Reserve service has been one of the most significant human resource components of the Syrian Regime Army, yet it has also posed one of the greatest challenges and obstacles for Syrians, especially after 2011. This is due to its extended duration([1]), with recruits unable to ascertain the length of their service or their discharge date.

The Turkish-Russian ceasefire agreement of March 2020 and the cessation of major military operations enabled the army to implement changes in reserve service, along with other reforms within the military and security institutions.

From mid-2023 to mid-2024, the leadership of the Army issued several administrative orders to end the retention of certain categories of reserve service personnel^([2]). This occurred before the official announcement of a plan for a "professional army", as stated by the Director of the General Administration of the "Army and Armed Forces"^([3]).

This article aims to clarify the current plan for reserve service and the objectives the regime seeks to achieve. Additionally, it will highlight the legal aspects related to reserve service and trace the changes made over the past several years.

Reserve Service Plan:Confirmed to Be 2 Years after All

It has become evident over the years that the regime has implemented new measures related to the army, especially after the appointment of a new Minister of Defense in April 2022^([4]). The years of military conflict since 2011 have demonstrated to the regime that an army based on conscripts is neither effective nor reliable. The regime’s lack of trust into its own army stems not only from the military's lack of professionalism but also social and sectarian reasons. Consequently, the regime has found it necessary to shift towards building a “professional army” composed of enlisted (volunteer) personnel, starting with a gradual reduction in the duration of reserve service as the first step toward redefining compulsory military service. However, this transition will take several more years to fully realize, ultimately helping to sustain the solid core upon which the regime has relied in its war against people.

The plan to build a “professional army” began with the army leadership introducing consecutive volunteer contracts for five or ten years. These contracts clearly outlined the substantial benefits provided to new enlistees, including higher salaries and additional bonuses. The new enlistees are exempt from compulsory military service if they complete five years of service and could leave the army upon completing the contract, subject to approval from the General Command. Notably, these benefits were not extended to previous enlistees, including in terms of salaries or entitlements^([5]).

Additional administrative orders related to reserve service continued to be issued until the reserve service plan was officially announced in June 2024. The plan is based on three main phases, culminating in a defined reserve service duration of 24 months^([6]). The plan is structured as follows:

Table (1): Reserve Service Plan

According to the official announcement, the plan may undergo modifications in the implementation of certain aspects based on the study of reserve service issues, including age criteria and years of service. The time periods for each of the three phases may be adjusted, either increased or decreased, based on the enlistment rates for compulsory military service and the number of contracted enlisted military personnel.

The large number of military personnel, approximately 152,000,expected to be discharged from reserve service by the end of 2025^([7]) indicates significant human resources available to the army. This figure does not include those already enlisted or conscripted for compulsory military service at the time the plan was issued, and contradicts previous estimates and reports that indicated a significant personnel shortage in the army^([8]).

The plan also includes a clause for the discharge of enlisted military personnel who complete five years of their new recruitment contract (as fighters) and choose not to continue. These individuals will not be retained or called up for reserve service until five years have passed since their discharge. They are also exempt from compulsory military service. However, they may be called up for reserve service for one year only, which can be served continuously or intermittently. Those with ten-year contracts are fully exempt from reserve service upon completion.

Legal Amendments: Serving the Regime's Interests

After the beginning of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, and due to the circumstances imposed by the conflict, the regime made numerous amendments to the Conscription Law (Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007) to address gaps revealed by the conflict, despite the law having been recently enacted at the time^([9]). Among the revised provisions was Article 26, which pertains to exemptions from reserve service. The first change came with Legislative Decree No. 31 of 2020, which added paragraph (e) to Article 26. This amendment allowed for the exemption of individuals residing outside Syria for at least one year upon payment of a cash allowance of USD 5,000."^([10]) This amendment aimed to provide additional foreign currency to the Ministry of Defense's treasury.

At the end of 2022, Law No. 29 of 2022^([11]) was issued, amending paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 26. The amendment made paragraph (a) more specific, categorizing disabilities into three types: partial disability not fit for service, near-total disability, and total disability. Paragraph (c) detailed exemptions for only sons and those considered as such due to siblings affected by seven specified disabilities or ailments^([12]). This amendment also coincided with the abolition of Decree No. 174 of 2006, which included the “Physical Fitness System for Conscription”^([13]). This system had been used to determine whether a conscript could be fully exempted from service or assigned to field or stationary roles based on permanent health conditions.

The regime did not stop at these amendments. On 1 December 2023, it issued Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023, adding a new paragraph (f) to Article 26^([14]). This provision allowed conscripts for reserve service (enrolled or not) who had reached the age of 40 to pay a cash allowance of USD 4,800 or its equivalent in Syrian pounds, with a reduction of USD 200 or its equivalent for each month of service performed by the conscript. This amendment aimed to generate additional funds for the Ministry of Defense’s treasury. Later, in August 2024, the regime issued Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2024, which lowered the eligible age in paragraph (f) from 40 to 38 years^([15]).

Additionally, Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2024 introduced two new paragraphs to Article 26. Paragraph (g) stipulated that conscripts could be exempt from reserve service by paying a cash allowance of USD 3,000 if they could prove they have partial disability not fit for service or near-total disability as listed in paragraph (a). This amendment aimed to offer a lower cash allowance for those with less than total disabilities, in line with the regime’s broader policies on disability, as outlined in Legislative Decree No. 19 of 2024^([16]). (h) provided an exemption for military personnel who completed ten years of service under the new enlistment contracts mentioned above.

What Lies Behind the Reserve Service Plan?

The reserve service plan aims to alleviate social pressures in regime-controlled areas, especially following significant waves of men leaving the country to seek asylum. seeking to avoid reserve service is one of the factors, along with security or economic or social reasons. Notably, the regime has suspended reserve service for conscripted officers holding university degrees requiring at least five years of study, as well as those holding higher degrees such as a master’s or PhD^([17]), regarding to brain drain as many professionals left Syria in order to avoid military service.

This plan is also closely related to the rate of personnel mobilization within the regime forces^([18]).New conscripts are being recruited, and discharged personnel are being replaced by enlistees who were attracted through previously announced enlistment contracts. Thus, the plan remains flexible and may be adjusted at various stages, given that the transformation to a "professional army" is still in its early stages and has not yet fully matured.

Another goal of the plan is to make the benefits of enlistment contracts equal to or even better than those offered by contracts in pro-regime militias, marking a significant shift from previous practices. By offering these contracts, the regime aims to integrate militia members into the official military institution as individuals, rather than as distinct groups. This is especially evident in the raised age limit to 32 years, which suggests an effort to weaken militias by drawing their members into the official forces, without necessarily dismantling the militias entirely at least for now.

In some respects, the regime's plan aims to generate additional funds for the Ministry of Defense's treasury and to leverage reserve service as a tool against society to extort it to generate funds and to keep control over the population. The option to pay a cash allowance in lieu of reserve service was not available until 2020, initially only for those outside the country. By the end of 2023, this option was extended to those within the country who meet the age requirement.

The reserve service issue is one of many critical challenges arising from the conflict since 2011, significantly both the military and social spheres across a large segment of Syrians. The regime approaches this issue with caution and deliberation. While reserve service was an important source of human resources for the regime until 2020, it has since evolved into a revenue-gathering tool, with payments collected from conscripts who wish to avoid service and can afford the cash allowance, both inside and outside the country. The regime’s amendments also portray it as a reformist entity, such as showcasing reform efforts in negotiations with external actors, while this approach focus on its own interests, and without regard for the direct or indirect effects of its policies.

Appendix:

Article 26 of the Conscription Law Issued by Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007 and All Its Amendments.

Original Article of 26([19]):

The Draftee may be exempted from Reserve Service in one of the following cases:

1. Permanent lack of physical fitness for Military Service.
2. The remaining children of two parents or one parent, whether both or one are living or dead, both or one of whom have had two children die or become martyred as a result of carrying out a work-related duty in the state or as a result of military operations.
3. The only son of two parents or a mother, living or dead, who is effectively the only healthy son to a sibling or siblings who have been afflicted with disabilities or ailments which prevent them from caring for themselves.
4. A father who has had one or more son die or become martyred as a result of war operations because of carrying out a work-related duty in the state or as a result of military operations recognized in the regulations.

Amended Article of 26^([20]):

The Draftee may be exempted from Reserve Service in one of the following cases:

a. Those permanently unable to perform reserve service, as determined by a medical examination, falling into one of the following categories: (partial disability not fit for service; near-total disability; total disability). (Amended by Law No. 29 of 2022).

b. The remaining children of two parents or one parent, whether both or one are living or dead, both or one of whom have had two children die or become martyred as a result of carrying out a work-related duty in the state or as a result of military operations.

c. The only son of two parents or a father or a mother, living or dead, who is effectively the only healthy brother to a sibling or siblings who have been afflicted by one of the seven specified disabilities or ailments. (Amended by Law No. 29 of 2022).

•   First:

1. Complete kidney failure.
2. Severe intellectual disability resulting in profound cognitive impairment.
3. Severe schizophrenia and severe postpartum depression.
4. Complete paralysis of one side of the body or all four limbs.
5. Total blindness with no vision beyond light perception in either eye.
6. Amputation of both lower limbs at the level of the legs or thighs.
7. Amputation of both upper limbs at or above the wrist joint level.

• Second: Those in similar conditions may be recommended by the permanent medical committees and approved by the military medical council.

d. A father who has had one or more son die or become martyred as a result of war operations because of carrying out a work-related duty in the state or as a result of military operations recognized in the regulations

e. Those residing outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic for at least one year upon payment of a cash allowance of five thousand US dollars. (Added by Legislative Decree No. 31 of 2020).

f. Those who pay the cash allowance (enrolled or not) who have reached the age of 38 must pay 4,800 US dollars or its equivalent in Syrian pounds based on the exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Syria on the payment date. A reduction of 200 US dollars, or its equivalent in Syrian pounds based on the exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Syria on the payment date, is applied for each month of service performed by the enrolled conscript, with partial months rounded up. (Added by Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023. The age limit was initially 40 but was amended to 38 by Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2024).

g. Those who pay the cash allowance (enrolled or not) of three thousand US dollars, or its equivalent in Syrian pounds as per the exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Syria on the payment date, if the medical examination confirms they fall into one of the categories (lower disability - partial disability capable of performing service). (Added by Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2024).

h. Military personnel who have completed ten years of service under the new enlistment contract (as fighters). (Added by Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2024).

([1]) After completing compulsory military service, men remain eligible for reserve call-up until age 42. Since 2011, conscripts have typically been retained as reservists beyond their initial service. The call-up for reserve service has also expanded to address increased manpower needs and issues of draft evasion and defection.

([2]) “What’s New in the Administrative Order of the Syrian Regime Regarding Military Service” Enab Baladi, Published on: 11/06/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/4d8kr79.

([3]) “Special Interview on Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023” Syrian News “Al-Ikhbariya| Channel, Published on: 01/12/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/3Sytc2k.

([4]) “General Ali Mahmoud Abbas” Ministry of Defense, Published on: 30/04/2022, Link: https://bit.ly/3WsN4oF.

([5]) “Syrian Defense Militarizes Society with Tempting Enlistment Contracts”, Enab Baladi, Published on: 28/11/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/4ccvnQb

([6]) “Our Goal is to Develop an Advanced Army Based on Enlistees”, Ministry of Information, Published on: 27/06/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/3SzIq6W

([7]) Leaked document of the plan showing the numbers of military personnel in reserve service to be discharged at the end of each phase.

([8]) “The Syrian Regime’s Army is Drained: Figures Confirm the Loss of Human Resources”, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, Published on: 31/07/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/46Fpzxq

([9]) “Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007, Containing the Conscription Law” ,The Parliament, Published on: 03/05/2007, Link: https://bit.ly/3EyjJSk

([10]) “Legislative Decree No. 31 of 2020” Syrian e-Government Portal, Published on: 08/11/2020, Link: https://bit.ly/3YBmP1M

([11]) “Law No. 29 of 2022”, Official Gazette, Part One, Issue No. 2, 2023, Page No.: 16, Syria Report, Link: https://bit.ly/3AhLb6E

([12]) Previous reference or see the appendix, updated Article 26, Paragraph /C/.

([13]) “Decree No. 334 of 2022”, Official Gazette, Part One, Issue No. 2, 2023, Page No.: 17, Syria Report, Link: https://bit.ly/3AhLb6E.

([14]) “Legislative Decree No. 37 of 2023”, SANA, Published on: 01/12/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/4dwhyxO.

([15]) “Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2024”, SANA, Published on: 01/08/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/3Yr6Wek.

([16]) “Legislative Decree No. 19 of 2024”, SANA, Published on: 21/07/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/3LULHdi.

([17]) “Special Interview on the Administrative Order Ending Summons and Retention”, Syrian News “Al-Ikhbariya” Channel, Published on: 17/08/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/46yHWUp.

([18]) The regime has set a minimum percentage for human resources in the army that must not fall below a certain level.

([19]) “Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007, The Conscription Law”, ibid.

([20]) Researcher’s observations.

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key political, security, and economic events in Syria during the month of July 2024, examining developments across various levels.

• Politically, the normalization process with the Assad regime advanced with Italy appointing an ambassador to Damascus. Additionally, seven countries submitted a "non-paper" to the European Union, urging it to abandon the Three No’s policy. The regime also expressed its readiness to establish a new relationship with Turkey.
• Security, instability continues to rise across Syria. In the northwest, protests escalated into violence and direct confrontations with Turkish forces, while the region witnessed the largest drone attack by regime forces against civilian targets in rural Aleppo and Idlib in 2024. In eastern Syria, the international coalition is strengthening its positions as Iran-backed militias increase their attacks.
• Economically, exports through the Nasib border crossing continued to decline, and the regime's economic policies have led to increased capital flight and a higher cost of living. The Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria (AANES) implemented economic policies that negatively impacted the agricultural sector.

Impact of Regional and International Normalization on Local Actors

Amid the ongoing normalization and restoration of relations with Bashar al-Assad, Italy announced the return of its diplomatic mission and the appointment of an ambassador in Damascus. This move coincided with efforts by Italy and six other EU member states to abandon the Three No’s policy that shapes the EU's stance on the Syrian issue. Meanwhile, the Syrian Regime’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement welcoming Turkey's calls to restore relations with Damascus, expressing readiness to establish a new relationship with Turkey based on clear principles, including the withdrawal of illegally stationed forces from Syrian territory and the combating of "terrorist groups" that threaten the security of both countries and linking the normalization of relations between the two countries to a return to the pre-2011 status quo.

The statement shows the regime's willingness to begin the normalization process and respond to Turkey's calls, dropping the precondition of Turkish troop withdrawal before the Erdogan-Assad meeting.

The regional and international normalization process with the Assad regime is progressing steadily, despite the differing motivations of the involved countries. These motivations are primarily security-driven or involve experimenting with alternative solutions under the guise of offering incentives to the regime, based on a step-by-step approach to gradually change its behavior. However, the normalization process is unfolding in a way that favors the regime and serves its interests. Bilateral agreements provide the regime with more maneuvering space, as they are tailored to each country's individual interests. Additionally, these agreements help the regime evade political obligations and the implementation of international resolutions, particularly Resolution 2245.

Domestically, the Assad regime held legislative elections for the fourth term since the adoption of the new constitution in 2012, following years of stagnation in the Syrian scene since the cessation of military operations under the de-escalation agreements. These elections come shortly after the Baath Party elections, which showed Assad's efforts to re-engineer power centers within the party and strengthen his absolute control to make it a disciplined political force aligned with Assad's direction and capable of interaction and leadership in any new political landscape. The regime's insistence on holding the elections aims to project an image of resilience and victory despite the conspiracies and international pressures, while also evading political solutions by claiming to strengthen its popular legitimacy through elections. Western countries considered the environment unsuitable for elections, while official opposition bodies called for genuine democratic elections in accordance with international resolutions, representing all segments of the Syrian people, unlike the current parliament. Additionally, popular and media campaigns opposed these superficial elections.

In northeastern Syria, the atmosphere of rapprochement between Turkey and the Assad regime has raised concerns among the AANES, considering it an existential threat and describing the process as a large conspiracy against the Syrian people. The administration realizes that Turkey's policy shift is strategic, not tactical, and that this rapprochement will reduce its available options and present it with difficult challenges, especially as it – if successful – would close the door to any future agreement between the administration and the regime. This explains the statement by Mazloum Abdi, the General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who affirmed that the Syrian crisis cannot be solved through violence and war, emphasizing the administration's readiness to engage in dialogue with all parties, including Turkey, to end the conflict and reach a political solution in Syria. To ease local tensions, the administration issued a general amnesty law in response to demands from the public, tribal leaders, and dignitaries. The amnesty includes hundreds of prisoners who committed crimes of terrorism and other offenses before the law was issued.

Rising Security Tensions: Popular Protests Increase Instability Indicators

In northwestern Syria, protests involved acts of vandalism against public and private property, including the burning of trucks, the removal of Turkish flags, and direct clashes with Turkish forces at several locations. This followed the acts of vandalism and attacks on Syrian refugees that occurred in Kayseri Province, Turkey, and in opposition to renewed talk of political normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime after Turkish officials' statements on rapprochement, which triggered the protests. Additionally, other factors led residents of these areas to express high levels of anger and frustration due to ongoing neglect of good governance issues, widespread corruption, security instability, and imbalanced civil-security relations, along with the lack of clear boundaries for the nature of relations with Turkey. Meanwhile, the Idlib region saw an escalation in military operations between regime forces and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with the regime launching the largest drone attack of 2024 on civilian sites in rural Aleppo and Idlib. HTS continued to carry out infiltration operations against regime forces, the most notable being operations along the Saraqib axis at the beginning of July.

In other areas, the reconciliation model remains characterized by security fragility across different regions. In the town of Kanaker, after the regime imposed a new security reconciliation aimed at enlisting draft dodgers into the army, opponents of the reconciliation attacked a regime headquarters. This reconciliation and the accompanying events come weeks after clashes between regime forces and local militants at the start of the previous month. In Suwayda, the leader of the Mountain Brigade, Marheg al-Jurmani, known for his support of the popular movement in the province and his responsibility for protecting demonstrations there, was assassinated. This assassination is the most significant incident in the province since the start of the popular movement, occurring shortly after the regime brought in security reinforcements to the province. In Daraa, clashes continued between two local groups in the city of Jasim in rural Daraa for over ten days following the assassination of a leader from one of the groups and accusations that the other was behind the attack. In the same province, fighters launched multiple attacks targeting various regime sites in the province, coinciding with roadblocks using burning tires, in response to the kidnapping of a family from the Al-Sanamayn area by a gang affiliated with the 4th Division in rural Homs. The attacks ceased after the family was released.

Meanwhile, 60 people, most of them civilians, were killed in areas controlled by the AANES due to security disturbances, killings, and tribal conflicts, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Additionally, ISIS operations continued in areas under the AANES influence, with 21 different security incidents involving shootings, killings with sharp objects, and planting explosive devices and landmines, resulting in six deaths. Meanwhile, the American base in the Koniko gas plant in rural Deir Ezzor was hit by rockets fired by Iranian backed-militias. American planes responded by targeting the surroundings of the seven villages in areas under the control of pro-Iranian militias in rural Deir Ezzor with heavy machine guns. New military reinforcements arrived for coalition forces in the area, including a short-range air defense system called Avenger. The international coalition has also begun constructing observation towers along the Euphrates River in eastern rural Deir Ezzor to monitor the area and control the security situation amid an increase in tribal attacks from the opposite bank on SDF positions and concerns of an Iranian escalation against the U.S. presence in the region.

Syrian Economy in a Vortex of Crises: Declining Exports and Increasing Living Costs

Syrian exports of vegetables and fruits to Jordan through the Nasib border crossing continued to decline significantly during July 2024 due to Jordan's restrictions on truck entry, following repeated incidents where the regime used trucks to smuggle drugs. This forced Jordan to upgrade the border infrastructure, modernize its equipment, and impose strict conditions on trucks coming from Syria. These measures result in significant losses for Syrian farmers and traders due to the spoilage of goods during the long wait at the border. These actions also negatively affect Syrian exports abroad, impacting foreign currency earnings and potentially straining relations with Jordan if drug smuggling into its territory and through it to the Gulf countries continues.

Regarding the ongoing economic stagnation in Syria and the regime's continued inability to develop the investment environment, figures indicate a 44% decrease in the number of registered companies in Syria during the first quarter of this year compared to the same period last year, along with continued capital flight due to worsening economic challenges. The number of registered traders in the Damascus Chamber of Commerce also dropped from 9,890 to 8,200 traders within one year, down from 17,000 traders before mandatory registration in social security. This decline is attributed to the rising costs of business, particularly energy costs and imposed taxes, difficulties in securing essential business supplies due to their high prices, declining competitiveness of Syrian products, and the lack of incentives and facilities offered by the government. These factors have driven many businesses to relocate to other countries.

Regarding the cost of living in regime-controlled areas, the cost of living for a family of five exceeded 13 million SYP in early July, according to the Qasioun Newspaper Index, while the minimum cost of living reached about 8.1 million SYP. Meanwhile, the minimum monthly wage was only about 278,000 SYP, which covers just 2.2% of the average cost of living in the first three months of 2024 and 2.1% in the following three months. This gap between low wages and high living costs exacerbates poverty and increases the number of people in need, further weakening the purchasing power of citizens, deepening the economic recession, and potentially leading to psychological effects on Syrian families, increasing social tensions, and worsening the humanitarian crisis.In the context of shortages of essential services such as gas and electricity, the waiting time for receiving a gas cylinder reached 85 days in Damascus and 100 days in Homs. This has led to a rise in prices on the black market, ranging from 250,000 to 300,000 SYP, adding to the living burden on residents, reducing their ability to meet basic needs, and increasing public dissatisfaction with government policies. Additionally, the growing reliance on the black market to obtain gas and other services contributes to further economic deterioration.

Regarding economic agreements with the regime's allies, the Syrian Battery and Liquid Gas Company in Aleppo signed a partnership memorandum of understanding with the Russian company Bogra Construction, committing the Russian company to supply, install, and equip a complete factory for the company. Despite a previously signed contract between the Syrian company and the Iranian company Tavan worth $41 million, the lack of progress under the contract indicates the fragility of Iranian investments in Syria and the competition from Russian investors in sectors entered by Iran. Reflecting the improvement in relations with Arab countries, the first Syrian Airlines flight arrived in Saudi Arabia after a year of the kingdom's approval to resume flights between the two countries. This move could open more avenues for cooperation between the two countries, positively impacting the regime's financial resources and encouraging other countries to resume air travel with Syria.

In northeastern Syria, the AANES decided to deprive summer vegetable farmers of their diesel fuel allocations, forcing farmers to buy it on the black market at high prices, which increased production costs and led to a 30% rise in local vegetable prices compared to previous years. These decisions are likely to reduce farmers' profit margins and their ability to continue farming. The lack of support could drive them to rely on the black market and pass on the increased costs to the prices of vegetables and fruits, adding to the financial burden on consumers and increasing poverty and deprivation among the population. This decision highlights the confusion in the administration's economic policies regarding planning and support for the agricultural sector, despite their adoption of socialist visions for regional management. In the same context, the quantity of wheat received this season in AANES areas has halved compared to the previous year due to the low purchase price set and farmers' reluctance to deliver their crops. The administration received only 766,000 tons of wheat, while expectations were around 1.5 million tons. The challenges facing farmers in Al-Hasakah have increased due to the lack of support and low local prices compared to the costs borne by farmers, forcing them to buy medicines and fertilizers in dollars on the black market, increasing costs and leading to a loss in the summer season. The decline in wheat received directly affects food security in the region. Farmers' reluctance to deliver their crops results in a growing trust gap between farmers and the "Autonomous Administration," reflecting the inefficiency of the administration's agricultural policies and its inability to meet farmers' needs.

In northern and eastern rural Aleppo, Syrian trucks resumed operations, transporting goods from border crossings with Turkey to northern Syria after a nearly complete halt lasting four years. Turkish trucks had stopped entering northern Syria due to the anger and protests in Syrian cities following the violence against Syrian refugees in Kayseri Province. The resumption of this activity is expected to create job opportunities for more than 700 Syrian truck drivers and around 500 workers in the region, helping to stimulate the local economy, reduce unemployment, and improve living conditions.

Concept Note for Side Event at the 8th Brussels Conference on

“Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region”

Harnessing Economic Autonomy for Peace: Reimagining Syria’s Path Forward

Date: 29 April, 2024

Time: 16.00 CET

Venue: Thon Hotel EU Brussels

Rue de la Loi 75, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgium

https://maps.app.goo.gl/hz9wWcmWy7MvWQN6A

 Registration link: https://ee.kobotoolbox.org/x/of8LLPG2

1. Event Context

In the backdrop of the 8th Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, this side event will explore the role of economic factors, including economic autonomy, in facilitating peace in Syria. The 90-minute panel will focus on economic empowerment at various levels, particularly emphasizing the support and empowerment of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the middle class as pivotal elements in the peace process.

2. Objective

To discuss and analyse the extent to which economic factors, particularly the empowerment of local economies, can be instrumental in fostering peace in Syria.

3. Panelists

• Dr. Rim Tourkmani.
• Mr. Samir Aita.
• Dr. Sinan Hatahet.

4. Format

• Duration: 90 minutes
• Structure: One panel discussion divided into three thematic sections, followed by a Q&A session

5. Panel Structure

• Economic Foundations for Peace in Syria: will provide an overview of Syria's current economic landscape and discuss how strengthening local economies can contribute to peace.
• The Role of Economic Autonomy and Decentralization: will discuss granting regions economic autonomy, focusing on how this can empower SMEs and strengthen the middle class, thereby positively impacting the peace process.
• Practical Economic Initiatives and Peacebuilding: will explore specific economic initiatives that support SMEs and the middle class, underlining their significance in fostering political negotiations and sustainable peace.

6. Expected Outcomes

1. A nuanced understanding of the relationship between economic empowerment and peace.
2. Insights into how economic autonomy can be leveraged to support these critical economic segments.
3. Recommendations for policy and practical measures to promote economic-driven peace efforts.
4. Recommendations for policy and practical measures to enhance the role of SMEs and the middle class in Syria’s peacebuilding efforts.

7. Target Audience

EU and international policymakers, development experts, Syrian civil society leaders, academics, and media representatives.

8. Concluding Session

• Summary of discussions, key insights, and policy recommendations.
• Strategies for implementing economic autonomy and local empowerment in Syria, as well as initiatives that support SMEs and empower the middle class in Syria.
• Proposal for a follow-up mechanism to track the impact of economic initiatives on the peace process.

Dr. Ammar Kahf, Executive Director of the Omran Center for Strategic Studies and a board member of the Syrian Forum, participated in a side event hosted by the Syrian Forum. This event, sponsored by the Permanent Mission of the European Union to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, was held in conjunction with the 54th session of the Human Rights Council.

The event, held on September 26, 2023, at the United Nations Palace in Geneva, was titled "Reshaping Syria's Future: Examining the Roles of Unions, Student Federations, and NGOs in Supporting Human Rights."

This event delved deep into the roles played throughout Syria's history by various entities, including unions, student federations, and NGOs. It shed light on how the regime potentially used these organizations as tools for repression and explored their evolution and possible future manipulation by the regime.

One of the primary objectives was to spotlight the pivotal dynamics shaping the human rights situation in Syria. The event aimed to offer a comprehensive understanding of the enduring challenges the Syrian people face and the possible paths forward in their quest for freedom.

In his address, Dr. Kahf elaborated on the Ba'ath Party's strategy since its ascent to power. He discussed how the party endeavored to mold civil society to fit its vision of a totalizing state. This was achieved by legally binding all labor, student, and community organizations to the Ba'ath Party, a practice persisting into Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Dr. Kahf pointed out the Ba'ath Party's strategy of monopolizing the National Union of Syrian Students. This move was designed to dominate student activism at university levels, leading to the establishment of Assad's Regime and the formation of the Ba'ath brigades in 2012. These brigades aimed to mobilize university students for operations to overtake cities and quell peaceful protests.

Further, Dr. Kahf highlighted the National Union's significant role in turning the conflict into a societal issue. This was done by arming student supporters and enabling them to suppress, detain, and torture students advocating for peaceful economic and political reforms.

In conclusion, Dr. Kahf perceives the National Union of Syrian Students as a pivotal instrument for the Assad regime. The regime uses it to secure its international reputation, especially in academic institutions offering scholarships to individuals were involved in post-2011 massacres against civilians or those who actively engaged in any kind of military or security operations.

English Copy Link: https://bit.ly/3Rswftb

Arabic Copy Link: https://bit.ly/3qBBiw1

Author: Yaman Zabad

1. Introduction

Entering its tenth year, the Syrian conflict has resulted in a host of challenges for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. The topic of return is among the most critical in local and international conversations, which remains a challenge with no solution in sight. Without a conducive political, social, and economically environment, voluntary return will be limited. A number of items must be considered to elevate the option of voluntary return, including securing a safe and dignified return, maintaining regional stability, and arranging the appropriate regional and international circumstances to ensure the availability of the objective conditions necessary for such return.

When discussing the internal factors in which effect the return of Syria’s displaced, the security situation is the most mentioned. The security conditions in all areas of Syria significantly influence an individual’s decision to return. With deteriorating security conditions, civilians are unable to feel safe and stable. With fear of being displaced again due to security reasons, they are deterred from voluntary return. With the ongoing crisis, maintaining a secure space remains difficult for security forces in opposition, Assad regime, and Autonomous Administration (AA) held territory. The path towards providing civilians with a sense of safety and stability there must be a political and military solution. Recovery and reconstruction may only begin when a safe environment is secured.

Omran Centre for Strategic Studies implemented a survey targeting individuals from regime, opposition, and AA-held territories. This survey is integral as it illustrates the perspective of civilians concerning the security situation and factors influencing their return. From the surveys, it is apparent that locally civilians understand the security conditions intensively, and are aware. The chaotic security situation -is manifested in a host of violations that come in different forms, tools, and intensities. Thus, it reflects the fragility and volatility of the security environment, which is inconsistent with the demand that international bodies seek to fulfil as one of the objective prerequisites for the safe and voluntary return of Syrian refugees from neighboring countries.

The goal of the survey was to identify primary and secondary factors as well as indicators related to the primary indicator of security stability in Syria. These secondary indicators include the efficiency of security apparatuses as well as the legal system associated with them, the performance of these apparatuses and their security operations in addition to relevant accountability, follow-up and complaints systems, as well as the extent to which these indicators have an impact on the return of the Syrian refugees from neighboring countries. First, the survey attempts to diagnose the general security landscape in various Syrian regions, then to identify the nature of relationships between civilians and security apparatuses in these areas, furthermore identifying the most important variables that govern the refugees' decision to return to Syria. Finally, it examines the reality of the refugees' return to Assad regime-held areas, opposition-held areas, and AA areas to determine the most important indicators related to the return of refugees to these areas.

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1. Introduction

Forced migration and internal displacement is still the heaviest toll of Syria’s security deterioration. The main political actors continue to struggle with resolving the causes of migration, including absence of security, empowerment, interaction, and safe spaces.

There are a host of challenges including the inability to provide basic services for IDPs and the lack of political coordination between local and international actors to maintain policies and procedures that lead to “dignified and voluntary return”. The local security actors, in turn, have no supporting strategies whether due to threats and challenges or the negative role they play within recovery and development prospects.

Stability is associated with the effectiveness of “local security” structures, which are deeply affected – structurally and functionally – by several governance models and performance, this association significantly affects refugees and IDPs return. This paper investigates indicators of a safe environment as a necessary condition for stability, return of refugees and IDPs and the prevention of further conflicts. This research attempted to raise questions and insights related to existing security structures, the Assad regime and its allies’ in-depth attitude towards such an environment, and finally, broad visions of a safe environment in the Syrian context.

This paper can be regarded as a thematic summary of an in-depth and comprehensive research initiated by Omran Center in the beginning of 2020. The research aimed at exploring several facets of the issue, first facet deals with refugees’ and IDPs’ prospect of return and related security issues. Second facet is related to the concept of relationship between civil society and security structures, as this relationship defines the legal and organizational parameter of a stable and secure environment. The third facet focuses on security indicators that affect people’s daily life, such as explosions, abductions, assassinations, etc. To examine the regime’s approach and attitudes towards national interest, the research was based on two focus groups located in areas the regime gained after 2018.

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I.    Executive Summary

•    Utilizing a qualitative approach, this report covers four security related indicators that significantly influence refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) decision to return to their original homes. Presenting a wide range of figures and trends, the four indicators that are covered within this report are: assassinations, explosions, extrajudicial detentions, and abductions. As the Syrian crisis grows more complex, security and stability are the main pillars that lead to recovery and safe return of those displaced. By covering the four security indicators, this report attempts to present both the individual and societal perspective that may feed into policy aiming for recovery and progress.

•    The report examined occurances of assassinations and explosions in the governorates of al-Hasaka, Deir Ez-Zour and Daraa during two time periods: last 6 months of 2019 and first 6 months of 2020. During this period, 308 explosions and 72 assassinations were logged. Methods used varied from gunfire in 213 incidents, IEDs in 94, car bomb in 39, mines in 25, grenades in 9 cases, as well as other methods. The total number of casualties reached 1,008 including 490 military personnel and 518 civilians. Daraa, Deir Ezzor, and Al-Hasaka, the selected case studies in the report, expose the failure and weakness of the regime, and to a lesser extent the Autonomous Administration (AA). The number of explosions and assassinations were high within these governorates, due to the unsecure environment and the various actors that included local, foreign and militia actors, each with a separate agenda. The instability and dangerous situation have had an adverse effect on the safe return of refugees and internally displaced individuals.

•    In opposition-controlled territories, incidents of assassinations and explosions within the studied timeframe amounted to: 1,209 casualties, the included 890 civilians and 319 military personnel. IEDs were used in 93 cases, while car bombs were used in 69. As revealed through the analysis from the Euphrates Shield and Afrin territory, the “Wrath of Olives-Ghadab al-Zaytun” operation room held a leading role in the adoption of assassinations within the two areas. There was also a substantial rate of extrajudicial detention and abduction incidents within the monitored areas. The figures highlight the failure of security agencies in protecting their local environments from breaches and their inability to identify methods used by perpetrators. The fragile security environment has raised skepticism on whether there could be a safe return of refugees.

•    In the cities of Jasim, Douma, al-Bukamal, and Raqqa, 73 abductions and extrajudicial detentions occurred, including 15 in Jasim, 20 in Douma, 20 in al-Bukamal, 18 in Raqqa. 23 of the operations were committed by foreign actors, resulting in 182 casualties, 19 incidents committed by local actors, which resulted in 117 casualties, and the perpetrators of an additional 31 incidents are unknown, but resulted in 89 casualties. The total number of casualties is 388, including 188 civilians (109 which are from reconciled areas) and 56 military personnel, including 12 from the ranks of the AA’s People Protection Units (YPG), 20 from civil defense, 2 from the AA, and one person from the Military Security branch. These figures illustrate the decline in security and stability. Perpetrators vary between local and international actors. This further highlights the deterioration and inefficiency of security actors.

•    In the cities of Afrin and Jarablus, there were 169 extrajudicial detentions and abductions; 37 in Jarablus and 132 in Afrin with 355 casualties. The “Wrath of Olives” operations room expanded to 17 operation rooms. The incidents focused primarily on targeting and killing members of the Syrian National Army. According to reported data, the highest number of incidents took place in January 2020. Known actors were responsible for 141 extrajudicial detentions, while 28 remain unknown. The majority were identified in Afrin, which highlights the failure of security actors to maintain a secure environment.

•    The data and analysis resulted in a number of recommendations concerning efforts to aid in Syrian refugee and IDP return. The main recommendation is for decision-makers to avoid general policies that do not explicitly define the necessary terms of security and stability. In order to achieve the level of detail necessary, key stakeholders must agree on legal, administrative, and political conditions that will insure a the safe, dignified, and voluntary return of Syrians.

II.    Introduction
Security, stability, and early recovery are dependent upon one another in a political transition and reformation. As highlighted throughout history, security and stability are essential and were predominately achieved by instilling a new political order that removes the main sources of conflict. Syria is no exception, as the need for a political transition grows more urgent. Although security and stability are a focus point for key stakeholders, the growing fragmentation and chaos has only expanded the various layers to attaining security. Also contributing, the prolonged political process, including the constitutional committee, have laid a confusing path with unclear outcomes that would lead to a stable political climate in the near future. The current outlook does not clearly outline when a secure and stable environment will be set for Syrian to return.

As the Syrian conflict reaches a “precarious freeze,” it has become increasingly apparent that the security borders separating the three zones will be consolidated, which are the zone influenced by Turkey northwest of the Euphrates, the zone controlled by the Autonomous Administration (AA) in cooperation with the United States, and Assad regime-held areas, secured with Iranian and Russian influence. Despite the divisions, security and stability are critical in moving forward with early recovering and attaining social stability, whether inside Syria or in neighboring regions. This report will focus on four particular indicators of security; assassinations, explosions, extrajudicial detentions, and abductions. A variety of cities from a wide range of backgrounds were selected as case-studies to cover the different areas of control in Syria.

Strategically selected, the case studies attempt to present a general picture of Syria’s current security condition. The first and second section of the report, presents an overview of data collected concerning explosions and assassinations over the course of a year, starting from the beginning of July 2019 until June 2020. explosion The sections cover the three areas of control through case studies from the following areas; in the Deir Ezzor and Daraa governorate are covered for Assad regime-held territory, areas in Deir Ezzor and Al-Hasaka governorate are covered for the AA region, and cities in Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, and Al-Hasaka are covered to represent the situation in opposition-controlled areas.

To measure indicators for assassinations and explosions, a tailored-approach was to collect and analyze data. Forms were utilized to record information on explosions and assassinations, including date, location, type of incident, target, targeting method, status of the target, and the actor. The results and consequences of each event were also recorded. After collection, data was cleaned and cross-checked, after which a cross-regional analysis was formed on the security conditions, stability, and how it relates to the topic of safe and neutral return.
The report relied on the following sources:

1) Accounts of activists in areas under observation or those following security operations on social media platforms.
2) Accounts and official websites of agencies and local media that cover events in those governorates.

The other two critical indicators of safe return, detention and abduction, were analyzed through case studies from the three particular zones of control. In regime-held areas, the city of Jasim in Daraa, Douma in Damascus, and Al-Bukamal in Deir Ezzor were selected. All three have been under the control of the regime since 2018. For opposition-controlled areas, the city of Jarablus and Afrin in Aleppo were selected. Both fell under opposition control in 2018, after Operations Euphrates Shield, therefore fitting into the same framework. The timing of control and the sensitivity of the situation in Afrin allows for the security situation to be compared with regime-held case studies.

For this purpose, a tailored form was designed to monitor these incidents and analyze their data as indicators of stability and safe return over half a year starting from October 2019 until the end of March 2020. The form of detention and abduction was designed as follows: (Date – location – type of operation – status of the target – number of those targeted – parties in control – places of observation – targeting party – gender of the target). In terms of sources, the report relied on private interviews with well-informed individuals whom are familiar with the details of the events in the monitored areas. In addition to relying on:

1.    The observation points affiliated with the Information Unit at Omran Center in northern Syria.
2.    The special security report issued by Ihsan Relief and Development offices inside Syria.
3.    The official social media sources of the targeted parties.

1. Introduction

The majority of literature discussing civil-military relationship highlight that armed forces must follow a democratic civilian leadership. To achieve such a relationship, a state must undergo a complicated process to meet the necessary requirements, including a comprehensive legislative reform, a change in the entire security sector, the inclusion of transitional justice, establishing democratic institutions, and instilling democratic values. Civil-military relations are the most sensitive and vital aspect of the democratic transformation process, as failure to address the complex relationship may result in a relapse to the pre-democratic authoritarian status. An essential component to establishing democratic transportation, civil-military relations is a key element affecting internally displaces persons (IDPs) and refugee return, as well as their engagement in political, social, and economical life.

The necessity to secure a safe environment for dignified and voluntary return is intertwined with promoting civil-military relations. Such an environment does not currently exist across Syria’s geography, as various actors struggle to attain more power. The absence of a future plan that entails a “new political era,” and the “cautious freeze” on the ground, has resulted in a multitude of governance models backed by the various international and regional powers. This paper seeks to delve into civil-military relations throughout Syria’s geography, which consists of numerous governance models, to assess the impact of those relations on a refugee and IDP return. The ultimate research question addressed; to what extent do civil-military relations affect refugee and IDP decision to return?

Although the study sheds light on civil-military relations in all areas of control, there is a particular focus on regime-held areas. Regime-controlled areas provide identifiable features concerning civil-military relations, as the regime has control over the state in legal and institutional terms. Additionally, the regime’s security approach will have the most impact on civil-military relations in the future, affecting more than 12 million displaced Syrians decision to return. The paper also sheds some light on such parameters in areas outside regime control as fragile stability in others zones also hinders the formation of a safe environment conducive of a voluntary and safe return.

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Navar Saban, expert in military situation at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul talking with Enab Baladi about the recent military developments in southern Idlib and mainly near the M4 and the possible scenario for the M4 agreement.

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Established in 2013 in Turkey with presence in Syria, and an office in Washington, DC.
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