islamic Resistance in Iraq...a coalition of armed groups to support the “Al-Aqsa Flood”, 5 February 2024. Al-Jazzera https://shorturl.at/gmqL8

^([3])  The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, October 17, 2023. Hamdi Malik, Michael Knights, https://bit.ly/3wFASrj.

^([4]) Profile: Al-Warithuun, September 13, 2022 (Updated on October 2023), The Washington Institute, Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, Crispin Smith, https://bit.ly/3P5obfV.

^([5]) Signs of Iranian Coordination in Iraqi Base Attacks and Messaging, The Washington Institute, Post October 17, 2023. Analyzes the coordination behind attacks on US bases in Iraq, emphasizing Iranian involvement.

^([6]) The "Islamic Resistance" in Iraq: We attacked 3 American bases in Iraq and Syria with missiles and drones, 24 February 2024 https://shorturl.at/txDMY

^([7])Syria & Yemen, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, October 18, 2023. Insights into drone and rocket attacks by Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria.

^([8]) A movement affiliated with the “Iraqi Resistance”: We continue to target Zionist sites, February 25, 2024, Al-Quds https://shorturl.at/nKX14

^([9]) Anti-U.S. Attacks Linked to the Sons of Jazira and Euphrates Movement, The Washington Institute, October 27, 2023. Hamdi Malik, Michael Knights https://bit.ly/3P7xoEt.

^([10]) Iran Update, October 23, 2023, Institute for the Study of War, October 23, 2023. Discusses Iranian activities and positions in relation to the ongoing conflict.

Iran Update, October 24, 2023, Institute for the Study of War, October 24, 2023. Analysis of Iran's information operations and their i

mpact on the conflict.

Iran Update, November 18, 2023, Institute for the Study of War, November 18, 2023. Briefs on recent threats and attacks by Iranian-backed militias against US forces.

^([11]) “The calm before the storm and surprises are coming.” Al-Nujaba escalates its rhetoric against the American forces in Iraq, 26 February 2024. Sputnik https://shorturl.at/xLVY6

^([12])  Assessment of Security Threats to U.S. Military Installations in the Middle East Post-Gaza Conflict, U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov

^([13])  U.S. launches strikes in Iraq, Syria, nearly 40 reported killed, February 04, 2024. Reuters https://bit.ly/3wE3v8d

^([14]) US Strikes Stoking Tensions with Iraq, February 06, 2024. Jeff Seldin, Voice Of America, https://bit.ly/49AcqGq.

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key events in Syria during the month of January 2024, focusing on political, security, and economic developments. It examines the developments at different levels.

·       Politically, efforts to normalize relations with the Syrian regime continue, with Arab nations offering more incentives for the regime to address their demands. Despite these efforts, the 21^st round of Astana peace talks saw no significant progress.

·       Security, Syria remains a battleground with ongoing conflicts between Iran and its militias versus the U.S. and Israel. The Syrian-Jordanian border faces a growing drug smuggling crisis Turkey has intensified its military operations in northeastern Syria, expanding its targets beyond military and security installations to also include infrastructure and service facilities managed by the “Autonomous Administration,” as well as oil and gas fields.

·       Economically, the Syrian regime persisted in leveraging available opportunities to bolster its treasury through the augmentation of fuel prices and the elevation of service fees and taxes. Concurrently, the northwestern regions of Syria observed initiatives aimed at enhancing the economic landscape.

The Path to Normalization: Navigating Acceptance and Resistance

In a strategic move to mitigate its global isolation, the Syrian regime's Deputy Foreign Minister participated in the Non-Aligned Countries' summit in Kampala, Uganda. During this event, the Syrian delegation engaged in bilateral discussions with representatives from North Korea, Venezuela, Russia, Cuba, and the Republic of Guyana.

As part of its efforts to bolster ties with Arab nations, the regime named its ambassador to Tunisia, reciprocated by the United Arab Emirates appointing its ambassador to Damascus. Despite this Arab rapprochement, Western nations remain skeptical about the benefits of normalizing relations with the Regime government. Brigitte Cormi, France's Special Envoy for Syria, highlighted the regime's stubbornness as a significant barrier to normalization efforts, urging the international community not to sideline the Syrian crisis amidst other global concerns. Similarly, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State labeled the Assad regime a primary hurdle to political progress in Syria, reaffirming U.S. support for UN Resolution No. 2254 and stating that the U.S. would neither normalize relations with Damascus nor lift sanctions without a political resolution.

In another development, the 21^st round of Astana talks concluded without significant advancements in key issues. However, the guarantor states—Turkey, Russia, and Iran—agreed to rejuvenate the Constitutional Committee's negotiations and uphold the military de-escalation in Idlib, despite failing to foster normalization between Turkey and the Syrian regime.

In Northwestern Syria, the Salvation Government announced the creation of the General Directorate of Works and Roads, alongside urban planning initiatives for several towns and cities. On the humanitarian file, the United Nations and the Syrian regime agreed to extend the delivery of humanitarian aid through the “Bab al-Hawa” crossing for an additional six months, starting from January 13, 2024, to July 13, 2024. This extension also includes aid delivery through the Bab Al-Salama and Al-Rai crossings until February 13, 2024.

In Northeastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration of northern and eastern regions has implemented revisions to the Media Law, aligning it with the most recent iteration of the Social Contract introduced at the previous year's end. Concurrently, it initiated the establishment of the High Electoral Commission, tasked with developing a preliminary electoral law framework. This step is in anticipation of conducting comprehensive elections in the forthcoming phase within its jurisdiction, addressing the ongoing legitimacy crisis that impedes its claim to represent the northeastern Syrian populace effectively. In addition, the Autonomous Administration has offered a general amnesty to those evading compulsory military service. Furthermore, it has shown a greater willingness to initiate conversations with stakeholders both within the country and on the global stage. Mahmoud al-Muslat, the co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council, has openly expressed his readiness to engage in discussions with all interested parties, from local entities to international ones, Turkey included.

The Escalating Drug Crisis in Syria: Implications and International Reactions

The Syrian regime, has undertaken a series of unannounced reforms within its security and intelligence sectors, including the reassignment of Ali Mamlouk from his role as the head of the National Security Bureau to a presidential advisor on national security affairs. Major General Kifah al-Mulhim has been appointed as the new head of the National Security Bureau. Additionally, /54/ retired generals have been reinstated to contribute to the restructuring of the security apparatus, aiming to enhance its efficiency and direct coordination under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad. These reforms, largely seen as symbolic, are part of efforts to appease Russian demands and facilitate broader normalization with Arab and Western nations through internal adjustments.

Israeli forces, conducted multiple strikes against sites associated with Iranian militias in Syria, leading to the death of four commanders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including high-ranking officials from the Quds Force. Additionally, the Israeli forces assassinated Hassan Okasha, a Hamas leader implicated in launching rockets from Syrian territory towards the the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Concurrently, the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq kept on targeting U.S. bases across several locations in northeastern Syria, including al-Omar, Rmelan, al-Malikiyah, al-Shadadi, and the U.S. base in Himo town.

In Southern Syria, in response to the ongoing conflict in Gaza and its repercussions for Syria, Russia has established two military positions in al-Quneitra and initiated aerial patrols along the “Bravo line,” the demarcation line between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. This move aims to prevent further escalations and monitor provocative activities along the border, potentially mitigating broader confrontations in the Golan region.

Jordan has intensified its efforts against drug trafficking from Syria, executing four airstrikes on suspected drug trafficking locations in al-Suwayda, which regrettably resulted in civilian casualties. Jordanian military forces also engaged with armed groups involved in drug trafficking within the free zone east of Sweid. The Men of Dignity movement (Rijal al-Karama movement), a prominent military faction in al-Suwayda, proposed a nine-point initiative to Jordan, emphasizing the need to prevent civilian casualties during these operations, in another development, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, a leader within “al-Druze al-Muwahhidun” sect and an opponent of the Assad regime, announced his support for the ongoing Jordanian military operations against drug traffickers. Amidst these developments, the Syrian regime and the Jordanian government have exchanged accusations, each blaming the other for jeopardizing border security. While Daraa continues to face security challenges due to the presence of various military and security groups, leading to ongoing violence, including targeted killings. A significant incident was the assassination of the head of the regime's criminal security center in Izraa. Additionally, the area has witnessed clashes between Ex-Opposition groups and ISIS cells, resulting in the death of Osama Shehadeh al-Azizi, identified as ISIS's governor of Hauran.

Among all these developments, ISIS has intensified its activities, announcing a campaign/raid titled “and kill them where you educated them”, after the announcement they executed 34 attacks across Syria in January 2024, included 22 in Deir Ezzor, 4 in Aleppo, 3 in Homs, 3 in Hasakah, and 2 in Raqqa. The increase in ISIS attacks reflects the growing instability and tension in the region, further aggravated by assaults from Iran-supported militias on U.S. bases. This surge in violence also suggests that ISIS has managed to regain some of its military strength, enabling it to launch operations across various locations.

In Idlib, ongoing assaults by regime forces and Iranian militias continue, with heavy artillery strikes on various cities and towns resulting in the death of 40 civilians, predominantly women and children, and injuring many others. A notable escalation occurred when Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fired a ballistic missile from Iranian soil, targeting a medical facility in the village of Talteta. In retaliation, the Turkish military engaged regime positions along the Saraqib front, responding to attacks on a Turkish base in Ibzimu.

Meanwhile, The Turkish Ministry of Defense reported neutralizing 14 members of the People's Protection Units (YPG) accused of initiating aggressive actions in the Euphrates Shield zone. This was in retaliation to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) shelling of a Turkish base in Kaljibrin, in addition, TSK drones conducted over 70 strikes on a variety of targets, including checkpoints, facilities, oil fields, and infrastructure across the region, such as the Swedish power plant. These attacks resulted in casualties among the SDF, triggered a fuel shortage, and led to a comprehensive power outage lasting several days.

In Deir Ezzor, the SDF have reopened al-Ashara crossing, bridging territories under their control with the Syrian regime held-areas. This move aims to curtail smuggling routes exploited by Iranian-backed militias to infiltrate the SDF held-areas and execute attacks on U.S. military bases.

Syrian Regime's Policies Exacerbate the Livelihood Crisis

The Syrian regime, has adjusted the foreign remittance dollar exchange rate from /12,500/ to /13,000/ SYP, aiming to boost incoming remittances and stabilize foreign exchange reserves. Concurrently, the Ministry of Internal Trade implemented a significant fuel price hike, with diesel prices for vehicles soaring by nearly 500% to reach /11,880/ SYP. This move has led to heightened inflation and a substantial 70% surge in the cost of essential goods and materials in Damascus.

In another development, the regime has enacted measures to increase service fees and taxes, including a 200% hike in passport fees and elevated registration costs for Sharia education certificates. Additionally, a new tax on cement production is anticipated to further escalate the prices of goods and services, adversely affecting the living standards of citizens, business owners, and industrialists. This economic pressure is expected to exacerbate migration drivers and potentially trigger a new refugee wave.

In the realm of international economic engagement, the Syrian-Iranian Chamber of Commerce has ratified its annual agenda, which encompasses the formation of Iranian investment entities within Syria. The regime is also exploring economic opportunities in South America, evidenced by the organization of a Syrian trade delegation to Brazil aimed at revitalizing previously established agreements.

Striving for Early Recovery: Efforts and Challenges

In the Opposition Held-Areas, the inaugural investment conference took place in the city of al-Ra'i, marking a significant effort to enhance the economic landscape and create employment opportunities. Complementing these economic initiatives, the Syrian Civil Defense Organization launched a health program across /33/ schools in the Idlib and Aleppo regions. Additionally, the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) initiated the “Sams Medical City” project in Idlib, in collaboration with the Syrian Forum and the Syrian Civil Defense Organization. This project represents a significant advancement in healthcare provision for northwestern Syria, aiming to substantially improve medical services in the area.

The financial ecosystem in Idlib faced a setback when numerous exchange and remittance offices halted operations following the bankruptcy of the “al-Rais” Company for Remittances and Exchange. This event led to substantial financial losses, estimated at around three million dollars, and resulted in a dramatic increase in remittance fees, restricting transactions to a limited number of entities and companies.

In the SDF Held-Areas, the Autonomous Administration implemented new annual taxes on commercial and pharmaceutical businesses, a move that has been met with considerable opposition from the affected merchants. In an effort to regulate the economy, a series of measures concerning both foreign and local currencies were introduced, including significant regulations on the licensing of banking institutions. These financial and tax-related decisions are expected to exacerbate the cost of living for residents, heightening tensions between the Autonomous Administration and local Arab tribes. The region is already grappling with a severe fuel shortage, lacking essential supplies of diesel, gasoline, and gas, which threatens to increase costs in agriculture and production, further straining the economic stability of the area.

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key events in Syria during the month of December 2023, focusing on political, security, and economic developments. It examines the developments at different levels.

• Politically, the Regime government has continued to promote its perspective in global discussions, arguing that rebuilding efforts should not be contingent on political conditions. Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration formed a new presidential council and adopted a controversial social contract.
• Security, the ongoing war in Gaza has influenced the security situation in Syria. Israel has intensified its airstrikes against various military and logistical sites. The most significant strike, with a substantial impact on the IRGC, was in Sayyida Zeinab, resulting in the death of a prominent IRGC commander, Sayyed Reza Mousavi. Additionally, the Syrian-Jordanian border witnessed clashes between Jordanian forces and a group of drug smugglers.
• Economically, the Regime government's financial policies continue to be a key factor in the instability of the Syrian pound, unpredictable price increases, and the export of agricultural goods without considering local needs. Internationally, Iran has maintained its efforts in signing agreements and understandings with the Syrian Regime, aiming to gain greater control over Syria's economy.

Heightened Diplomatic Maneuvers, and a Controversial New Social Contract in Northeastern Syria

The regime's representatives in both the Security Council and the United Nations continued to assert their political narrative before the international community. “Al-Hakam Dundee,” the acting representative of the Syrian regime in the Security Council, continued to criticize Western countries for imposing economic sanctions on Syria, particularly the (Caesar Act), and insisted on the right to manage humanitarian aid from Damascus through Syria's official channels, not from Gaziantep, al-Rai, or Bab al-Salama crossings. In the ongoing search for solutions to the economic crisis, “Qusai al-Dahhak,” the regime's permanent delegate to the United Nations, participated in the second Global Refugee Forum held in Geneva.

During several meetings with international leaders at the Doha Forum, the Syrian opposition's political discourse concentrated on critical issues:

1. The opposition emphasized the necessity and importance of reactivating the stalled constitutional committee. They warned of the dangers associated with the absence of serious international pressure to initiate a political process. Such a process is vital for the full implementation of Resolution 2254 and is critical to addressing the deteriorating humanitarian and security situations in Syria.
2. They highlighted that the continued stagnation of the political process will have negative repercussions on humanitarian matters. Furthermore, they stressed the significance of supporting sustainable development projects in northern Syria to ensure long-term stability and growth.

Meanwhile, at its 4th conference in al-Raqqa, the Syrian Democratic Forces Council announced the election of a new council led by Mahmoud al-Mashhadani and Layla Qahraman. This change abolishes the executive president position, which had been held by Ilham Ahmed since the council's establishment in late 2015.

Al-Mashhadani, hailing from a prominent tribal family in al-Hasakah province, is a well-known and influential figure in the region. His appointment could be interpreted as a desire by the Administration or Washington to strengthen relations with Arab tribes in northeastern Syria, particularly following recent conflicts in Deir Ezzor. Additionally, it may signal the possibility of opening communication channels with areas controlled by the opposition and the regime.

In addition, the Autonomous Administration also approved the new Social Contract Law, renaming itself to (Democratic Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria,) which has several issues, including:

• It was drafted by the ruling party and its allies, thus reflecting the perspective of the de facto authority and its orientations.
• It emphasizes the continuation of the de facto authority imposing its philosophy, which is alien to the region's inhabitants and rejected by several components as it does not represent them.
• The inability to activate many of its articles for various reasons, making them problematic.

From an international perspective, the Turkish Defense Minister, Hulusi Akar, has linked the continuation of the Turkish presence in Syria to two key conditions: the elimination of terrorist organizations and the achievement of an agreement between the regime and opposition, leading to the drafting of a new constitution for the country and subsequent elections. This stance represents one of the ongoing challenges in the normalization process between Turkey and the Syrian regime, a dialogue-initiated months ago under Russian mediation. In parallel, the international envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, met with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister in Moscow. This meeting was part of Pedersen's ongoing efforts to discuss the resumption of the constitutional committee's work and address issues related to normalizing the social and economic situation in Syria, particularly considering the negative impact of sanctions and the lack of international funding.

Strategic Shifts in Syria: From Israeli Airstrikes to Internal Power Dynamics

The recent Israeli airstrikes in Damascus, which led to the death of Reza Mousavi, one of the oldest advisers of the IRGC in Syria, mark a continuation of Israel's strategy to target key Iranian figures orchestrating Tehran's security operations in Syria. These strikes, five in total across various Syrian regions, aim to dismantle Iranian strongholds and thwart Tehran's military support to Lebanon and Syria. Conversely, Iranian-backed militias have continued targeting U.S. bases in northeast Syria and northern Iraq in response to Israeli actions in Gaza.

In Southern Syria, the Regime continues to employ aggressive security tactics, including assassinations and city sieges, to assert its dominance over Daraa province. This is ostensibly to combat the remnants of “terrorist organizations.” Recently, regime forces encircled the city of Jassem for several days, conducting searches of civilian homes and farms in response to local armed factions attacking nearby security patrols. In addition, the area has seen a surge in Assassination attempts over the past month, affecting both civilians and military figures. Notably, Radi al-Hashish, the leader of the Central Committee in Daraa's western countryside, and Muhammad Yassin al-Makkhal, a drug dealer with ties to the Military Security branch, were assassinated. These incidents highlight the prevailing lawlessness exploited by various factions to further their agendas.

On the Jordanian-Syrian border, tensions escalated with a Jordanian air strike on the town of al-Mata'iya following skirmishes between the Jordanian army and smuggling groups. These clashes resulted in casualties, arrests, and the confiscation of significant quantities of drugs and weaponry. This marks a significant escalation in both the intensity and location of these confrontations, potentially leading to increased military and security tensions in southern Syria. Moreover, it raises the likelihood of Jordan engaging more directly in future conflicts with Iranian militias and smugglers, deviating from standard engagement protocols. This shift is partly due to the threat that border smuggling poses to Jordan's national security. Additionally, these developments could undermine the Arab Initiative's efforts to normalize relations with the regime, representing a continued setback for regional stability.

In Northwestern Syria, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham announced the dismissal of leader Jihad Issa al-Sheikh, also known as Abu Ahmad Zakour, for violating the group's policies. This move is part of a broader strategy to consolidate Al-Julani's control and eliminate internal competition, preparing the group for a new phase of leadership without the Old Problematic Members.

In Northeastern Syria, Turkish intelligence claimed responsibility for the assassination of Sherwan Hassan, a military commander in the SDF's Deir Ezzor region, through the use of Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs). Additionally, in response to an attack by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on a Turkish military site in Northern Iraq, which resulted in the deaths of 12 Turkish soldiers, the Turkish military has targeted approximately 50 sites. These include oil fields, military installations, and other facilities.

Navigating the Complex Economic Landscape: Currency Devaluation, International Alliances, and Local Infrastructure Developments

In the Regime Held-Areas, the Central Bank of Syria's recent adjustment of the Syrian pound's exchange rate against the U.S. dollar continues its 2023 monetary policy of 'managed floating' or 'directed floating.' While this approach allows market forces to influence the exchange rate, primarily guided by the black-market rate, it has resulted in the rapid devaluation of the Syrian Pound. The pound plummeted to 14,200 SYP on the black market and 12,500 SYP officially. Moreover, the regime increased the customs dollar rate by 30%, setting it at 8,500 SYP per U.S. dollar, up from 6,500 SYP. This adjustment is likely to further escalate prices of goods and services, encourage smuggling and the shadow economy, and impose additional burdens on exporters and importers due to increased customs duties. The regime's monetary strategies have already led to significant price hikes in essential commodities, with a 25% increase in meat prices from the previous month and soaring prices for vegetables and fruits. Subsidized gasoline prices have also seen the eighth increase within a year, reaching around 9,000 SYP per liter, while the price of free diesel rose to 10,900 SYP per liter, and fertilizer prices surged by up to 200%. Despite the economic strain these measures impose, the regime continues to export fruits, citrus, and Awassi sheep to Gulf markets, exacerbating local price inflation and ignoring the economic burdens on citizens, traders, and industrialists.

Internationally, the first shipment of industrial gas cylinders from India recently arrived in Syria, marking a notable development since the imposition of economic sanctions by Western countries in 2012. Amidst global attention on Gaza, this shipment underscores the regime's efforts to establish trade relations with friendly nations and secure vital supplies. Additionally, Air Algerie has resumed flights to Syria after a 12-year hiatus, signaling a gradual re-engagement with the international community. The regime has also held economic discussions with Baghdad to rejuvenate the electrical connection project between the two nations at the Bukamal/Qaim border point. Further, the Minister of Oil, Firas Qaddour, has engaged in talks with the Ambassador of the Republic of Venezuela to bolster cooperation in the oil and mineral resources sectors.

Meanwhile, the regime's relationship with Iran continues to strengthen, as evidenced by the signing of memorandums of understanding across various sectors, including banking, finance, tourism, and trade. These agreements are designed to bolster Iranian investment in Syria, facilitating initiatives such as the establishment of electric power plants and the elimination of customs duties between the two nations. The Central Bank of Syria and its Iranian counterpart are exploring avenues to enhance trade relations, including the establishment of a joint bank and the implementation of projects under an entity affiliated with Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

In the SDF Held-Areas, the northern and eastern regions of Syria have experienced a severe fuel crisis following the Turkish army's targeting of oil fields in al-Hasaka province. These strikes have caused collateral damage to other sectors, including electricity generation and industrial and agricultural production. In Amuda city, for instance, 20 out of 40 generators ceased operation due to not receiving their diesel allocations from the relevant authorities. Similarly, many neighborhoods in al-Qamishli have reported power outages from generators due to diesel shortages. Furthermore, the Autonomous Administration (AANES) has taken precautionary measures to protect foreign currency reserves in its territories. It has prohibited the outflow of U.S. dollars to areas controlled by the regime and the opposition as part of a broader strategy to restrict financial transactions. This decision suggests an uptick in financial or cash outflows through smuggling, illegal business activities, money laundering, and evasion of fees and taxes.

In Qamishli, minibuses (Saravis) drivers have gone on strike protesting the 4,000 SYP fare per passenger, which fails to cover fuel and repair costs. They are demanding an increase in the current fare to 5,000 SYP to better reflect their operational expenses.

In the Opposition Held-Areas, the Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) has initiated a project to support olive cultivation in the northern countryside of Aleppo, providing around 1,000 farmers with planting, pesticides, harvesting, and pruning equipment. The project is backed by a total budget of €1.89 million. Additionally, in response to the increasing demand for lending services in trade, services, manufacturing, industry, and agriculture sectors, the SRTF has launched the second phase of the livelihood project. This initiative aims to offer various loans and non-financial products and services to 1,170 entrepreneurs. In northwestern Syria, loans range from $400 to $8,000. The President of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), Abdul Rahman Mustafa, inaugurated the third bridge project in the city of Afrin. This initiative aims to alleviate pressure and congestion by linking the city's entrances and exits with other areas, as well as reducing security risks through enhanced control and meticulous scrutiny of trucks.

The Ministry of Justice in the Salvation Government of Idlib has established a commercial court in the city of Sarmada. This court is aimed at addressing lawsuits and disputes arising among merchants registered with the chambers of commerce. The establishment of this court follows a series of decisions aimed at enhancing regulatory control, including one to oversee contracting procedures. These measures are expected to contribute to the institutionalization and governance of the region and the regulation of commercial affairs. This is particularly pertinent given the extensive business activities and the complexity of commercial relations, accentuated by the Bab al-Hawa crossing that links Idlib with Turkey. Furthermore, the Salvation Government is attempting to attract investors to the areas under its control.

On the other hand, the chambers of industry and commerce of the local councils in the northern and eastern countryside of Aleppo have increased the annual fees for traders crossing into Turkish territory from $2,200 to $5,000. This decision is expected to negatively impact the economic landscape of the region, leading to a reluctance among many to register due to the high fees, a diminished interest among industrialists and traders to participate in economic activities, and increased unemployment rates. Meanwhile, the region's electricity company, AK Energy, issued a new list of electricity prices in December. The rates are now set at 2.81 Turkish Lira (TL) for household subscriptions and 3.22 TL for commercial subscriptions. Additionally, the Turkish government has opened a new PTT center in the city of Azaz to alleviate congestion at the existing center.