Executive Summary

In the wake of the Assad Regime’s collapse on the 8th of December 2024, Syria stands at a critical crossroads, as it presents both opportunities for reform and risks of further fragmentation. Previously, management of the territorial system of Syria was heterogenous despite the State’s hegemonic outlook. The central state applied diverse formulas for managing the territory focused mainly on building loyalty to the Baath regime rather than focusing on the efficiency and effectiveness of administration to serve local communities. During the upheaval of the Syrian revolution and the ensuing conflict, authorities in Damascus transformed the territorial system in Syria. Many of the areas that fell outside the control of the central regime adopted their own territorial orders. Today, amid the uncertainty surrounding the country's future, there is an urgent need to revisit and understand the territorial structures of Syria—examining their historical trajectories and evolving geography leading up to November 2024. This understanding is crucial for guiding future efforts in restructuring the territorial order in an effective manner; this will be essential for reorganizing the country’s territorial hierarchies, administrative borders, and political economy in a manner that supports sustainable reconstruction and fair representation of Syria’s diverse communities.

As such, this paper proposes an analytical framework to approach the complex spatial dynamics of Syria's territorial orders, examining how they were shaped by historical legacies, centralization efforts, and the impact of 14 years of conflict, influencing governance practices and everyday life across the country. Aggregation in this context refers to the consolidation and concentration of authority at various levels of territorial administrations within set boundaries, shaping the interactions between central and local authorities. Whereas other papers in this series will focus on governmental and formal and informal political dimensions of territories, this paper will focus on spatial manifestations looking into distribution of administrative units, internal borders, and population densities.

The paper begins with an overview of the historical roots of territorial governance in Syria, summarizing its evolution from Ottoman administrative reforms seeking balanced centralisation, through the strong asymmetries imposed by the French Mandate and into post-independence highly centralized governance models. Most importantly, we discuss how territorial systems were divided in two separate overlapping frameworks that were never reconciled, mainly the territorial units (governorates, districts and sub-districts) and the municipal units (cities, towns, and townships). Dynamically changing administrative divisions were persistently used as mechanisms to consolidate central authority and exert control over diverse and often fragmented territories. Societal and regional divisions were often exacerbated by introducing and reinforcing strong spatial asymmetries, which served as tools for managing or manipulating local populations and resources in return.

The paper places a critical focus on the Decree 107 of 2011 as the existing legal framework for managing the local governance. This law will be the point of departure to reform the system of territorial governance in Syria. Understanding how the law was implemented to demarcate the local administration units will be critical for any reform process in the future. The said decree aimed to promote decentralization by granting greater autonomy to Local Administrative Units (LAUs). In theory, it offered a pathway to increased local agency in managing local affairs, transparency, and civic participation. However, in practice, central control remained entrenched, as the central government retained the power to dissolve councils, manipulate their formation, and reconfigure territorial boundaries to serve its political interests. This led to imbalances and disparities in the distribution of councils, limiting genuine local autonomy and fostering dependency on central authority as the ultimate arbiter in local affairs. Rather than achieving meaningful decentralization, the implementation of Decree 107 often reinforced existing hierarchies and patronage networks, undermining the law's intended reforms.

Conflict further fragmented Syria’s territorial governance, giving rise to distinct models of local governance under various de facto authorities. Each governance model tried to adapt to unique political, social, and regional considerations, resulting in disparate approaches to administration, resource allocation, and public service provision. Today, despite the fall of the Assad regime, the legacy of fragmented spatial geometries highlight the challenges of reunifying the territory, adjusting regional disparities and achieving a viable cohesive governance model. In this context, Decree 107 serves as the starting point in understanding the territorial framework and setting a baseline for comparison between the divided areas, as a first step in developing a new unified framework.

By interrogating the spatial dynamics of territorial orders, this paper illuminates the dual role of territorial governance structures as instruments of control and as reflections of socio-political realities. The study underscores the importance of re-designing territorial orders using new spatial demarcations that could balance political authority, administrative efficiency, and local identity. Such designs must prioritize inclusivity, equitable service delivery, and meaningful local autonomy to foster stability, cohesion, and sustainable development. Ultimately, the success of territorial governance in Syria will depend on its ability to adapt to shifting socio-political realities while addressing historical asymmetries, finding commonalities in the various territorial models and harmonizing differences to promote a more equitable distribution of power and resources. We conclude with a series of recommendations for the future of territorial orders in Syria:

1. Tackling Systemic and Historical Imbalances: Addressing entrenched disparities to ensure equitable distribution of resources, authority, and representation across all regions.
2. Leveraging Cities as Localized Cross-Geography Constants: Utilizing urban centres as anchors of stability and development, fostering connectivity and cohesion across fragmented territories.
3. Balancing Peripheral Orders: Harmonizing the relationships between central and local authorities to promote inclusivity, efficiency, and local empowerment in governance.

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Introduction

The history of Syrian geography is inseparable from the history of its tribes, which settled in the Levant and its Baadiyah (deserts and steppes) during ancient pre-Christian times. As the geography changed, so did ruling regimes,; tribes also experienced significant political and structural transformations, forming a historically extended social system with evolving features still observable today.

An examination of Syria's political history, both ancient and modern, reveals that tribes and tribalism are both key factors in social, political, and power dynamics; often embodying power itself. Arab and other tribes established kingdoms, emirates, and states, ruling regions across different historical periods. They engaged in conflicts, alliances, and submission with various authorities, possessing elements that made them a governance system predating many ancient and modern structures. Through these interactions, their social structures evolved, transitioning from nomadic to semi-settled, with the latter eventually merging into cities and becoming fully urbanized. The latter shift is harder to trace compared to the more distinct nomadic structures.

With Syria's integration into the modern state system, pivotal transformations occurred within tribal and clan structures due to various successive changes (economic, political, social, military, legal). These cumulative effects were evident in the tribes and clans, starting with their economic patterns, which were dismantled as they were either willingly or forcibly moved from a nomadic to a settled, agricultural-based economy. This shift led to a change in their historical roles, most of which were lost to the nation-state, which confined them within new borders, stripping them of the open geography that had historically been a key source of their strength.

The tribe adapted to the modern state structure embracing the new dynamics. Depending on the shifting powers, the role and position of tribes and clans evolved: sometimes as a disruptive or competing alternative; and at other times as a strong ally with considerable influence in rural areas, counterbalancing urban families and notable figures. In many cases, tribes served as a broad social basis, forming much of Syria's rural landscape, which, in turn, acts as a crucial social and economic backbone, a field for mobilization, and an experimental ground for political elites and ideological parties. Through these changes, the structure and roles within tribes shifted, affecting the nature of "tribal leadership" embodied by sheikhs and princes—both in their political roles and their ties to the social fabric. This fabric gradually transformed into more stable rural structures with diverse economic patterns, fostering a new social sphere where the “sheikh” no longer held sole authority.

Traditional nomadism gradually declined, with tribes settling geographically and adopting regional identities. Local sheikhdoms and tribal notables emerged, while tribe members engaged in agriculture, trade, and state jobs; altering settlement patterns, and weakening traditional tribal cohesion. This shift moved the tribe/clan concept from a political-organizational role to a socio-cultural one, reshaping social relations and levels of solidarity, now influenced by geographic, economic, developmental, and political factors.

Within Syria's diverse tribal landscape, the northern tribes are particularly notable for their influence, extensive geographic reach, and border-specific dynamics, with cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian structures. Many quickly engaged with these elements when the Syrian revolution began in 2011, followed by military, security, and economic repercussions. The state's withdrawal from most regions subsequently tested the tribes' ability to assume roles in local governance.

During these phases, tribes emerged as a significant social force, reacting to events with diverse political stances, reflecting cumulative impacts on their structures. Initially, when peaceful protests started tribal groups mobilized independently of traditional authorities (sheiks, princes, notables) and then shifted towards militarization marked by overlapping regional tribal interactions. As the Assad regime waged open war on the social fabric of the revolting areas; distinct zones of influence emerged, divided among local, regional, and international actors. This fragmented tribal geography turned tribes into key, cross-regional social structures, and a field of competition.

Unlike the peaceful phase, militarization intensified tribal representation at all levels, creating vertical and horizontal divisions within tribal structures and reviving tribal leadership as a local player with political, military, and social roles. Tribes, heavily engaged in Syria’s events, were also among the most impacted by military, security, and economic fallout, especially through forced displacement—unprecedented in modern Syrian history. After 2016, as the regime and its allies reclaimed opposition areas, military actions receded northward to Aleppo and Idlib, which became hubs for successive waves of internal displacement, both within these governorates and from other parts of Syria.

In this complex context, within the north-west opposition enclaves after 2016, a new organizational trend emerged: the establishment of “tribal councils”. Most tribes established their own councils, functioning as administrative bodies with diverse responsibilities, thereby reducing reliance on the sheikh’s traditional leadership. This shift promoted tribal presence in a new organized form, partially reviving the tribal spirit and roles. Notably, the initiative extended beyond Arab tribes to Kurdish and Turkmen clans. However, the councils' roles remain limited, and their impact on the tribal structure and traditional leadership remains ambiguous, as this move is unprecedented in Syria’s tribal landscape.

Thus, the post-2011 period marks a pivotal phase in Syrian state history and its social structures. Examining tribes over twelve years of conflict reveals interactions of prominent local social structures during a critical period. This study enhances a body of longstanding research, as tribes have long shaped the region’s intellectual heritage, particularly in Syria Occupying a significant place in sociological, anthropological, and political studies. Tribes often serve as interpretive tools for major political events or as frameworks for understanding local conflict dynamics. However, this study diverges from such an approach. It does not view tribalism as a lens for the Syrian conflict nor explores tribal influence on it; rather, it examines the conflict's impact on tribes and their varied responses across its phases, consequences, and actors.

This study first seeks to explore the history of tribes and clans within Syrian geography, especially in the north-west. Examining their historical relationships with various successive authorities, structural shifts, and the changes that shaped their current forms. It proceeds to map the tribal structures across Aleppo and Idlib, identifying their current geographic and demographic distribution. The study also analyzes their diverse roles and interactions (political, military, social) after 2011, emphasizing key impacts, particularly the complex effects of forced displacement. Lastly, it explores the emergence of "tribal and clan councils" as a new organizational phenomenon within Syria’s tribal framework post-2016, defining their roles, influence on traditional tribal governance, and effectiveness within the social structure.

In line with these objectives, the study/book is methodologically and analytically structured into three chapters. Chapter One serves as an introduction and review of the history of tribes and clans within Syrian geography generally, with a focus on Aleppo and Idlib. It examines their historical relations with successive authorities, structural transformations, and various shifts leading to their current forms. This chapter adopts a systematic historical periodization across seven key phases: an overview of the region’s ancient history and tribes, the Ottoman era, the Arab government under King Faisal, the French colonial period, the era of national independence, the union with Egypt, and the Ba'ath periods—first under the early Ba'ath regime, then under Hafez al-Assad, followed by the first decade of Bashar al-Assad's rule.

Within this broad historical scope, the study identifies several key variables to track and assess across each era and phase, including: active tribes in the north, the nature of their relationship with central authority and the factors shaping it, evolving roles of tribes and clans, tribal conflicts and interrelations, structural shifts—economic, social, political, and legal—and their impacts, major tribal migrations and displacements within the region, factors driving urbanization and settlement, and shifts in the concept of tribal leadership.

Chapter Two picks up where the first left off, examining tribal and clan interactions with the Syrian revolution post-2011 through its various phases, actors, repercussions, and impacts. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explores the demographic, economic, and cultural conditions of tribal areas in Aleppo and Idlib on the eve of the revolution, mapping the presence of twenty-five tribes encompassing 220 clans, alongside twenty-seven independent clans of diverse ethnicities (Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Circassian, Gypsy). A field survey identifies approximately 2,033 geographic points where these tribes and clans are concentrated across administrative units (cities, towns, villages, neighborhoods, and key farms).

Following this mapping, the section delves into the motivations and forms of tribal and clan participation in the early stages of the 2011 uprising. It then moves to the phase of militarization, analyzing tribal armed groups in Aleppo and Idlib. The study documents over twenty-three tribal military groups allied with the Assad regime and more than thirty-eight groups aligned with the opposition between 2012 and 2020, as well as the influence of jihadist organizations and their relationships with local tribes. The section concludes by examining the non-military roles tribes and clans played during the conflict, particularly their adaptation to local governance as state authority receded, leaving administrative functions vacant in these areas.

The second section of Chapter Two examines the forced displacement experienced by tribal structures in Aleppo and Idlib and its complex effects. It includes a survey of displaced areas, an analysis of the displacement context, and the parties involved, as well as documentation of major clans displaced from other Syrian governorates to Aleppo and Idlib. This section provides a detailed map of forced displacement phases in Aleppo and Idlib from 2012 to 2020, covering approximately 1,233 geographic points (cities, towns, villages, key farms) affected by varying degrees of forced displacement, along with thirty neighborhoods in Aleppo. It examines the political and military context of displacement, the actors involved, and the compounded impacts on tribes. Additionally, it includes a survey of areas where partial return has occurred, covering approximately 556 geographic points, while 707 locations remain uninhabited as of early 2023.

The third section examines the nature and extent of tribal military participation within major military formations in northern Syria up to early 2023, across various zones of control. It maps out key formations and tracks the impact of displacement on factional structures in Aleppo and Idlib, especially following the arrival of dozens of displaced factions from other Syrian regions.

The fourth section is dedicated to analyzing the emergence of "tribal and clan councils" in the north after 2016, exploring the motivations, dynamics, and contexts behind their formation. This includes a survey of around thirty tribal councils and over 130 clan councils in Aleppo and Idlib. The study then focuses specifically on the effectiveness of seventeen prominent tribal councils, assessing them first from the perspectives of council members and then from the viewpoint of tribal and clan members in the region, to gauge the scope and future of these councils and their varied impacts. Additionally, the section examines the parallel formation of "family and notable councils" in certain cities of Idlib as a counterpart to "tribal and clan councils" in the rural areas of Aleppo and Idlib.

Chapter Three presents the results of the field survey conducted by the research team, mapping the diverse ethnic composition (Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Circassian, Gypsy) of tribes and clans in Aleppo and Idlib. It includes fifty-two graphical maps and fifty-two statistical tables detailing each tribe, the number of associated clans in the two governorates, key family groups, and the geographic areas they inhabit, categorized according to the official administrative divisions in Aleppo and Idlib (city, town, village, neighborhood, key farms).

The study/book bases its chapters and sections on a diverse range of primary and secondary data sources. In addition to books, academic studies, historical references, documents, and archives on the region and its tribes, it relies heavily on field data as primary sources. Various research tools and methods were employed for data collection, primarily interviews and field focus sessions conducted between 2021 and 2024. These sessions involved over 780 sources from diverse groups, including tribal sheikhs, princes, and notables; aghas and dignitaries; founders and members of tribal councils; genealogists and tribal experts; social and political activists; local council members from tribes in the region; defected officers and tribal field commanders; specialists and researchers focused on regional or tribal issues; and numerous displaced individuals who participated in focus sessions on forced displacement, among others.

Key Findings and Conclusions

Based on the chapter summaries, with Chapter Two marking the start of the study’s practical findings, this paper provides a condensed overview of the study’s core findings. Key insights include: the structure, influence, and geographic distribution of tribal and clan networks in Aleppo and Idlib; their interactions with the Syrian revolution; and their varied roles in political, military, and local governance spheres. The study also examines the diverse impacts of the conflict on these structures, particularly forced displacement, and explores the emergence of tribal councils, analyzing their current and future implications. Lastly, it examines the position of tribal structures within the power dynamics and the complex relationship with authority, especially regarding the management of loyalties and the form of the state.

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Introduction

An armed alliance of the Haya’t Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the mainstream Syrian opposition forces have launched a new military operation against the Assad regime and Iranian-backed militias in Western Aleppo, dubbed the “Deterrence of Aggression.” This marks the first large-scale ground offensive in Northern Syria since March 2020. (1) 

Although the stated objective of the operation was to counter further escalation by the regime and Russia, following intensified airstrikes and bombardment on Northern Syria, the poor performance of regime forces allowed the HTS and the opposition to achieve significant and unexpected advances.  By the end of Thursday December 5th, Syria’s opposition forces had regained control of the Aleppo province, eight years after being forced to withdraw from the city in 2016 due to the strong support provided to the Assad regime by Iranian-backed militias and Russia. Alongside the capture of Aleppo, the armed alliance has taken control of the southern countryside of Idlib and the city of Hama, where the regime had reorganized its groups and brought reinforcement to stop the collapse of its defense lines, yet to no avail. 

This article gives insight into the operation's background and how Syria’s conflict reignited, the current situation on the ground explaining the reasons of the fast advancement, the military institution building of the HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA), and the armed alliance and what does it tell the world. Lastly, it addresses the potential scenarios awaiting Syria and highlights the relevant policy implications.

The Road to the Operation

Syria is back under international spotlight and likely to remain so. Many analysists have warned that the “frozen” Syrian conflict might blow up at any moment. This article (2) explained the significant changes that were unfolding within each zone of influence, alongside the escalating violence across the country, and argued that the increasing fragility and uncertainty in Syria indicated that the status quo was unsustainable. Nevertheless, Syria has attracted far too little attention from the international community, in which the worsening humanitarian crisis was largely overlooked and less than 30% of the required funding in 2024 was provided for the humanitarian response(3).

The ‘frozen’ conflict in Syria has never been frozen. Neither the regime nor its allies have stopped the bombardment and shelling against Northern Syria, nor the HTS and opposition armed groups have ceased to launch 'raids' against the regime forces in response. Since March 2020, Northern Syria has been on the brink of open war multiple times, the most astonishing incident was the drone attack on the military academy of Homs, which killed over 100 regime soldiers, followed by a massive Russian escalation against Northern Syria(4). 

Making Sense of the Shocking Operation

A few months ago, the rebel forces signaled their intentions to launch an operation toward Aleppo, releasing a video that quickly went viral within local communities. On the ground, Russia and the regime have intensified their bombardment against the local population and infrastructure in Northwestern Syria, leading to the displacement of thousands of civilians. Consequently, the sense of safety was lost due to the continuous bombardment of the regime and Russia, and the resentment and grievances among locals, particularly IDPs living in makeshift camps, was reinforced. UNHCR estimates the numbers of the internally displaced persons in Northwestern Syria to be close to 3.6 million out of 5 million, 1.9 million of whom have been living in camps and self-settled sites (5). For years, many displaced young men, and even elderly men, have been balancing work with intermittent military training. This reality illustrates why the HTS and the armed opposition set the objective of the operation as facilitating the return of displaced people to their original cities and towns(6).

The objective of the operation was set to be limited, yet the collapse of the regime’s defenses has allowed the armed alliance to advance unexpectedly fast, shocking Syrians as well as the experts who have been analyzing the Syrian conflict for more than a decade. While the institution-building efforts of the armed groups have had a considerable impact, the severe blows dealt to Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias by Israel since mid-September have been a decisive factor in the collapse of the regime forces on strategic fronts. Moreover, Moscow’s diverted attention in Ukraine, including the partial withdrawal of warplanes and air defense systems to reinforce its forces there, has left the regime without the robust aerial cover it previously relied on.

Other reasons also explain the impressive success achieved by the ‘Deterrence of Aggression’ campaign. For instance, many armed groups have extensive combat experience across various regions in Syria, including Aleppo and Hama, giving them a deep familiarity with the geography. This experience is further complemented by their history of numerous assaults on regime bases, as well as their involvement in laying sieges. Additionally, sleeper cells played a critical role in supporting the oppositions’ advance, providing intelligence and logistical aid during the operation. Also, the use of drones proved to be a game-changer, giving the opposition a significant advantage by enabling precise strikes on regime troops, tanks, aircraft, helicopters, bases, and even high-ranking commanders.

The operation has been carefully planned and executed on multiple levels. Armed groups have applied lessons learned from the numerous operation rooms established throughout the Syrian conflict. The planning demonstrates high tactical and operational coordination, a structured communication strategy, and a focus on service provision. This suggests significant preparation and an evolving institutional capacity.

Institution Building of the Armed Groups

Despite the Russian and regime bombardment, the relative calm since March 2020 has allowed the armed groups to reorganize and achieve a certain level of institutionalization. Much of the focus has been on the development of the HTS-backed Syrian Salvation Government (7)in Idlib and to a less extent the military capacity-building efforts of HTS. In contrast, the institutional growth and capacity-building efforts of the Syrian National Army have received far less attention. The clandestine nature of the military institutions and the suspicion that much of the online materials might be mere propaganda had contributed to keeping them under the radar. Nevertheless, the reality on the ground appeared to indicate considerable changes(8), yet it was impossible to assess the extent and influence of these changes on the battlefield.

HTS has been transforming itself into a hybrid actor by modifying insurgent tactics and claiming conventional army principles simultaneously. First, HTS has transformed its insurgent tactics, most importantly, developing its drone capabilities, which seem indispensable for the current battle. Before the current use of drones, HTS’s drone attacks have reportedly reached the Russian Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia(9) and the regime's stronghold al-Qardaha (10) 

among dozens of other locations in 2023.

Second, HTS began adopting functions traditionally reserved for conventional armies, including the establishment of a military academy, a military training department, a conscription office, and a center for military studies and planning. The group has benefited from former Syrian military commanders who defected from the regime during the war; their expertise was invaluable for HTS in restructuring its armed wing and building institutions. The head of HTS, al-Jawlani, even expressed intentions to establish a defense ministry and “get out of the factionalism situation (11)"

Last year, HTS faced a challenging test of the coherence of its armed wing when it purged hundreds of its military officers, including prominent figures such as Abu Maria al-Qahtani, under accusations of espionage. Neither the killing of al-Qahtani nor the defection of another prominent figure, Abu Ahmad Zakkour, have disrupted the group’s chain of command. However, these events triggered a wave of popular protests that posed serious challenge to its local acceptance (12).

The Syrian National Army (SNA) has also been occupied with following up on institution building. Aiming at reorganizing the opposition factions under one command, the Defense Ministry of the Syrian Interim Government established a military academy, initiated a process of reorganizing the economic resources of the factions under a centralized mechanism, allocating significant resources to the military police, and established a central border guard units to counter human and illegal goods trafficking. Moreover, subgroups have been undergoing professional military training, including using drones. In addition, members of the SNA started to receive education on international humanitarian law after singing an action plan with the United Nations to end and prevent the recruitment use and killing and maiming of children. Hasan Alhamada signed the action plan for the SNA, Mohammed Walid Dowara for the Jaysh al-Islam, and Amer al-Sheikh for the Ahrar al-Sham. Al-Sheikh is one of the newly established ‘Administration of Military Operation Room’ leaders (13).

On the other hand, the regime’s institutions were grappling with severe challenges. Anonymous attacks have targeted highly securitized areas in Damascus, its outskirts, Homs, and Quneitra undermining the regime’s control in these regions (14). Additionally, the continuous targeting of regime locations by the IDF has also played a significant role in weakening its forces. The regime’s involvement in the Captagon industry and trafficking has also affected its military structure, occasionally resulting in infighting among various official and auxiliary forces (15).

The armed opposition groups have always perceived the regime to be weak and incapable of fighting a battle without the support of Russia and Iran. A high-ranking commander (military defector) expressed that “the regime is divided vertically between Russia and Iran” and that this has deeply influenced its “military structure”(16). The leader of HTS, al-Jawlani, has always propagated that the regime is weak and defeatable. Moreover, he revealed his intentions to launch an operation on various occasions. In early 2023, for instance, he said that “we are ready for battle at any time, God willing, whether in attack or defense… there will be an attack [on the regime]. We will not wait for the regime to attack us... The decision is made, but we await the appropriate time(17)."

The Armed Alliance: What Do They Tell the World?

There has been misinformation about the armed alliance, and various international media outlets have labelled them as ‘jihadists’. Much of this misinformation stems from two simple facts: First, everyone stopped paying attention to Syria, assuming that everything, including the ideological tendency of armed groups such as HTS, has remained the same. Second, the mainstream opposition armed groups have been largely overlooked because HTS has proved itself to be the dominant actor.

To tackle these points, one should first look at the profiles of the leaders of the newly established ‘Administration of the Military Operations Room’, Jamil al-Saleh, Amer al-Sheikh, and most importantly, Abu Muhammed al-Jawlani. Jamil al-Saleh is the leader of Jayish al-Izza, a former commander (major) in the Syrian Army who defected from the regime in 2012. He established his group in 2012. His motivation to fight against the regime is not merely political but also personal since he lost more than 30 members of his family member in a massacre that claimed the lives of over 70 people in al-Latamna in Hama – which made him principled in fighting against the regime and pragmatic in allying with the hardliner HTS(18). Amer al-Sheikh, the leader of Ahrar al-Sham, is from Damascus countryside. He served as the commander of Ahrar al-Sham in Daraa province before moving to Northern Syria after refusing to reconcile with the regime in 2018. In addition, he is one of the opposition commanders who signed the UN’s action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use and killing and maiming of children (19). 

Lastly, and most controversially, is Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. A veteran jihadist who once served in al-Qaeda’s ranks in Iraq, al-Jawlani later shifted his approach by purging jihadist elements in Northwestern Syria. Pragmatic in nature, he received support from ISIS to establish al-Nusra Front, the predecessor of HTS, in 2012 before pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda to avoid being ISIS’s branch in Syria and counted on al-Qaeda’s support in his fight against ISIS. In July 2016, he rebranded his group as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, breaking up ties with al-Qaeda under the external pressure of the airstrikes of the US-led coalition to defeat ISIS and the internal pressure of opposition armed groups. Finally, he established Haya’t Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a broader armed coalition in January 2017(20). 

Driven by survival and appetite for power, al-Jawlani led HTS’s mission of cracking down on all rivalries, revolutionaries and Jihadists, in which HTS became the dominant force in Idlib with other secondary groups operating under the ‘al-Fateh al-Mubin’ operations room, which HTS leads. While doing so, al-Jawlani modified his narrative, claiming to represent the Syrian revolution and justifying his moves under the pretext of achieving unity and building a model for Syria. In Short, he recognized that the Islamist radical agenda wouldn’t grant his survival, let alone expand HTS’s influence to be a dominant force in Northern Syria.

The group’s transformation warrants attention indeed, but it is essential to consider its history including human rights violations, authoritarian tendencies, and practices that triggered widespread resentment and protests before (21). 

Nevertheless, it is also crucial to consider that this transformation has shaped the narrative and behavior of the rebels in this battle thus far. In contrast to the first wave of the conflict in Syria, the revenge narrative is primarily absent. Moreover, Today’s rebels are more politically mature than 2015 – the painful Syrian tragedy seems to have taught them a lesson.

The HTS-backed Salvation Government’s ‘Department of Political Affairs’ has been issuing statements reflecting this political maturity's nature. Notably, the department has issued a statement communicating rebels’ commitment to protect consulates, historical and cultural sites, churches, and different (international) schools and grant the “rights of civilians from all sects and Syrian components” (22). Moreover, they went far as to call on Russia not to associate its interests with the regime, considering Moscow as a “potential partner in building a bright future for free Syria (23)"  in another statement – among other statements and speeches. It seems like the rebels have come to realize that war is an extension of politics. The next few weeks will tell whether rebels will stand the test of time and prove that change has taken root.

Peacebuilding: The Mission is Not Impossible

There is no doubt that the regime is responsible for the prolonging of the conflict and the current escalation because it has continued to target civilians in recent years and refrained from engaging in a meaningful political process to open a new chapter for Syria. Assad has not been willing to compromise; he overestimated his ability to stand the test of time with his regime intact, and his strategic patience has been leading Syria into a strategic disaster.

On the other hand, the HTS, a terrorist-designated organization, will remain a debatable issue for policy analysts and policymakers – as it has always been. In 2015, Lina Khatib argued that “instead of putting Nusra [the predecessor of HTS] and the Islamic State in the same basket, the West should look beyond the Nusra Front’s ideological affiliation and encourage its pragmatism (24)." Nine years have passed, and it seems that this policy has contributed to the efforts of countering terrorism, particularly al-Qaeda and ISIS (25). Later, in 2021, Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni argued in favor of a conditional engagement with the group on two central matters: “HTS’s human rights track record and a clarification of its long-term vision for a political solution in Syria(26)". 

Key Messages

• Assad's regime issued Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024, mirroring past amnesty decrees but with additional wide exemptions.
• The decree excludes political detainees and prisoners of conscience, continuing a policy that neglects any political reform or reconciliation with opposition forces.
• Security agencies are not bound by the decree, limiting its impact and allowing them to detain individuals without judicial oversight, which reduces the practical effects of the amnesty.
• State security and Cybercrime offenses remain excluded, underscoring the regime's intent to suppress dissent rather than promoting public safety.
• The decree fails to create a safe environment for the return of refugees and displaced persons as it does not address the root issues of security and political repression.
• The international community is urged to demand transparency and accountability from the regime to genuinely address detention and human rights abuses.

Background

On September 22, 2024, Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024,⁽¹⁾ granting a general amnesty for crimes committed before this date. This decree is the latest in a series of amnesty decrees issued by the regime, a trend that has accelerated since 2011.

Legislative Decree No. 27 closely mirrors the structure and legal provisions of the previous amnesty under Decree No. 24 of 2022⁽²⁾but introduces expanded exemptions to cover additional offenses and legislation enacted since 2022. It also varies slightly from the amnesty issued under Legislative Decree No. 36 of 2023.⁽³⁾

This analysis reviews the content and specific exemptions of Decree No. 27, examines its objectives and implications, and compares it with Decree No. 24 of 2022 to assess its continuity and changes within the broader pattern of Syrian amnesty policies.

A Routine Decree... Security Agencies as an Exception

The Syrian Penal Code classifies crimes into three categories: Violations are minor offenses punishable by a fine or imprisonment from 24 hours to 10 days. Misdemeanors carry penalties of imprisonment for 10 days to 3 years or a fine. Felonies are serious crimes punishable by death or imprisonment exceeding three years. This classification provides context for understanding the scope and limitations of the amnesty decree.⁽⁴⁾ In general, any penalty with a minimum sentence of more than three years—whether imprisonment, detention, house arrest, or civil disenfranchisement—is considered criminal.⁽⁵⁾

Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024 grants amnesty for all penalties related to misdemeanors and violations. It also includes amnesty for internal and external desertion, as defined in Articles 100 and 101 of the Military Penal Code. However, as with previous decrees, this one excludes individuals who remain in hiding or are fugitives unless they surrender within three months (for internal desertion) or four months (for external desertion).

The decree, however, exempts Articles 102 and 103 of the Military Penal Code, which address "defection to the enemy" and "conspiracy to defect," both punishable by death. The regime classifies military personnel who defected to join opposition forces under these articles. Additionally, articles such as 137 through 150, which prescribe lengthy prison sentences or death penalties, remain outside the scope of this amnesty.

This exclusion underscores that the amnesty primarily targets military deserters who stayed loyal to the regime or reside in regime-controlled areas. Furthermore, the decree does not waive the exemption fee for individuals over 42 who did not complete military service, as this fee is considered civil compensation to the state. Similarly, compensatory fines under current laws are typically excluded from amnesty provisions.⁽⁶⁾

According to Article 3 of the Executive Instructions for the Civil Status Law, the amnesty waives fines for “all violations stipulated in the mentioned law and committed before September 22, 2024 of the legally required fines, provided they are settled within three months for those inside Syria and nine months for those abroad.”⁽⁷⁾ While positive in theory, implementation remains challenging as Syrians outside regime-controlled areas, or those living abroad, face complex procedures in accessing Syrian diplomatic missions, often rendering this provision ineffective for them.⁽⁸⁾

In practice, individuals wanted by security agencies are excluded from amnesty benefits, as these agencies operate beyond legal and constitutional oversight. Public prosecutors do not visit security branches to determine if detainees qualify for amnesty, limiting their oversight to official prisons and detention centers.⁽⁹⁾The decree notably excludes political detainees and prisoners of conscience linked to opposition activities or political beliefs. Consequently, it fails to address the plight of most refugees and displaced individuals who fled Syria due to security concerns.

This is the third consecutive amnesty to exclude prisoners of conscience, limiting amnesty benefits to minor offenses and misdemeanors while leaving major charges intact. The regime’s disregard for this group underscores its unwillingness to make political concessions or engage in meaningful dialogue with the opposition.

Objectives and Dimensions of the Decree: Aims of Control and Security Regulation

Since 2011, the regime has regularly included desertion offenses in its amnesty decrees. By granting amnesty for desertion, it seeks to reintegrate deserters, particularly those in regime-controlled areas, back into its forces and to clear minor offenses for individuals who evaded or neglected mandatory or reserve service, though certain cases remain excluded.⁽¹⁰⁾ However, this decree should not be mistaken for a genuine effort toward military restructuring or a shift to a "professional army," as such reforms would require a national strategy involving cooperation across all Syrian factions. Such a strategy would need to encompass the following steps:

• Evaluating the regulatory legal framework and constitutional requirements for mobilization, conscription, and military service;
• Proposing legislative reforms for the military and security agencies, which currently operate outside constitutional and legal obligations, and instituting reforms within the military judiciary;
• Establishing independent civilian public institutions to oversee and monitor military reforms and transformation plans.

Regarding the potential impact of this decree on reconciliation dynamics, past settlements generally indicate that most officers who reached agreements with the regime were subsequently imprisoned and subjected to severe torture, not to mention being stripped of their civil rights. As for individual soldiers, in addition to being investigated, they are often forced back into the army, which remains a non-neutral entity. For most of those involved in reconciliation, the issue is not solely about personal safety; it is deeply tied to their national choices and stances.

By excluding crimes related to state security, corruption, and economic offenses from the decree, the regime signals its intention to maintain strict control and neutralize threats to its authority. Exempting cybercrimes, particularly those involving information technology, implies a stance of "protecting citizens" from digital threats, aligning with the regime's recent crackdown on digital content creators and platforms it accuses of undermining societal values.⁽¹¹⁾Additionally, the regime has leveraged the exclusion of cybercrimes to target its opponents, especially activists who have voiced criticism against the regime on social media, particularly in recent times.⁽¹²⁾

The regime’s continued disregard for political detainees and prisoners of conscience, whom it has detained throughout its rule—particularly since 2011—reflects its unwillingness to engage in any genuine political process or national reconciliation. This stance indicates a persistent policy of repression and restriction on fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The exclusion of political detainees even raises suspicions that some may no longer be alive, potentially having met their fate in mass graves.

Detention as a Persistent Indicator

The Assad regime continues to systematically obscure information and statistics related to detainees (providing neither data nor specialized institutions). Since the beginning of Ba'ath rule to the present day, the precise whereabouts of detainees remain unknown, and the regime has not officially disclosed the number of released detainees or their locations. This lack of transparency stems from the chaotic nature of information due to the dominance and multiplicity of security agencies, their conflicting operations, and lack of coordination. Additionally, the regime's reluctance to disclose the real number of detainees aims to avoid using such data against it in human rights contexts. Politically, the regime seeks to keep this issue as a bargaining chip and tool for political leverage.

As of the release of this report, there is no official count of those released as a result of this amnesty, while legal sources estimate an increase in detention rates. In late April 2022, Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No. 7 of 2022,⁽¹³⁾ At the time, it was considered "significant" for covering many offenses related to the Syrian revolution. However, it later became evident that the decree was largely symbolic, aimed at giving the impression that the regime was pursuing rehabilitation. In practice, repressive security practices continued, including arbitrary arrests, with the regime detaining 2,301 people by the end of September 2024.⁽¹⁴⁾ Among them, 1,527 individuals were detained between the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 7 in 2022 and the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 36 in 2023, as follows:

Figure (1): Number of detainees since the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 7 of 2022

Conclusion

The international community must intensify pressure on the Assad regime to disclose the fate of all political detainees and prisoners of conscience and work towards the release of those who remain imprisoned, and demand adherence to international human rights standards to end arbitrary arrests. Rather than accepting the regime’s amnesty decrees at face value, countries and organizations should critically examine these decrees with legal expertise, closely monitoring their implementation and insisting on transparency regarding actual beneficiaries. For the Syrian opposition, prioritizing the issue of detainees in all negotiations and political initiatives is essential.

While the decree may result in the release of some individuals convicted of minor offenses, its societal impact is limited. Amnesty decrees like this one suffer from the absence of independent civilian or humanitarian oversight to verify implementation and accurately track beneficiaries. Additionally, the state's reluctance to provide clear data on released detainees—beyond distributing the decree to official channels—exacerbates the persistent gap between legal text and practical enforcement. Syria’s crisis is not merely a legal or judicial issue; it reflects a deep-rooted political, economic, and social divide. The decree does not foster social cohesion, reconciliation, or a safe environment for the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Ultimately, this decree is not a genuine step toward resolving Syria’s crisis. It serves as a tactical maneuver to advance the regime’s interests, largely aimed at shaping public opinion, mitigating social discontent, and handling specific legal cases without addressing the underlying issue of thousands of detainees held since 2011. Its primary objective appears to be projecting a façade of reform to the international community, while offering little substantive change.

Appendix:

The following tables illustrate the articles excluded by Amnesty Decree No. 27 of 2024, with a comparison to Legislative Decree No. 24 of 2022.

First: Crimes excluded under the General Penal Code and its amendments:

Second: Articles and Paragraphs Excluded Under the Military Penal Code:

Third: Other Laws and Articles Excluded from the Amnesty Decree:

([1])“Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024”, SANA, Published Date: 22/09/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/3XUDjBy

(2)Muhsen ALMustafa, “Legislative Decree No. 24: Amnesty as a Dynamic for Internal Needs”, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Published Date: 26/12/2022, Link: https://bit.ly/3jvYPe6

(3)“Amnesty Decree No. 36 of 2023 Excludes Political Prisoners”, Syrian Network for Human Rights, Published Date: 21/11/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/4dujuFK

(4)Ibid.

(5)According to Article 37 of the Penal Code, amended by Law No. 15 of 2022, ordinary criminal penalties are: 1) Death penalty. 2) Life imprisonment. 3) Life detention. 4) Temporary imprisonment. 5) Temporary detention. For more details, see: “Law No. 15 of 2022, Amendments to Several Articles of the Penal Code”, The Parliament, Published Date: 28/03/2022, Link: https://bit.ly/3Bfr5uq

(6)The decree does not cover fines related to violations of currency and exchange laws, transfer regulations, traffic laws, tobacco and stamp duties. It also excludes certain misdemeanors stipulated in building regulations, economic crimes, electricity theft, fraudulent use of telecommunications services, consumer protection law violations, public examination fraud, forestry violations, and misdemeanors related to transactions in foreign currencies. Additionally, the decree stipulates that for misdemeanors involving harm to personal property, compensation must be provided to the victim. This amnesty does not affect personal claims, as they remain within the jurisdiction of the court handling the public claim. In all cases, the aggrieved party may file a lawsuit in the criminal court within one year from the date of the decree’s issuance.

(7)“Circular No. 59/4/2, Issued by the Directorate of Legal Affairs at the General Directorate of Civil Affairs in the Ministry of Interior”, Published Date: 1/10/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/4eQikW9

⁽⁸⁾For example, obtaining an appointment for civil status transactions at the Syrian consulate in Istanbul requires several months before it can be scheduled, in addition to the financial costs associated with visiting the consulate.

(9)Interview via Phone with Legal Advisor, former Judge Mustafa Al-Qassem, Istanbul/Turkey, Date of interview: 25/09/2024.

(10)Interview via Phone with Colonel Ahmad Hamad, a defected officer and former head of the Recruitment branch, Istanbul/Turkey, Date of interview: 24/09/2024.

⁽¹¹⁾Mohammad Al-Sheikh, "Mass Exodus of Syrian Content Creators to Lebanon", Al-Modon, Published Date: 22/09/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/3BjOIlK

⁽¹²⁾Ma'moun Al-Bustani, "New Details on the Arrest of an Alawite Activist in Latakia", Orient News, Published Date: 21/08/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/47BQH0C

⁽¹³⁾Muhsen AL Mustafa, Mohammad Munir Al-Fakir, “Amnesty Decree No. 7: Hope for Rehabilitation through Superficial Steps”, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Published Date: 23/09/2022, Link: https://bit.ly/3SLDj0U

⁽¹⁴⁾The figures were compiled from monthly reports issued by the Syrian Network for Human Rights on the number of detainees.

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key political, security, and economic events in Syria during the month of August 2024, examining developments across various levels.

• Politically, the popular movement in Suwayda has persisted for over a year, maintaining its demands for freedom, justice, the release of detainees, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. While international reactions to the normalization process with the Assad regime remain mixed, with some welcoming it and others expressing skepticism, Turkey continues to push forward, driven by domestic pressures, national security needs, and international relations.
• Security, the growing Russian role in containing the increasing tensions in northeastern Syria is becoming more prominent. The renewed cycle of violence claimed the lives of 57 civilians across Syria this month.
• Economically, the continued rise in prices remains one of the most pressing crises affecting the livelihoods of Syrian citizens. The significant drop in wheat production, with over 60% of cultivated land lost, threatens Syria's food security, and raises concerns of potential humanitarian disasters in the medium and long term.

Varied International Reactions to Normalization with the Assad Regime

The popular movement in Suwayda, now marking its one-year anniversary, continues to demand freedom, justice, accountability for human rights violators and war criminals, the release of detainees, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. This ongoing movement reflects a strong determination to achieve political change, despite the security challenges and obstacles imposed by the Assad regime to block any real reform. It is clear that the regime has relied on time to suppress and end the protests, sometimes through indifference and other times through security restrictions. Notably, the regime has refrained from using the same level of repression it employed against the demonstrations during the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011. However, the continued peaceful and growing momentum of the Suwayda movement demonstrates that a political solution that satisfies the Syrian people is the foundation for peace and stability in Syria and the region.

As Turkey's normalization process with the Assad regime continues at a slow pace, international reactions—especially from the United States and Russia—remain mixed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov affirmed Moscow's interest in normalizing relations between its partners in Damascus and Ankara, indicating that a new meeting would take place soon. In contrast, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake emphasized that the United States would not normalize relations with Bashar al-Assad's regime and would continue to adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Additionally, Ethan Goldrich, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, reminded countries engaging with the Assad regime that such relationships should advance common international goals under Resolution 2254 and serve to improve the conditions for the Syrian people. He stressed that the U.S. does not support normalization efforts by these countries with Assad. Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Ministry welcomed Russia’s efforts to restore relations with the Assad regime, confirming that Ankara's efforts to normalize relations with Damascus continue based on "good faith" and without preconditions.

The path to normalization is fraught with challenges, yet Turkey’s urgent priorities—including the burden of the Syrian refugee crisis, national security, counterterrorism, and border security—push Ankara's decision-makers to continue this path despite doubts about its feasibility, high costs, and Western opposition, which has been expressed in statements by representatives at the UN Security Council. A U.S. representative voiced concern over the more than two-year stall in Constitutional Committee meetings and the Assad regime's disregard for the political process called for in Resolution 2254. The U.S. official reiterated that American sanctions would remain in place until tangible and measurable progress is made toward a political solution in line with the international resolution. He also reminded U.S. partners in the region that normalization with Assad would not end or reduce the production of Captagon. Meanwhile, Special Envoy Geir Pedersen warned that escalating security tensions are reaching new and dangerous levels, with rising violence threatening international peace and security.

It appears that Western countries and the United States' efforts to maintain the status quo in the Syrian file are unsatisfactory to neighboring countries, which can no longer bear the burdens of the ongoing conflict that has lasted for over a decade. These countries seek to resolve the conflict in any way that protects their interests and reduces their burdens, even if such a settlement comes at the expense of the Syrian people.

Increasing Russian Role Amid Escalating Security Tensions

August witnessed significant security developments across different areas of control in Syria, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights documenting the deaths of 57 civilians during this month. Regime forces continued their attacks on northwestern Syria, including an assault targeting a Turkish observation point in the de-escalation zones. Additionally, a large explosion in a truck occurred in the city of Azaz, in northern rural Aleppo, killing nine civilians and injuring 13 others. The targeted area came under rocket fire during the rescue and evacuation operations. Meanwhile, tensions continued to rise around the "Abu al-Zendin" crossing, where efforts to open the crossing faced objections from armed groups and civil activists who prevented trucks from passing through.

In Deir Ezzor, eastern Syria, violent clashes lasted for days following large-scale attacks by fighters from the western bank of the Euphrates River, who identified themselves as members of the "Tribal Army." These fighters targeted checkpoints of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in villages and towns in eastern Deir Ezzor. Both sides engaged in mutual shelling along the banks of the Euphrates, with regime artillery bombarding the villages of Dahla and Jadid Bakara, resulting in a massacre that killed 11 civilians, mostly children and women. In response, SDF forces shelled the opposite bank and, for the first time, conducted a security operation in which their special forces crossed the Euphrates using river barges, supported by drone air cover. This operation resulted in the killing of seven regime soldiers, including an officer with the rank of captain, and the capture of two members of Assad’s Fourth Division.

Two significant developments emerged during these security tensions in Deir Ezzor. First, the SDF explicitly accused regime forces of orchestrating the attacks, directly blaming General Intelligence Chief Hussam Louqa for overseeing the operation. The SDF responded with force, sending a clear message that it is prepared to counter the regime's attempts to destabilize its controlled areas and that relying on regime security forces to undermine the "Autonomous Administration" project is a failed strategy. The second development was Russia's role in mediating the crisis between the two sides. Sergey Alexandrovich Kiselev, the commander of Russian forces in Syria, led a mediation process over several days to prevent further military confrontations in Hasakah and Qamishli and to lift the SDF's siege on regime security zones. Russia’s efforts to expand its influence in northeastern Syria are evident, as it seeks to limit U.S. involvement. Russia has accused the U.S. of increasing tensions in Syria. Alongside its military activities in the east, Russia expressed concern over international coalition movements, particularly U.S. aircraft flights in Russian-controlled areas, with 360 violations of Syrian airspace in the Al-Tanf region reported in August alone, according to the head of the Russian Reconciliation Center. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also warned the Kurds in northeastern Syria against continuing to rely on the United States, reminding them of the Afghanistan scenario.

In southern Syria, Daraa province saw escalations between local armed groups and regime forces in the eastern countryside of Daraa, as well as in the northern countryside. Local groups targeted regime forces in response to kidnappings and arrests of the province’s residents by regime forces. Meanwhile, the regime sought to impose new local reconciliations, which were rejected by the groups that refused to surrender their weapons.

On another front, Israel intensified its airstrikes on Iranian supply lines in eastern and southern rural Homs, near the Lebanese border, in addition to targeting another site in western rural Daraa within regime-controlled areas. Since October, Israel has conducted 180 airstrikes. Despite these attacks, Hezbollah's supply routes and Iran's presence in Syria persist. Iran has successfully entrenched itself in the regime's military, security, and civil institutions over the years, solidifying its presence alongside Hezbollah from Al-Bukamal on the Iraqi border to Al-Qusayr on the Lebanese border. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration appears reluctant to engage in a wide regional war that could significantly jeopardize the gains from its counterterrorism operations and military bases in the region.

Growing Food Security Crisis

The continued rise in prices remains one of the most significant crises burdening Syrian citizens. The primary causes include increasing costs of raw materials, declining agricultural and industrial production, and rampant corruption in the form of bribes and tolls between cities and provinces. Additionally, the drop in purchasing power and financial crises strain the public budget, exacerbated by the regime's poor economic management, including flawed decisions, policies, and relationships with neighboring countries.

Wheat production has significantly declined due to ineffective pricing policies, high production costs, poor-quality seeds, and inadequate fuel distribution to farmers. The indicative price for wheat has proven ineffective, further exacerbated by insufficient rainfall and unfavorable weather conditions. As a result, cultivated wheat areas in Syria have decreased by 60% this season. The reduction in wheat acreage is expected to lead to a shortage of flour, necessitating greater imports and negatively impacting food security.

At the same time, Syria faces difficulties in the flow of goods both locally and regionally. Farmers in the villages of Al-Qusayr, rural Homs, struggle to transport their agricultural produce due to the presence of 22 regime checkpoints and the confiscation of goods by customs under the pretext of smuggling. Farmers are often forced to pay bribes amounting to millions of Syrian pounds to recover their goods and secure passage.

Regionally, delays in Syrian trucks crossing into Jordan continue for the third consecutive month. Entry through the Nasib border crossing is delayed, leading to spoilage of goods and increased costs. Regime officials have accused the Jordanian side of deliberately disrupting traffic at the crossing to promote their own products at the expense of Syrian goods. Syrian truck movement into Jordan faces severe slowdowns due to thorough inspections aimed at preventing drug smuggling. Local markets are also suffering from an increase in smuggling, particularly of milk to Lebanon, which affects the availability of dairy products in Syrian markets and drives prices higher. Although prices have stabilized somewhat in recent months, forecasts indicate further increases due to declining local production.

Simultaneously, the regime and Russia are discussing the use of local currencies in bilateral trade to mitigate the economic impact of Western sanctions on both countries. However, significant obstacles remain, such as the non-convertibility of the ruble and Syrian pound, limiting the effectiveness of such transactions. Moreover, trade between the two countries is imbalanced, with annual trade volumes amounting to $650 million, where the regime imports most of its needs from Russia while exporting limited quantities of agricultural products.

In northeastern Syria, economic problems continue to worsen month by month, particularly due to reduced support from the "Autonomous Administration" to its citizens and rising overall prices. The "Autonomous Administration" has removed subsidies for diesel fuel allocated to commercial electric generators, causing electricity prices to rise. Additionally, the poultry sector in Al-Hasakah has been severely impacted by high temperatures, disease outbreaks, and rising production costs, including the costs of medicine and diesel, which have resulted in the death of large numbers of birds. This has forced some vendors to close their shops due to reduced demand. The military tensions between the "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) and the "Tribal Army" in Deir Ezzor have also cast a shadow over the region's economy. The closure of crossings between SDF-controlled areas and regime-controlled areas has led to a shortage of food supplies and a sharp increase in prices.

In an attempt to alleviate the crisis, the "Agriculture and Irrigation Authority" of the Autonomous Administration announced plans to compensate farmers affected by fires that destroyed vast agricultural areas. These measures include distributing free wheat seeds to affected farmers for the next agricultural season. However, these efforts appear insufficient to address the multiple crises facing the agricultural sector in the region, especially given the rising fuel prices and the overall costs of farming. Overall, these crises reflect a sharp economic decline in northeastern Syria. Worsening the situation is the lack of sufficient government support and the rising cost of living, which place immense pressure on residents already suffering from the consequences of war and ongoing unrest. In these circumstances, a solution remains dependent on achieving comprehensive political and economic stability that can ease the burden on citizens and improve living conditions in these areas.

The economic reality is not much different in northwestern Syria, where Idlib and rural Aleppo are witnessing significant price increases in the energy and basic goods sectors. This adds further pressure on local residents, who are already struggling with the ongoing humanitarian crisis and difficult economic conditions. One of the most notable developments was the decision by "Green Energy," which operates in the electricity sector in Idlib, and the "Syrian-Turkish Electrical Energy Company" (STE) in rural Aleppo, to raise residential and commercial electricity prices. This was justified by the increase in prices from the Turkish supplier providing energy to the region. This decision comes at a time when residents are grappling with declining purchasing power and rising living costs, further increasing the financial burden on families and businesses. Moreover, the poultry market in northwestern Syria is experiencing significant price fluctuations. The price of a ton of chicken in northwestern Syria has dropped by around $300 after the closure of smuggling crossings with areas under the control of the SDF. However, price differences between Idlib and rural Aleppo still range between $300 and $500, attributed to factors such as transportation costs, the availability of feed, and varying security conditions in each region.

Overall, these recent changes highlight significant challenges facing the local economy in northwestern Syria. Rising electricity prices and increasing living costs are putting additional pressure on residents, while productive sectors like poultry are experiencing sharp price fluctuations due to changing security and economic conditions. Without sustainable economic interventions or international support, these crises may continue to negatively affect the region's stability and the lives of its inhabitants.

Since early 2024, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has been working to contain the civilian unrest in its controlled areas in Northwestern Syria, which was triggered by the internal crisis of the mid-2023. While HTS has considerable experience in managing internal power struggles, including defections, it has not faced such widespread popular protests since it has begun to acquire monopoly of governance in Idlib in 2017⁽¹⁾

The interaction between HTS and the civilian populations in Idlib, has been characterized as a relationship between ruler and ruled, with HTS relying on mass obedience and modest support- similar to many hybrid insurgencies⁽²⁾, This article elaborates on the grievances that triggered the protests challenging HTS’s ability to maintain mass obedience and how HTS employed a calibrated response to sustain it.

Old and New Grievances

The process of establishing governance and ensuring its monopoly in the hands of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) from November 2017⁽³⁾onwards has created local grievances that played, among other factors, a crucial role in fueling resentment toward the HTS. The authoritarian nature of HTS’s rule is quite reflected in its way of dismantling the local councils, the establishment of the “General Security Service” (GSS) and its use of detention and torture to intimidate opponents.

In 2023, local councils were dismantled in favor of the SSG’s centralized eight municipalities system⁽⁴⁾, which operates under the SSG’s Ministry of Local Administration and Services. This move came after a long process of gradually cracking down on local councils, overcoming their resistance and their efforts to maintain their autonomy and slow down the HTS’s growing control over governance in Idlib.

HTS first brought local councils operating in its strongholds, as in the case of Harem, under its control either by directly overseeing them or by supervising phony elections to designate new councils following the establishment of the SSG. Then, after defeating the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 2019, HTS coerced the remaining local councils in previously NLF-controlled areas, such as Kafr Takharim and Jabal al-Zawiya, to submit to its authority.

HTS acknowledged that dismantling local councils had contributed to local resentment. Before the protests began, HTS’s leader al-Jawlani had rejected suggestions to reestablish local councils during meetings with local notables. However, the protests compelled HTS to compromise by forming a new committee in March 2024 ⁽⁵⁾, tasked with defining the rules and procedures for local council elections in HTS-controlled areas. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of these councils remains uncertain.

The General Security Service (GSS), established in mid-2020⁽⁶⁾ as a security and intelligence apparatus for HTS, has played a key role in suppressing opponents during HTS's power consolidation, leading to widespread grievances. Tasked with enforcing regulations, conducting security operations, and managing detention facilities; the GSS has already developed a notorious reputation among local communities for its violent conduct and use of torture in its prisons. Common methods of torture include handcuffing, blindfolding, dragging, hanging detainees from the ceiling, and beating them with cables or hosepipes to extract confessions⁽⁷⁾.

The GSS sparked even more outrage following the internal purge that began in August 2023⁽⁸⁾. During this period, hundreds of HTS members were arrested on charges of espionage and subsequently subjected to severe mistreatment and torture. The widespread use of torture resembled the brutal tactics of the Syrian regime, rekindling past traumas for Syrians who had suffered at the hands of the regime and considered HTS as the lesser of two evils. In short, the protests against HTS were a reaction from local communities to the group's increasingly authoritarian grip over Idlib.

Calibrating the Response: HTS’s Containment of the Protests

The protests posed a new challenge to HTS, threatening both its governance model and the narrative it uses to portray itself as not only a better alternative to the regime, but also to its rival opposition’s Syrian Interim Government - a narrative that was employed to legitimize its attempts to expand influence into areas controlled by the Syrian National Army. As protesters demanded the overthrow of al-Jawlani’s rule ⁽⁹⁾, the latter calibrated his response by employing a mix of persuasion and coercion tactics, such as using limited violence, announcing reforms, and launching mediation initiatives led by local governance bodies. These actions were aimed at containing the protests and restoring mass obedience in HTS-controlled areas.

By employing limited violence, such as deploying security or military forces, limited shootings, beating with sticks, and arresting activists and protesters, HTS aimed to maintain its strong image and project power without causing severe losses that could backfire and fuel further resentment. This calibrated violence was utilized to pressure localities into recognizing the reforms announced by the SSG and conceding to local settlements brokered by the local governance bodies.

The announced reforms revolved around reorganizing the General Security Service under the supervision of the SSG’s interior ministry, expanding the representation within the “Shura Council” (a parliament-like body), initiating a process of re-establishing the local councils, and establishing a board of grievances to address issues related to detainees⁽¹⁰⁾. Meanwhile, the Management of the Liberated Areas (MLA), which is composed of eight local governance bodies operating as a mediatory bodybetween HTS and the SSG on one side and the local communities on the other, have been engaging with local communities to address their local needs in respect to services and their resentment toward the HTS, alleviating local security concerns and seeking local settlements to protests.

For instance, the “Management of the Middle Area”, one of the MLA eight local governance bodies, reached an agreement with representatives of the local movement in Binish⁽¹¹⁾, under the auspices of local notables in mid-July, stipulating the release of detainees and the withdrawal of military and security deployments as well as the suspension of protests for three months. A similar agreement was reached in Ariha between the Management of the Area and the representatives of the local movement therein.

Although the agreements have not halted the protests(12) in the two regions due to the unresolved issue of detainees among other reasons, they have helped to reduce tensions. Notably, the dispute over the agreement in Binish, where the MLA accused the protest movement of circumventing the agreement and applying it outside of its intended local context, showcases HTS’s tendency to treat the protests as isolated local issues. Such an approach is set to address the differing motivations by region and adopt a ‘divide and contain’ tactic which is considered a more effective way to regain control of the situation.

Local settlements seem to be the preferred alternative to a broader settlement with the “Gathering of the Revolutionary Movement”, a group led by public figures including former founders of the HTS-backed SSG such as Bassam Sahyouni⁽¹³⁾ and Farouk Kushkush. This group insists to aspire for a radical change as it considers SSG’s reforms as superficial, which made HTS’s attempts to broker a settlement with them, including a meeting held with HTS’s leader al-Jawlani in late May⁽¹⁴⁾, yield no concrete results. In short, HTS’s calibrated response, which combines coercive and persuasive means, is designed to offer partial solutions, keep the movement fragmented, and thus manage the crisis.

Escaping Forward

Had HTS escalated its use of force against the protesters, the situation on the ground would have been completely different, likely resulting in an extremely violent scenario. It seems that HTS did not perceive the protests as an existential threat, as it had already survived a more critical challenge—the internal purge of mid-2023.

While it has employed force and offered concessions to contain the protests, it also appears to be attempting to turn the challenge into an opportunity. The concessions themselves, from expanding the Shura Council to introducing new judicial mechanisms, align with HTS’s mission to further expand its governance structure and entrench itself in the local setting. Moreover, such actions represent a way of escaping forward, particularly when considering other measures, such as the recent Police Academy ceremony⁽¹⁵⁾. 

Ultimately, HTS’s primary concern is to prevent public resentment from disrupting its internal dynamics, especially the balance between its military, security, and governance wings—a balance that was difficult to maintain during the internal crisis. Hence, escaping forward appears to be the only viable option for HTS and its leadership.

(1)HTS-backed civil authority moves against rivals in latest power grab in northwest Syria, Syria Direct, 13 December 2017, https://cutt.us/GZ2I2

(2)Ana Arjona, Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance, 26 July 2017, https://cutt.us/xhTUv

(3)HTS-backed civil authority moves against rivals in latest power grab in northwest Syria, ibid.

(4)SSG Transfers Civil Administration Powers from Local Councils to New Centralised Municipalities, Syria Report, 12 September 2023, https://cutt.us/zAWe5

(5)Qarar bitashkil lujna li'iidad nizam 'amal khas bialmajalis almahaliyya wa'aliyyat intikhabiha fi almanatiq almuḥarrara [A decision to form a committee to prepare a special working system for local councils and the mechanism for their election in the liberated areas], SSG, 19 March 2024, https://cutt.us/c66nw

(6) “Jihaz al-Amn al-‘Aam”.. Waraqat al-Jawlani al-rabihat wa-wikalat istikhbarat tatmahu li'ab’ad min Idlib [“The General Security Service”.. Al-Jawlani’s trump card and an intelligence agency aspiring beyond Idlib], Syria TV, 18 June 2021, https://cutt.us/27h6A

(7)No End in Sight: Torture and ill-treatment in the Syrian Arab Republic 2020-2023, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 10 July 2023, https://cutt.us/i1Gou

(8)Orwa Ajjoub, Crossroads in Idlib: HTS navigating internal divisions amid popular discontent, Middle East Institute 13 May 2024, https://cutt.us/6CDIx

(9)HTS cracks down on Idlib demonstrations as protest movement persists, Syria Direct, 17 May 2024, https://cutt.us/r3Qyd

(10)“Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” tunshi’ “Diwan Mazalim”.. Islah am ijra’ shakli?, [“Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” establishes a “Board of Grievances”.. Reform or merely a formal procedure?], al-Arabi al-Jadeed, 2 July 2024, https://cutt.us/6rLrg

(11) Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham tu'lin ‘aqd ittifaq ma’a al-hirak fi Binnish.. Ma bunuduh? [ Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham announces an agreement with the movement in Binnish.. What are its terms?], Syria TV, 17 July 2024, https://cutt.us/9ZrRu

(12) Awdat al-khilafat bayn ahali Binnish wa “Tahrir al-Sham” shamal gharbi Suriya [The return of disputes between the people of Binnish and “Tahrir al-Sham” in northwestern Syria], al-Arabi al-Jadeed, 10 August 2024, https://cutt.us/SptC6

(13) Bassam Sahyouni, Syrian Memory, https://cutt.us/KunVU

(14) Al-Jawlani" yarbit itlaq sarih mu'taqali al-hirak al-sha'bi bi'iqaf al-muzaharat [“Al-Jawlani” links the release of detainees from the popular movement to the cessation of protests], Radio Alkul, 26 May 2024, https://cutt.us/xw1oH

(15) Idlib.. “Al-Inqadh” tukhrij al-daf’a al-awla min dubbat kulliyat al-shurta, [Idlib.. The “Salvation Government” graduates the first batch of officers from the Police Academy], Eneb Baladi, 15 August 2024, https://cutt.us/l6DfE

Executive Summary

• The Ba'ath Party elections on May 4, 2024, during the General Conference, were part of Assad's efforts to reshape and reorganize the power centers within the Ba'ath Party to align with the regime's requirements and challenges. These elections came after years of implementing new Internal Regulations, modifying the mechanism for selecting the party's candidates in the 2020 legislative elections, and establishing an election committee in preparation for the conference.
• The number seats on the Central Committee increased to 125 from 80, with General Secretary Bashar al-Assad appointing 45 members. The members invited by Assad competed against those elected from the branches. As a result, only 49 members from the branches gained seats on the Central Committee, compared to 18 invited members and 13 members from the Ba'ath Party bloc in Parliament. Additionally, Bashar al-Assad directly appointed 45 more
• Based on a comprehensive analysis of the Central Committee members, it was determined that 22 of them served on the previous committee, 77 are employed by state institutions, and there are also members from the militaryindividuals linked to militias and security and military networks, some of whom are under sanctions.
• The provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and Homs dominated as a place of origin for Central Committee members, comprisingwere elected to the Central Committee, 11 of whom were directly appointed by Bashar Al-Assad.
• The committee included 68 Sunnis, 40 Alawites, 10 Christians, 5 Druze, and 2 Ismailis. This sectarian distribution reflects the demographic makeup of the country to some extent but also shows deviations, particularly with the significant representation of Alawites, who constitute the core of the ruling elite.
• The elections resulted in an entirely new central leadership, consisting of 14 members plus Bashar al-Assad, including 13 members who work in state institutions, among whom 3 hold high-level government positions as Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, 3 military personnel, and 3 sanctioned individuals.
• The election results generally revealed that the party leadership engaged in misleading tactics and manipulated the branch representation percentages and results, marginalizing some popular cadres at the branch level by conducting the elections as a single electoral district to create a mechanism for central control.
• The elections, its details, and the dynamics of Bashar al-Assad's intervention suggest a re-engineering of power centers within the party and the regime's philosophy regarding the form of political power (Ba'ath) and its ability to overcome stagnation and dominate the new scene, regardless of any political context.
• This restructuring indicates an effort to integrate high-ranking state officials into the party's central decision-making body, ensuring close alignment between the state's executive functions and the party's leadership.

For More: https://bit.ly/3MuUZgx

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key events in Syria during the month of June 2024, focusing on political, security, and economic developments. It examines the developments at different levels.

• Politically, the normalization steps between Turkey and the Assad regime are progressing. The announcement of local elections by the Autonomous Administration has angered Turkey, increasing its threats.
• Security, violence has escalated across Syria, with 429 civilian and 700 military casualties in the first half of the year.
• Economically, the significant rise in prices continues to be a major issue, alongside increased Iranian influence in the Syrian financial sector.

Turkish Normalization with the Assad Regime: Political Transformations and Future Outcomes

The most discussed topic regarding the Syrian issue is the latest developments in Turkish rapprochement with the Assad regime. Following the Iraqi Prime Minister's statement about creating a basis for dialogue between the regime and Turkey and confirming that talks are ongoing, Turkish statements about upcoming normalization steps followed. The Assad regime has waived its previous condition of Turkish forces' actual withdrawal from Syria to merely declaring their readiness to withdraw and making commitments, according to the regime's Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad. The Turkish Foreign Minister emphasized the importance of the ceasefire between the regime and the opposition, urging the regime to rationally use this period of calm to resolve its constitutional issues, achieve peace with its opponents, facilitate the return of millions of Syrian refugees, and unite efforts with the opposition to combat terrorism, particularly the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Russia is intensifying efforts to expedite the normalization steps between the two sides and facilitate a presidential-level meeting between Erdogan and Bashar al-Assad, capitalizing on Turkish concerns about local elections and the entrenchment of the AANES project. Turkey is pursuing a “parallel tracks” policy to improve its relations with Moscow while preparing for the pre-US election period and the potential implications of a Trump administration on the region.

Despite the increased indications of Turkish rapprochement with the Assad regime this month, the normalization process began in late 2022 during quadrilateral talks at the security and intelligence levels under Russian auspices and Iranian participation. These talks went beyond being exceptional meetings to indicate the start of a new normalization path, though initially hindered by preconditions and external interventions. Turkey's insistence on bilateral meetings with the regime without other parties suggests it viewed the Iranian role as obstructive. As for the future of the normalization path, it still requires much time, as the proposed agenda from both sides seems complex and exceeds their capacities. Turkey aims to combat “terrorism” and dismantle the Autonomous Administration project in Northeast Syria, while the regime is unable to achieve this. The AANES 's High Election Commission announced the postponement of municipal elections, originally scheduled for June, to August in response to demands from political parties and alliances. The announcement of the elections faced Turkish rejection and threats to use force to prevent them, considering them a move towards division, as per Turkish statements. The US also declared that conditions are not conducive to conducting transparent and inclusive elections. This indicates that the postponement decision resulted from the lack of US support and serious Turkish threats, prompting local Autonomous Administration supporters to pressure for election cancellation to avoid new military operations. However, setting and then postponing the election date put the Administration in a dilemma, making it appear dependent on Turkish approval for any future entitlements in Northeast Syria. The Administration insists on postponing rather than canceling the elections, while recent Turkish moves toward normalization with the regime primarily target the Autonomous Administration project and open doors to various scenarios for the region's future.

Separately, the Negotiation Commission held its periodic meeting in Geneva, attended by several civil society representatives from within and outside Syria and Arab and European state representatives. The final statement emphasized that UN Security Council Resolution 2254 is the legitimate framework for reaching a sustainable political solution, asserting that Syria is currently unsafe for refugee returns, and rejecting “sham elections” in regime-controlled areas and those planned by the Autonomous Administration.

Increasing Indicators of Violence Escalation in Different Influence Areas

Despite Jordanian understandings with the regime and Arab pressures on the drug trafficking issue, Jordan still faces the threat of smuggling networks. Authorities foiled the largest smuggling attempt in months, seizing 9.5 million Captagon pills and 143 kilograms of hashish intended to be smuggled through Jordan to a third country.

Regarding changes in the regime's military institution, following the cessation of extensive military operations and the regime's involvement in regional communication pathways, the regime seeks internal military structure changes. According to official statements, this aims to discharge reserve service members in three phases by the end of 2025, moving towards reliance on volunteers to build a professional army. Concurrently, the regime's Ministry of Defense issued an administrative order halting the recall of reserve officers aged 40 who have completed two years of service and discharging non-commissioned officers and reserve personnel who have completed six years of service.

In Suwayda, demonstrations against the regime continued, along with a campaign of posters against the People's Assembly elections scheduled for mid-July. The province also witnessed clashes between local armed groups and regime forces, sparked by the regime establishing a new security checkpoint following the abduction of 15 regime members by local groups in response to the regime's arrest of a civil activist.

In North Aleppo, the local council of Al-Bab city announced the opening of the Abu al-Zendin crossing between opposition and regime areas as an official commercial crossing to improve living conditions and enhance local economic activity. This decision coincided with increased indications of Turkish normalization with the regime and aligns with Russian understandings to open trade lines between influence areas. However, reactions varied, with traders and investors viewing it as a vital trade and movement artery and an opportunity to reduce smuggling operations and lower prices due to availability. Conversely, some residents and Syrian National Army members attacked the crossing, damaging some equipment in opposition to its opening, while several entities issued statements demanding civilian management of the crossing outside military faction control, overseen by local institutions responsible for managing the city and establishing mechanisms to secure the crossing economically and security-wise.

This month also saw a significant escalation in ongoing violence in Northeast Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the killing of 62 people, including 40 civilians, by various means, resulting from 37 acts of violence, including tribal conflicts, murders, about 20 operations by ISIS cells, and Turkish drone strikes. Indicators of violence have also increased across influence areas, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights documenting the killing of 429 civilians in Syria during the first half of 2024, including 65 children, 38 women, and 53 under torture. The highest proportions of victims were in Daraa 27%, Deir Ezzor 18%, and 14% each in Raqqa and Aleppo. The military death toll reached around 700 fighters in different control areas.

Continuous Price Increases Deepen the Economic Crisis

Amid the regime's economic decisions affecting living standards, the requirement for smart cardholders to open bank accounts to transfer support funds is significant. The Council of Ministers stated this step aligns with restructuring support towards targeted and gradual cash support. The regime is expected to abolish current subsidies on bread, fuel, electricity, water, and phone services, shifting the burden to the private sector due to its inability to meet living requirements, leading to significant price hikes and free market sales.

Under Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2024, Bashar al-Assad granted a one-time financial grant of 300,000 SYP (approximately $20) to retirees and government employees, including civil and military workers in the public sector. Given the Syrian pound's devaluation against foreign currencies, the grant is symbolic, covering only a few meals and failing to meet citizens' basic needs.

Clothing prices increased by 200% compared to last year due to rising cotton and yarn prices and the government's lack of intervention to control prices or support the clothing sector. Confectionery prices in Damascus markets also doubled compared to last Eid al-Adha. Despite the arrival of eight Iranian oil tankers loaded with crude oil and gas at Banias port in Tartus countryside, indicating continued Iranian support and sanctions breaches, the regime raised fuel prices amid a local fuel crisis. Due to rising fuel prices and shortages, increased temperatures, and the start of the harvest season, amperage companies in Damascus and its countryside raised kilowatt-hour prices in several areas.

The regime's shift towards export policies, away from self-sufficiency and market regulation, caused price increases. The regime's exports increased by 30% in the first half of this year compared to the same period in 2023. However, the number of Syrian fruit and vegetable trucks exported to Jordan dropped by 80% due to Jordanian restrictions amid anti-drug smuggling efforts.

Iran continues to expand its influence in the Syrian financial sector by opening institutions and banks. The Islamic City Bank, jointly owned by Iran and Syria with a capital of 50 billion SYP, recently opened, making it the fifth Islamic bank in Syria. Meanwhile, Russian tourism investors supervised the construction of two tourism facilities in Latakia province, with 50% completion. The number of Russian visitors to Syria reached 780,000 by the end of May, a 10% increase from the same period last year.

In Northeast Syria, the AANES published the 2024 budget details, with total revenues of $670 million and expenditures of $1.059 billion, indicating a projected $389 million deficit. Turkish airstrikes on SDF economic hubs, including energy infrastructure, caused estimated losses exceeding $500 million, contributing to economic paralysis. Given the estimated $1 billion expenditures, the region continues to face living crises at all levels, including rising prices, material shortages, and poor public services. Meanwhile, the SDF began delivering the first batch of wheat procured from Northeast Syria farmers to regime grain collection centers in southern Qamishli, transporting over 2,500 tons of wheat in 24 hours.

In North Aleppo, the Syrian-Turkish Energy Company raised household and industrial electricity prices to 3.6 and 4.1 Turkish liras per kilowatt, respectively, citing changes in Turkish electricity prices. The Syrian Interim Government set wheat prices in its areas at $220 per ton, $110 less than last season and the lowest price among influence areas: $310 per ton in Idlib and Northeast Syria and $360 in regime areas. This price is disproportionate to farmers' production costs. In Idlib, the “Salvation Government” reiterated financial transfer delivery regulations in the sent currency to organize the financial market, increase trust, and enhance control over financial policies and price regulation, reducing the need for black market currency conversions.

Introduction

Due to the escalating crises and conflicts worldwide, the growing number of individuals requiring relief and humanitarian assistance, and the significant disparity between needs and resources(1),Syrians face complex challenges and responsibilities amidst political deadlocks. This situation necessitates an awareness of the implications for the level of services provided and the number of beneficiaries within Syria, considering the deteriorating social and economic conditions for Syrians in host countries.(2)

According to the Global Humanitarian Overview report issued by OCHA for 2024, approximately 308 million people worldwide require humanitarian assistance, necessitating $48.64 billion to aid 187.8 million people in 70 countries through 36 coordinated response plans. Only 15.3% of the plan has been funded so far, with $7.42 billion in funding, which is 35% less than the $11.40 billion recorded during the same period last year. Additionally, the total reported funding amounted to $4.34 billion, which is 42% less than in 2023 ($7.44 billion). Reported funding from major donors in the first four months of 2024 has also decreased compared to 2023.

Local and Regional Implications

This reduction will have several implications for Syria on the local level, such as worsening living conditions, increased migration waves, heightened militia activity, the growth of the war economy, and involvement in illicit activities such as drug and arms trafficking. Additionally, societal violence, including theft, kidnapping, and extortion, will negatively impact local security and stability indicators.

On the regional level, economic pressures on host countries will increase, leading to a higher likelihood of these countries pushing Syrian refugees to return voluntarily or forcefully and taking measures to tighten restrictions on them. Additionally, the risk of drug trafficking in neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq) may increase, using their territories as transit points to the Gulf and Europe.

Syrian actors in the relief and development field will face several direct challenges, including:

• Severe Food Security Crisis: The reduction in humanitarian funding since 2023 to $2.1 billion (39% of needs) led the World Food Program (WFP) in mid-2023 to reduce the number of people receiving aid from 5.5 million to 3.2 million (a 40% reduction) starting in July 2023. The program announced the cessation of its general food aid across Syria in January 2024 due to severe funding shortages, marking the seventh and largest reduction since the program began its work in Syria.
• Increased Needs: According to United Nations estimates, around 16.7 million people need humanitarian assistance, up from 15.3 million in 2023, the highest number since 2011. Among them, 7.2 million people are internally displaced in scattered areas, including 2.05 million in overcrowded camps.
• Severe Funding Shortages: Only 8% of the required funds have been received, with $358 million collected out of the $4.07 billion needed by May 2024 to meet the immediate humanitarian needs of 10.8 million targeted individuals. Many local organizations in northwestern Syria have had to halt numerous service programs, lay off dozens of employees, and close offices in various towns and cities in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib.

The following table shows the gradual increase in people in need of humanitarian assistance between 2018 and 2024, in contrast to the decrease in the percentage of funding received compared to the required funding, from 62% in 2018 to 39% last year and 8% this year:

Increased Pressure on Services in Host Countries: It is expected that more than 19 million people will need assistance in 2024, including about 6.4 million refugees and 12.9 million affected members of the host community. Due to reduced funding and the need to prioritize strategically, the collective funding request for 2024 has been reduced to $4.1 billion compared to $5.8 billion in 2023 after reviewing requirements based on priority needs. As a result of the increasing funding crisis, the number of Syrian refugee families in Lebanon receiving cash assistance has been reduced to about one-third in 2024. The World Food Program in Jordan announced a reduction in its monthly food aid to 465,000 refugees in mid-July 2023 and excluded about 50,000 others from monthly assistance due to funding shortages.

The following table shows the increase in people in need of humanitarian assistance in the five host countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey) against the decrease in coverage between the required amount and the paid amount.

Deterioration of Services (Water, Sanitation, Care, Electricity, Education): The deteriorating services for displaced individuals in collective centers will increase the risk of resorting to negative coping strategies. About 2.3 million women of reproductive age, including 500,000 pregnant and lactating women, will lose access to essential reproductive and maternal healthcare. Additionally, 2.5 million out-of-school children will miss the opportunity to return to school, threatening the future of an entire generation and depriving children of their basic right to education(3).

Strategic Recommendations

Despite donor pledges during the eighth Brussels Conference for "Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region" amounting to €7.5 billion ($8.1 billion), with $3.8 billion allocated for 2024 and $1.3 billion for 2025, the importance of addressing the potential for funding cuts and reduced aid remains significant. Syrian actors in the political, humanitarian, and developmental sectors must urgently address this challenge through several policies:

• Operational Alliances: These alliances ensure organizational independence while enhancing cooperation and coordination for effective project execution, preventing activity and project duplication.
• Syrian-Designed Comprehensive Response and Recovery Plan: Syrian actors should develop a comprehensive plan as a reference for response and recovery priorities, updated annually.
• Multi-Dimensional Advocacy Policies: Alongside traditional advocacy, innovative advocacy through coalitions can enhance benefits and broaden advocacy efforts both geographically and sectorally.
• Economic Empowerment Policies: Develop statistical and information collection tools, support small and medium-sized projects, and provide vocational training to create job opportunities, thereby reducing dependence on external aid. Implement basic infrastructure projects (water, sanitation, electricity, health, education) to enhance economic recovery and improve living conditions.

Conclusion

International involvement is crucial in Syria's response and recovery efforts. However, the capabilities, networks, and experience of Syrian actors can drive the development of an executive vision for the region's requirements, transitioning them from implementers to planners and implementers simultaneously.

^([1]) The disparity between needs and requirements reached an unprecedented level of $31 billion by the end of 2023, with a total paid amount of $24.28 billion, or 43% of the required amount estimated at approximately $56 billion.

^([2]) The year 2023 ended laden with significant difficulties and challenges faced by the world, starting with the earthquake that struck Syria and Turkey in February, followed by the conflict in Sudan in April, which left 30 million people in need. Additionally, the Israeli aggression on Gaza resulted in the deadliest humanitarian crisis in the sector since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Alongside all these crises, conflicts continued in Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Yemen, Congo, Haiti, and other regions.

([3]) Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator Mr. Adam Abdelmoula Press Briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria, 22-03-2024. Link: https://2u.pw/EGrZ56mr