Key Messages

• Assad's regime issued Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024, mirroring past amnesty decrees but with additional wide exemptions.
• The decree excludes political detainees and prisoners of conscience, continuing a policy that neglects any political reform or reconciliation with opposition forces.
• Security agencies are not bound by the decree, limiting its impact and allowing them to detain individuals without judicial oversight, which reduces the practical effects of the amnesty.
• State security and Cybercrime offenses remain excluded, underscoring the regime's intent to suppress dissent rather than promoting public safety.
• The decree fails to create a safe environment for the return of refugees and displaced persons as it does not address the root issues of security and political repression.
• The international community is urged to demand transparency and accountability from the regime to genuinely address detention and human rights abuses.

Background

On September 22, 2024, Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024,⁽¹⁾ granting a general amnesty for crimes committed before this date. This decree is the latest in a series of amnesty decrees issued by the regime, a trend that has accelerated since 2011.

Legislative Decree No. 27 closely mirrors the structure and legal provisions of the previous amnesty under Decree No. 24 of 2022⁽²⁾but introduces expanded exemptions to cover additional offenses and legislation enacted since 2022. It also varies slightly from the amnesty issued under Legislative Decree No. 36 of 2023.⁽³⁾

This analysis reviews the content and specific exemptions of Decree No. 27, examines its objectives and implications, and compares it with Decree No. 24 of 2022 to assess its continuity and changes within the broader pattern of Syrian amnesty policies.

A Routine Decree... Security Agencies as an Exception

The Syrian Penal Code classifies crimes into three categories: Violations are minor offenses punishable by a fine or imprisonment from 24 hours to 10 days. Misdemeanors carry penalties of imprisonment for 10 days to 3 years or a fine. Felonies are serious crimes punishable by death or imprisonment exceeding three years. This classification provides context for understanding the scope and limitations of the amnesty decree.⁽⁴⁾ In general, any penalty with a minimum sentence of more than three years—whether imprisonment, detention, house arrest, or civil disenfranchisement—is considered criminal.⁽⁵⁾

Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024 grants amnesty for all penalties related to misdemeanors and violations. It also includes amnesty for internal and external desertion, as defined in Articles 100 and 101 of the Military Penal Code. However, as with previous decrees, this one excludes individuals who remain in hiding or are fugitives unless they surrender within three months (for internal desertion) or four months (for external desertion).

The decree, however, exempts Articles 102 and 103 of the Military Penal Code, which address "defection to the enemy" and "conspiracy to defect," both punishable by death. The regime classifies military personnel who defected to join opposition forces under these articles. Additionally, articles such as 137 through 150, which prescribe lengthy prison sentences or death penalties, remain outside the scope of this amnesty.

This exclusion underscores that the amnesty primarily targets military deserters who stayed loyal to the regime or reside in regime-controlled areas. Furthermore, the decree does not waive the exemption fee for individuals over 42 who did not complete military service, as this fee is considered civil compensation to the state. Similarly, compensatory fines under current laws are typically excluded from amnesty provisions.⁽⁶⁾

According to Article 3 of the Executive Instructions for the Civil Status Law, the amnesty waives fines for “all violations stipulated in the mentioned law and committed before September 22, 2024 of the legally required fines, provided they are settled within three months for those inside Syria and nine months for those abroad.”⁽⁷⁾ While positive in theory, implementation remains challenging as Syrians outside regime-controlled areas, or those living abroad, face complex procedures in accessing Syrian diplomatic missions, often rendering this provision ineffective for them.⁽⁸⁾

In practice, individuals wanted by security agencies are excluded from amnesty benefits, as these agencies operate beyond legal and constitutional oversight. Public prosecutors do not visit security branches to determine if detainees qualify for amnesty, limiting their oversight to official prisons and detention centers.⁽⁹⁾The decree notably excludes political detainees and prisoners of conscience linked to opposition activities or political beliefs. Consequently, it fails to address the plight of most refugees and displaced individuals who fled Syria due to security concerns.

This is the third consecutive amnesty to exclude prisoners of conscience, limiting amnesty benefits to minor offenses and misdemeanors while leaving major charges intact. The regime’s disregard for this group underscores its unwillingness to make political concessions or engage in meaningful dialogue with the opposition.

Objectives and Dimensions of the Decree: Aims of Control and Security Regulation

Since 2011, the regime has regularly included desertion offenses in its amnesty decrees. By granting amnesty for desertion, it seeks to reintegrate deserters, particularly those in regime-controlled areas, back into its forces and to clear minor offenses for individuals who evaded or neglected mandatory or reserve service, though certain cases remain excluded.⁽¹⁰⁾ However, this decree should not be mistaken for a genuine effort toward military restructuring or a shift to a "professional army," as such reforms would require a national strategy involving cooperation across all Syrian factions. Such a strategy would need to encompass the following steps:

• Evaluating the regulatory legal framework and constitutional requirements for mobilization, conscription, and military service;
• Proposing legislative reforms for the military and security agencies, which currently operate outside constitutional and legal obligations, and instituting reforms within the military judiciary;
• Establishing independent civilian public institutions to oversee and monitor military reforms and transformation plans.

Regarding the potential impact of this decree on reconciliation dynamics, past settlements generally indicate that most officers who reached agreements with the regime were subsequently imprisoned and subjected to severe torture, not to mention being stripped of their civil rights. As for individual soldiers, in addition to being investigated, they are often forced back into the army, which remains a non-neutral entity. For most of those involved in reconciliation, the issue is not solely about personal safety; it is deeply tied to their national choices and stances.

By excluding crimes related to state security, corruption, and economic offenses from the decree, the regime signals its intention to maintain strict control and neutralize threats to its authority. Exempting cybercrimes, particularly those involving information technology, implies a stance of "protecting citizens" from digital threats, aligning with the regime's recent crackdown on digital content creators and platforms it accuses of undermining societal values.⁽¹¹⁾Additionally, the regime has leveraged the exclusion of cybercrimes to target its opponents, especially activists who have voiced criticism against the regime on social media, particularly in recent times.⁽¹²⁾

The regime’s continued disregard for political detainees and prisoners of conscience, whom it has detained throughout its rule—particularly since 2011—reflects its unwillingness to engage in any genuine political process or national reconciliation. This stance indicates a persistent policy of repression and restriction on fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The exclusion of political detainees even raises suspicions that some may no longer be alive, potentially having met their fate in mass graves.

Detention as a Persistent Indicator

The Assad regime continues to systematically obscure information and statistics related to detainees (providing neither data nor specialized institutions). Since the beginning of Ba'ath rule to the present day, the precise whereabouts of detainees remain unknown, and the regime has not officially disclosed the number of released detainees or their locations. This lack of transparency stems from the chaotic nature of information due to the dominance and multiplicity of security agencies, their conflicting operations, and lack of coordination. Additionally, the regime's reluctance to disclose the real number of detainees aims to avoid using such data against it in human rights contexts. Politically, the regime seeks to keep this issue as a bargaining chip and tool for political leverage.

As of the release of this report, there is no official count of those released as a result of this amnesty, while legal sources estimate an increase in detention rates. In late April 2022, Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No. 7 of 2022,⁽¹³⁾ At the time, it was considered "significant" for covering many offenses related to the Syrian revolution. However, it later became evident that the decree was largely symbolic, aimed at giving the impression that the regime was pursuing rehabilitation. In practice, repressive security practices continued, including arbitrary arrests, with the regime detaining 2,301 people by the end of September 2024.⁽¹⁴⁾ Among them, 1,527 individuals were detained between the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 7 in 2022 and the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 36 in 2023, as follows:

Figure (1): Number of detainees since the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 7 of 2022

Conclusion

The international community must intensify pressure on the Assad regime to disclose the fate of all political detainees and prisoners of conscience and work towards the release of those who remain imprisoned, and demand adherence to international human rights standards to end arbitrary arrests. Rather than accepting the regime’s amnesty decrees at face value, countries and organizations should critically examine these decrees with legal expertise, closely monitoring their implementation and insisting on transparency regarding actual beneficiaries. For the Syrian opposition, prioritizing the issue of detainees in all negotiations and political initiatives is essential.

While the decree may result in the release of some individuals convicted of minor offenses, its societal impact is limited. Amnesty decrees like this one suffer from the absence of independent civilian or humanitarian oversight to verify implementation and accurately track beneficiaries. Additionally, the state's reluctance to provide clear data on released detainees—beyond distributing the decree to official channels—exacerbates the persistent gap between legal text and practical enforcement. Syria’s crisis is not merely a legal or judicial issue; it reflects a deep-rooted political, economic, and social divide. The decree does not foster social cohesion, reconciliation, or a safe environment for the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Ultimately, this decree is not a genuine step toward resolving Syria’s crisis. It serves as a tactical maneuver to advance the regime’s interests, largely aimed at shaping public opinion, mitigating social discontent, and handling specific legal cases without addressing the underlying issue of thousands of detainees held since 2011. Its primary objective appears to be projecting a façade of reform to the international community, while offering little substantive change.

Appendix:

The following tables illustrate the articles excluded by Amnesty Decree No. 27 of 2024, with a comparison to Legislative Decree No. 24 of 2022.

First: Crimes excluded under the General Penal Code and its amendments:

Second: Articles and Paragraphs Excluded Under the Military Penal Code:

Third: Other Laws and Articles Excluded from the Amnesty Decree:

([1])“Legislative Decree No. 27 of 2024”, SANA, Published Date: 22/09/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/3XUDjBy

(2)Muhsen ALMustafa, “Legislative Decree No. 24: Amnesty as a Dynamic for Internal Needs”, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Published Date: 26/12/2022, Link: https://bit.ly/3jvYPe6

(3)“Amnesty Decree No. 36 of 2023 Excludes Political Prisoners”, Syrian Network for Human Rights, Published Date: 21/11/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/4dujuFK

(4)Ibid.

(5)According to Article 37 of the Penal Code, amended by Law No. 15 of 2022, ordinary criminal penalties are: 1) Death penalty. 2) Life imprisonment. 3) Life detention. 4) Temporary imprisonment. 5) Temporary detention. For more details, see: “Law No. 15 of 2022, Amendments to Several Articles of the Penal Code”, The Parliament, Published Date: 28/03/2022, Link: https://bit.ly/3Bfr5uq

(6)The decree does not cover fines related to violations of currency and exchange laws, transfer regulations, traffic laws, tobacco and stamp duties. It also excludes certain misdemeanors stipulated in building regulations, economic crimes, electricity theft, fraudulent use of telecommunications services, consumer protection law violations, public examination fraud, forestry violations, and misdemeanors related to transactions in foreign currencies. Additionally, the decree stipulates that for misdemeanors involving harm to personal property, compensation must be provided to the victim. This amnesty does not affect personal claims, as they remain within the jurisdiction of the court handling the public claim. In all cases, the aggrieved party may file a lawsuit in the criminal court within one year from the date of the decree’s issuance.

(7)“Circular No. 59/4/2, Issued by the Directorate of Legal Affairs at the General Directorate of Civil Affairs in the Ministry of Interior”, Published Date: 1/10/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/4eQikW9

⁽⁸⁾For example, obtaining an appointment for civil status transactions at the Syrian consulate in Istanbul requires several months before it can be scheduled, in addition to the financial costs associated with visiting the consulate.

(9)Interview via Phone with Legal Advisor, former Judge Mustafa Al-Qassem, Istanbul/Turkey, Date of interview: 25/09/2024.

(10)Interview via Phone with Colonel Ahmad Hamad, a defected officer and former head of the Recruitment branch, Istanbul/Turkey, Date of interview: 24/09/2024.

⁽¹¹⁾Mohammad Al-Sheikh, "Mass Exodus of Syrian Content Creators to Lebanon", Al-Modon, Published Date: 22/09/2024, Link: https://bit.ly/3BjOIlK

⁽¹²⁾Ma'moun Al-Bustani, "New Details on the Arrest of an Alawite Activist in Latakia", Orient News, Published Date: 21/08/2023, Link: https://bit.ly/47BQH0C

⁽¹³⁾Muhsen AL Mustafa, Mohammad Munir Al-Fakir, “Amnesty Decree No. 7: Hope for Rehabilitation through Superficial Steps”, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Published Date: 23/09/2022, Link: https://bit.ly/3SLDj0U

⁽¹⁴⁾The figures were compiled from monthly reports issued by the Syrian Network for Human Rights on the number of detainees.

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key political, security, and economic events in Syria during the month of August 2024, examining developments across various levels.

• Politically, the popular movement in Suwayda has persisted for over a year, maintaining its demands for freedom, justice, the release of detainees, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. While international reactions to the normalization process with the Assad regime remain mixed, with some welcoming it and others expressing skepticism, Turkey continues to push forward, driven by domestic pressures, national security needs, and international relations.
• Security, the growing Russian role in containing the increasing tensions in northeastern Syria is becoming more prominent. The renewed cycle of violence claimed the lives of 57 civilians across Syria this month.
• Economically, the continued rise in prices remains one of the most pressing crises affecting the livelihoods of Syrian citizens. The significant drop in wheat production, with over 60% of cultivated land lost, threatens Syria's food security, and raises concerns of potential humanitarian disasters in the medium and long term.

Varied International Reactions to Normalization with the Assad Regime

The popular movement in Suwayda, now marking its one-year anniversary, continues to demand freedom, justice, accountability for human rights violators and war criminals, the release of detainees, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. This ongoing movement reflects a strong determination to achieve political change, despite the security challenges and obstacles imposed by the Assad regime to block any real reform. It is clear that the regime has relied on time to suppress and end the protests, sometimes through indifference and other times through security restrictions. Notably, the regime has refrained from using the same level of repression it employed against the demonstrations during the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011. However, the continued peaceful and growing momentum of the Suwayda movement demonstrates that a political solution that satisfies the Syrian people is the foundation for peace and stability in Syria and the region.

As Turkey's normalization process with the Assad regime continues at a slow pace, international reactions—especially from the United States and Russia—remain mixed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov affirmed Moscow's interest in normalizing relations between its partners in Damascus and Ankara, indicating that a new meeting would take place soon. In contrast, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake emphasized that the United States would not normalize relations with Bashar al-Assad's regime and would continue to adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Additionally, Ethan Goldrich, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, reminded countries engaging with the Assad regime that such relationships should advance common international goals under Resolution 2254 and serve to improve the conditions for the Syrian people. He stressed that the U.S. does not support normalization efforts by these countries with Assad. Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Ministry welcomed Russia’s efforts to restore relations with the Assad regime, confirming that Ankara's efforts to normalize relations with Damascus continue based on "good faith" and without preconditions.

The path to normalization is fraught with challenges, yet Turkey’s urgent priorities—including the burden of the Syrian refugee crisis, national security, counterterrorism, and border security—push Ankara's decision-makers to continue this path despite doubts about its feasibility, high costs, and Western opposition, which has been expressed in statements by representatives at the UN Security Council. A U.S. representative voiced concern over the more than two-year stall in Constitutional Committee meetings and the Assad regime's disregard for the political process called for in Resolution 2254. The U.S. official reiterated that American sanctions would remain in place until tangible and measurable progress is made toward a political solution in line with the international resolution. He also reminded U.S. partners in the region that normalization with Assad would not end or reduce the production of Captagon. Meanwhile, Special Envoy Geir Pedersen warned that escalating security tensions are reaching new and dangerous levels, with rising violence threatening international peace and security.

It appears that Western countries and the United States' efforts to maintain the status quo in the Syrian file are unsatisfactory to neighboring countries, which can no longer bear the burdens of the ongoing conflict that has lasted for over a decade. These countries seek to resolve the conflict in any way that protects their interests and reduces their burdens, even if such a settlement comes at the expense of the Syrian people.

Increasing Russian Role Amid Escalating Security Tensions

August witnessed significant security developments across different areas of control in Syria, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights documenting the deaths of 57 civilians during this month. Regime forces continued their attacks on northwestern Syria, including an assault targeting a Turkish observation point in the de-escalation zones. Additionally, a large explosion in a truck occurred in the city of Azaz, in northern rural Aleppo, killing nine civilians and injuring 13 others. The targeted area came under rocket fire during the rescue and evacuation operations. Meanwhile, tensions continued to rise around the "Abu al-Zendin" crossing, where efforts to open the crossing faced objections from armed groups and civil activists who prevented trucks from passing through.

In Deir Ezzor, eastern Syria, violent clashes lasted for days following large-scale attacks by fighters from the western bank of the Euphrates River, who identified themselves as members of the "Tribal Army." These fighters targeted checkpoints of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in villages and towns in eastern Deir Ezzor. Both sides engaged in mutual shelling along the banks of the Euphrates, with regime artillery bombarding the villages of Dahla and Jadid Bakara, resulting in a massacre that killed 11 civilians, mostly children and women. In response, SDF forces shelled the opposite bank and, for the first time, conducted a security operation in which their special forces crossed the Euphrates using river barges, supported by drone air cover. This operation resulted in the killing of seven regime soldiers, including an officer with the rank of captain, and the capture of two members of Assad’s Fourth Division.

Two significant developments emerged during these security tensions in Deir Ezzor. First, the SDF explicitly accused regime forces of orchestrating the attacks, directly blaming General Intelligence Chief Hussam Louqa for overseeing the operation. The SDF responded with force, sending a clear message that it is prepared to counter the regime's attempts to destabilize its controlled areas and that relying on regime security forces to undermine the "Autonomous Administration" project is a failed strategy. The second development was Russia's role in mediating the crisis between the two sides. Sergey Alexandrovich Kiselev, the commander of Russian forces in Syria, led a mediation process over several days to prevent further military confrontations in Hasakah and Qamishli and to lift the SDF's siege on regime security zones. Russia’s efforts to expand its influence in northeastern Syria are evident, as it seeks to limit U.S. involvement. Russia has accused the U.S. of increasing tensions in Syria. Alongside its military activities in the east, Russia expressed concern over international coalition movements, particularly U.S. aircraft flights in Russian-controlled areas, with 360 violations of Syrian airspace in the Al-Tanf region reported in August alone, according to the head of the Russian Reconciliation Center. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also warned the Kurds in northeastern Syria against continuing to rely on the United States, reminding them of the Afghanistan scenario.

In southern Syria, Daraa province saw escalations between local armed groups and regime forces in the eastern countryside of Daraa, as well as in the northern countryside. Local groups targeted regime forces in response to kidnappings and arrests of the province’s residents by regime forces. Meanwhile, the regime sought to impose new local reconciliations, which were rejected by the groups that refused to surrender their weapons.

On another front, Israel intensified its airstrikes on Iranian supply lines in eastern and southern rural Homs, near the Lebanese border, in addition to targeting another site in western rural Daraa within regime-controlled areas. Since October, Israel has conducted 180 airstrikes. Despite these attacks, Hezbollah's supply routes and Iran's presence in Syria persist. Iran has successfully entrenched itself in the regime's military, security, and civil institutions over the years, solidifying its presence alongside Hezbollah from Al-Bukamal on the Iraqi border to Al-Qusayr on the Lebanese border. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration appears reluctant to engage in a wide regional war that could significantly jeopardize the gains from its counterterrorism operations and military bases in the region.

Growing Food Security Crisis

The continued rise in prices remains one of the most significant crises burdening Syrian citizens. The primary causes include increasing costs of raw materials, declining agricultural and industrial production, and rampant corruption in the form of bribes and tolls between cities and provinces. Additionally, the drop in purchasing power and financial crises strain the public budget, exacerbated by the regime's poor economic management, including flawed decisions, policies, and relationships with neighboring countries.

Wheat production has significantly declined due to ineffective pricing policies, high production costs, poor-quality seeds, and inadequate fuel distribution to farmers. The indicative price for wheat has proven ineffective, further exacerbated by insufficient rainfall and unfavorable weather conditions. As a result, cultivated wheat areas in Syria have decreased by 60% this season. The reduction in wheat acreage is expected to lead to a shortage of flour, necessitating greater imports and negatively impacting food security.

At the same time, Syria faces difficulties in the flow of goods both locally and regionally. Farmers in the villages of Al-Qusayr, rural Homs, struggle to transport their agricultural produce due to the presence of 22 regime checkpoints and the confiscation of goods by customs under the pretext of smuggling. Farmers are often forced to pay bribes amounting to millions of Syrian pounds to recover their goods and secure passage.

Regionally, delays in Syrian trucks crossing into Jordan continue for the third consecutive month. Entry through the Nasib border crossing is delayed, leading to spoilage of goods and increased costs. Regime officials have accused the Jordanian side of deliberately disrupting traffic at the crossing to promote their own products at the expense of Syrian goods. Syrian truck movement into Jordan faces severe slowdowns due to thorough inspections aimed at preventing drug smuggling. Local markets are also suffering from an increase in smuggling, particularly of milk to Lebanon, which affects the availability of dairy products in Syrian markets and drives prices higher. Although prices have stabilized somewhat in recent months, forecasts indicate further increases due to declining local production.

Simultaneously, the regime and Russia are discussing the use of local currencies in bilateral trade to mitigate the economic impact of Western sanctions on both countries. However, significant obstacles remain, such as the non-convertibility of the ruble and Syrian pound, limiting the effectiveness of such transactions. Moreover, trade between the two countries is imbalanced, with annual trade volumes amounting to $650 million, where the regime imports most of its needs from Russia while exporting limited quantities of agricultural products.

In northeastern Syria, economic problems continue to worsen month by month, particularly due to reduced support from the "Autonomous Administration" to its citizens and rising overall prices. The "Autonomous Administration" has removed subsidies for diesel fuel allocated to commercial electric generators, causing electricity prices to rise. Additionally, the poultry sector in Al-Hasakah has been severely impacted by high temperatures, disease outbreaks, and rising production costs, including the costs of medicine and diesel, which have resulted in the death of large numbers of birds. This has forced some vendors to close their shops due to reduced demand. The military tensions between the "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) and the "Tribal Army" in Deir Ezzor have also cast a shadow over the region's economy. The closure of crossings between SDF-controlled areas and regime-controlled areas has led to a shortage of food supplies and a sharp increase in prices.

In an attempt to alleviate the crisis, the "Agriculture and Irrigation Authority" of the Autonomous Administration announced plans to compensate farmers affected by fires that destroyed vast agricultural areas. These measures include distributing free wheat seeds to affected farmers for the next agricultural season. However, these efforts appear insufficient to address the multiple crises facing the agricultural sector in the region, especially given the rising fuel prices and the overall costs of farming. Overall, these crises reflect a sharp economic decline in northeastern Syria. Worsening the situation is the lack of sufficient government support and the rising cost of living, which place immense pressure on residents already suffering from the consequences of war and ongoing unrest. In these circumstances, a solution remains dependent on achieving comprehensive political and economic stability that can ease the burden on citizens and improve living conditions in these areas.

The economic reality is not much different in northwestern Syria, where Idlib and rural Aleppo are witnessing significant price increases in the energy and basic goods sectors. This adds further pressure on local residents, who are already struggling with the ongoing humanitarian crisis and difficult economic conditions. One of the most notable developments was the decision by "Green Energy," which operates in the electricity sector in Idlib, and the "Syrian-Turkish Electrical Energy Company" (STE) in rural Aleppo, to raise residential and commercial electricity prices. This was justified by the increase in prices from the Turkish supplier providing energy to the region. This decision comes at a time when residents are grappling with declining purchasing power and rising living costs, further increasing the financial burden on families and businesses. Moreover, the poultry market in northwestern Syria is experiencing significant price fluctuations. The price of a ton of chicken in northwestern Syria has dropped by around $300 after the closure of smuggling crossings with areas under the control of the SDF. However, price differences between Idlib and rural Aleppo still range between $300 and $500, attributed to factors such as transportation costs, the availability of feed, and varying security conditions in each region.

Overall, these recent changes highlight significant challenges facing the local economy in northwestern Syria. Rising electricity prices and increasing living costs are putting additional pressure on residents, while productive sectors like poultry are experiencing sharp price fluctuations due to changing security and economic conditions. Without sustainable economic interventions or international support, these crises may continue to negatively affect the region's stability and the lives of its inhabitants.

Since early 2024, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has been working to contain the civilian unrest in its controlled areas in Northwestern Syria, which was triggered by the internal crisis of the mid-2023. While HTS has considerable experience in managing internal power struggles, including defections, it has not faced such widespread popular protests since it has begun to acquire monopoly of governance in Idlib in 2017⁽¹⁾

The interaction between HTS and the civilian populations in Idlib, has been characterized as a relationship between ruler and ruled, with HTS relying on mass obedience and modest support- similar to many hybrid insurgencies⁽²⁾, This article elaborates on the grievances that triggered the protests challenging HTS’s ability to maintain mass obedience and how HTS employed a calibrated response to sustain it.

Old and New Grievances

The process of establishing governance and ensuring its monopoly in the hands of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) from November 2017⁽³⁾onwards has created local grievances that played, among other factors, a crucial role in fueling resentment toward the HTS. The authoritarian nature of HTS’s rule is quite reflected in its way of dismantling the local councils, the establishment of the “General Security Service” (GSS) and its use of detention and torture to intimidate opponents.

In 2023, local councils were dismantled in favor of the SSG’s centralized eight municipalities system⁽⁴⁾, which operates under the SSG’s Ministry of Local Administration and Services. This move came after a long process of gradually cracking down on local councils, overcoming their resistance and their efforts to maintain their autonomy and slow down the HTS’s growing control over governance in Idlib.

HTS first brought local councils operating in its strongholds, as in the case of Harem, under its control either by directly overseeing them or by supervising phony elections to designate new councils following the establishment of the SSG. Then, after defeating the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 2019, HTS coerced the remaining local councils in previously NLF-controlled areas, such as Kafr Takharim and Jabal al-Zawiya, to submit to its authority.

HTS acknowledged that dismantling local councils had contributed to local resentment. Before the protests began, HTS’s leader al-Jawlani had rejected suggestions to reestablish local councils during meetings with local notables. However, the protests compelled HTS to compromise by forming a new committee in March 2024 ⁽⁵⁾, tasked with defining the rules and procedures for local council elections in HTS-controlled areas. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of these councils remains uncertain.

The General Security Service (GSS), established in mid-2020⁽⁶⁾ as a security and intelligence apparatus for HTS, has played a key role in suppressing opponents during HTS's power consolidation, leading to widespread grievances. Tasked with enforcing regulations, conducting security operations, and managing detention facilities; the GSS has already developed a notorious reputation among local communities for its violent conduct and use of torture in its prisons. Common methods of torture include handcuffing, blindfolding, dragging, hanging detainees from the ceiling, and beating them with cables or hosepipes to extract confessions⁽⁷⁾.

The GSS sparked even more outrage following the internal purge that began in August 2023⁽⁸⁾. During this period, hundreds of HTS members were arrested on charges of espionage and subsequently subjected to severe mistreatment and torture. The widespread use of torture resembled the brutal tactics of the Syrian regime, rekindling past traumas for Syrians who had suffered at the hands of the regime and considered HTS as the lesser of two evils. In short, the protests against HTS were a reaction from local communities to the group's increasingly authoritarian grip over Idlib.

Calibrating the Response: HTS’s Containment of the Protests

The protests posed a new challenge to HTS, threatening both its governance model and the narrative it uses to portray itself as not only a better alternative to the regime, but also to its rival opposition’s Syrian Interim Government - a narrative that was employed to legitimize its attempts to expand influence into areas controlled by the Syrian National Army. As protesters demanded the overthrow of al-Jawlani’s rule ⁽⁹⁾, the latter calibrated his response by employing a mix of persuasion and coercion tactics, such as using limited violence, announcing reforms, and launching mediation initiatives led by local governance bodies. These actions were aimed at containing the protests and restoring mass obedience in HTS-controlled areas.

By employing limited violence, such as deploying security or military forces, limited shootings, beating with sticks, and arresting activists and protesters, HTS aimed to maintain its strong image and project power without causing severe losses that could backfire and fuel further resentment. This calibrated violence was utilized to pressure localities into recognizing the reforms announced by the SSG and conceding to local settlements brokered by the local governance bodies.

The announced reforms revolved around reorganizing the General Security Service under the supervision of the SSG’s interior ministry, expanding the representation within the “Shura Council” (a parliament-like body), initiating a process of re-establishing the local councils, and establishing a board of grievances to address issues related to detainees⁽¹⁰⁾. Meanwhile, the Management of the Liberated Areas (MLA), which is composed of eight local governance bodies operating as a mediatory bodybetween HTS and the SSG on one side and the local communities on the other, have been engaging with local communities to address their local needs in respect to services and their resentment toward the HTS, alleviating local security concerns and seeking local settlements to protests.

For instance, the “Management of the Middle Area”, one of the MLA eight local governance bodies, reached an agreement with representatives of the local movement in Binish⁽¹¹⁾, under the auspices of local notables in mid-July, stipulating the release of detainees and the withdrawal of military and security deployments as well as the suspension of protests for three months. A similar agreement was reached in Ariha between the Management of the Area and the representatives of the local movement therein.

Although the agreements have not halted the protests(12) in the two regions due to the unresolved issue of detainees among other reasons, they have helped to reduce tensions. Notably, the dispute over the agreement in Binish, where the MLA accused the protest movement of circumventing the agreement and applying it outside of its intended local context, showcases HTS’s tendency to treat the protests as isolated local issues. Such an approach is set to address the differing motivations by region and adopt a ‘divide and contain’ tactic which is considered a more effective way to regain control of the situation.

Local settlements seem to be the preferred alternative to a broader settlement with the “Gathering of the Revolutionary Movement”, a group led by public figures including former founders of the HTS-backed SSG such as Bassam Sahyouni⁽¹³⁾ and Farouk Kushkush. This group insists to aspire for a radical change as it considers SSG’s reforms as superficial, which made HTS’s attempts to broker a settlement with them, including a meeting held with HTS’s leader al-Jawlani in late May⁽¹⁴⁾, yield no concrete results. In short, HTS’s calibrated response, which combines coercive and persuasive means, is designed to offer partial solutions, keep the movement fragmented, and thus manage the crisis.

Escaping Forward

Had HTS escalated its use of force against the protesters, the situation on the ground would have been completely different, likely resulting in an extremely violent scenario. It seems that HTS did not perceive the protests as an existential threat, as it had already survived a more critical challenge—the internal purge of mid-2023.

While it has employed force and offered concessions to contain the protests, it also appears to be attempting to turn the challenge into an opportunity. The concessions themselves, from expanding the Shura Council to introducing new judicial mechanisms, align with HTS’s mission to further expand its governance structure and entrench itself in the local setting. Moreover, such actions represent a way of escaping forward, particularly when considering other measures, such as the recent Police Academy ceremony⁽¹⁵⁾. 

Ultimately, HTS’s primary concern is to prevent public resentment from disrupting its internal dynamics, especially the balance between its military, security, and governance wings—a balance that was difficult to maintain during the internal crisis. Hence, escaping forward appears to be the only viable option for HTS and its leadership.

(1)HTS-backed civil authority moves against rivals in latest power grab in northwest Syria, Syria Direct, 13 December 2017, https://cutt.us/GZ2I2

(2)Ana Arjona, Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance, 26 July 2017, https://cutt.us/xhTUv

(3)HTS-backed civil authority moves against rivals in latest power grab in northwest Syria, ibid.

(4)SSG Transfers Civil Administration Powers from Local Councils to New Centralised Municipalities, Syria Report, 12 September 2023, https://cutt.us/zAWe5

(5)Qarar bitashkil lujna li'iidad nizam 'amal khas bialmajalis almahaliyya wa'aliyyat intikhabiha fi almanatiq almuḥarrara [A decision to form a committee to prepare a special working system for local councils and the mechanism for their election in the liberated areas], SSG, 19 March 2024, https://cutt.us/c66nw

(6) “Jihaz al-Amn al-‘Aam”.. Waraqat al-Jawlani al-rabihat wa-wikalat istikhbarat tatmahu li'ab’ad min Idlib [“The General Security Service”.. Al-Jawlani’s trump card and an intelligence agency aspiring beyond Idlib], Syria TV, 18 June 2021, https://cutt.us/27h6A

(7)No End in Sight: Torture and ill-treatment in the Syrian Arab Republic 2020-2023, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 10 July 2023, https://cutt.us/i1Gou

(8)Orwa Ajjoub, Crossroads in Idlib: HTS navigating internal divisions amid popular discontent, Middle East Institute 13 May 2024, https://cutt.us/6CDIx

(9)HTS cracks down on Idlib demonstrations as protest movement persists, Syria Direct, 17 May 2024, https://cutt.us/r3Qyd

(10)“Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” tunshi’ “Diwan Mazalim”.. Islah am ijra’ shakli?, [“Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” establishes a “Board of Grievances”.. Reform or merely a formal procedure?], al-Arabi al-Jadeed, 2 July 2024, https://cutt.us/6rLrg

(11) Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham tu'lin ‘aqd ittifaq ma’a al-hirak fi Binnish.. Ma bunuduh? [ Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham announces an agreement with the movement in Binnish.. What are its terms?], Syria TV, 17 July 2024, https://cutt.us/9ZrRu

(12) Awdat al-khilafat bayn ahali Binnish wa “Tahrir al-Sham” shamal gharbi Suriya [The return of disputes between the people of Binnish and “Tahrir al-Sham” in northwestern Syria], al-Arabi al-Jadeed, 10 August 2024, https://cutt.us/SptC6

(13) Bassam Sahyouni, Syrian Memory, https://cutt.us/KunVU

(14) Al-Jawlani" yarbit itlaq sarih mu'taqali al-hirak al-sha'bi bi'iqaf al-muzaharat [“Al-Jawlani” links the release of detainees from the popular movement to the cessation of protests], Radio Alkul, 26 May 2024, https://cutt.us/xw1oH

(15) Idlib.. “Al-Inqadh” tukhrij al-daf’a al-awla min dubbat kulliyat al-shurta, [Idlib.. The “Salvation Government” graduates the first batch of officers from the Police Academy], Eneb Baladi, 15 August 2024, https://cutt.us/l6DfE

Executive Summary

• The Ba'ath Party elections on May 4, 2024, during the General Conference, were part of Assad's efforts to reshape and reorganize the power centers within the Ba'ath Party to align with the regime's requirements and challenges. These elections came after years of implementing new Internal Regulations, modifying the mechanism for selecting the party's candidates in the 2020 legislative elections, and establishing an election committee in preparation for the conference.
• The number seats on the Central Committee increased to 125 from 80, with General Secretary Bashar al-Assad appointing 45 members. The members invited by Assad competed against those elected from the branches. As a result, only 49 members from the branches gained seats on the Central Committee, compared to 18 invited members and 13 members from the Ba'ath Party bloc in Parliament. Additionally, Bashar al-Assad directly appointed 45 more
• Based on a comprehensive analysis of the Central Committee members, it was determined that 22 of them served on the previous committee, 77 are employed by state institutions, and there are also members from the militaryindividuals linked to militias and security and military networks, some of whom are under sanctions.
• The provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and Homs dominated as a place of origin for Central Committee members, comprisingwere elected to the Central Committee, 11 of whom were directly appointed by Bashar Al-Assad.
• The committee included 68 Sunnis, 40 Alawites, 10 Christians, 5 Druze, and 2 Ismailis. This sectarian distribution reflects the demographic makeup of the country to some extent but also shows deviations, particularly with the significant representation of Alawites, who constitute the core of the ruling elite.
• The elections resulted in an entirely new central leadership, consisting of 14 members plus Bashar al-Assad, including 13 members who work in state institutions, among whom 3 hold high-level government positions as Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, 3 military personnel, and 3 sanctioned individuals.
• The election results generally revealed that the party leadership engaged in misleading tactics and manipulated the branch representation percentages and results, marginalizing some popular cadres at the branch level by conducting the elections as a single electoral district to create a mechanism for central control.
• The elections, its details, and the dynamics of Bashar al-Assad's intervention suggest a re-engineering of power centers within the party and the regime's philosophy regarding the form of political power (Ba'ath) and its ability to overcome stagnation and dominate the new scene, regardless of any political context.
• This restructuring indicates an effort to integrate high-ranking state officials into the party's central decision-making body, ensuring close alignment between the state's executive functions and the party's leadership.

For More: https://bit.ly/3MuUZgx

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key events in Syria during the month of June 2024, focusing on political, security, and economic developments. It examines the developments at different levels.

• Politically, the normalization steps between Turkey and the Assad regime are progressing. The announcement of local elections by the Autonomous Administration has angered Turkey, increasing its threats.
• Security, violence has escalated across Syria, with 429 civilian and 700 military casualties in the first half of the year.
• Economically, the significant rise in prices continues to be a major issue, alongside increased Iranian influence in the Syrian financial sector.

Turkish Normalization with the Assad Regime: Political Transformations and Future Outcomes

The most discussed topic regarding the Syrian issue is the latest developments in Turkish rapprochement with the Assad regime. Following the Iraqi Prime Minister's statement about creating a basis for dialogue between the regime and Turkey and confirming that talks are ongoing, Turkish statements about upcoming normalization steps followed. The Assad regime has waived its previous condition of Turkish forces' actual withdrawal from Syria to merely declaring their readiness to withdraw and making commitments, according to the regime's Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad. The Turkish Foreign Minister emphasized the importance of the ceasefire between the regime and the opposition, urging the regime to rationally use this period of calm to resolve its constitutional issues, achieve peace with its opponents, facilitate the return of millions of Syrian refugees, and unite efforts with the opposition to combat terrorism, particularly the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Russia is intensifying efforts to expedite the normalization steps between the two sides and facilitate a presidential-level meeting between Erdogan and Bashar al-Assad, capitalizing on Turkish concerns about local elections and the entrenchment of the AANES project. Turkey is pursuing a “parallel tracks” policy to improve its relations with Moscow while preparing for the pre-US election period and the potential implications of a Trump administration on the region.

Despite the increased indications of Turkish rapprochement with the Assad regime this month, the normalization process began in late 2022 during quadrilateral talks at the security and intelligence levels under Russian auspices and Iranian participation. These talks went beyond being exceptional meetings to indicate the start of a new normalization path, though initially hindered by preconditions and external interventions. Turkey's insistence on bilateral meetings with the regime without other parties suggests it viewed the Iranian role as obstructive. As for the future of the normalization path, it still requires much time, as the proposed agenda from both sides seems complex and exceeds their capacities. Turkey aims to combat “terrorism” and dismantle the Autonomous Administration project in Northeast Syria, while the regime is unable to achieve this. The AANES 's High Election Commission announced the postponement of municipal elections, originally scheduled for June, to August in response to demands from political parties and alliances. The announcement of the elections faced Turkish rejection and threats to use force to prevent them, considering them a move towards division, as per Turkish statements. The US also declared that conditions are not conducive to conducting transparent and inclusive elections. This indicates that the postponement decision resulted from the lack of US support and serious Turkish threats, prompting local Autonomous Administration supporters to pressure for election cancellation to avoid new military operations. However, setting and then postponing the election date put the Administration in a dilemma, making it appear dependent on Turkish approval for any future entitlements in Northeast Syria. The Administration insists on postponing rather than canceling the elections, while recent Turkish moves toward normalization with the regime primarily target the Autonomous Administration project and open doors to various scenarios for the region's future.

Separately, the Negotiation Commission held its periodic meeting in Geneva, attended by several civil society representatives from within and outside Syria and Arab and European state representatives. The final statement emphasized that UN Security Council Resolution 2254 is the legitimate framework for reaching a sustainable political solution, asserting that Syria is currently unsafe for refugee returns, and rejecting “sham elections” in regime-controlled areas and those planned by the Autonomous Administration.

Increasing Indicators of Violence Escalation in Different Influence Areas

Despite Jordanian understandings with the regime and Arab pressures on the drug trafficking issue, Jordan still faces the threat of smuggling networks. Authorities foiled the largest smuggling attempt in months, seizing 9.5 million Captagon pills and 143 kilograms of hashish intended to be smuggled through Jordan to a third country.

Regarding changes in the regime's military institution, following the cessation of extensive military operations and the regime's involvement in regional communication pathways, the regime seeks internal military structure changes. According to official statements, this aims to discharge reserve service members in three phases by the end of 2025, moving towards reliance on volunteers to build a professional army. Concurrently, the regime's Ministry of Defense issued an administrative order halting the recall of reserve officers aged 40 who have completed two years of service and discharging non-commissioned officers and reserve personnel who have completed six years of service.

In Suwayda, demonstrations against the regime continued, along with a campaign of posters against the People's Assembly elections scheduled for mid-July. The province also witnessed clashes between local armed groups and regime forces, sparked by the regime establishing a new security checkpoint following the abduction of 15 regime members by local groups in response to the regime's arrest of a civil activist.

In North Aleppo, the local council of Al-Bab city announced the opening of the Abu al-Zendin crossing between opposition and regime areas as an official commercial crossing to improve living conditions and enhance local economic activity. This decision coincided with increased indications of Turkish normalization with the regime and aligns with Russian understandings to open trade lines between influence areas. However, reactions varied, with traders and investors viewing it as a vital trade and movement artery and an opportunity to reduce smuggling operations and lower prices due to availability. Conversely, some residents and Syrian National Army members attacked the crossing, damaging some equipment in opposition to its opening, while several entities issued statements demanding civilian management of the crossing outside military faction control, overseen by local institutions responsible for managing the city and establishing mechanisms to secure the crossing economically and security-wise.

This month also saw a significant escalation in ongoing violence in Northeast Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the killing of 62 people, including 40 civilians, by various means, resulting from 37 acts of violence, including tribal conflicts, murders, about 20 operations by ISIS cells, and Turkish drone strikes. Indicators of violence have also increased across influence areas, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights documenting the killing of 429 civilians in Syria during the first half of 2024, including 65 children, 38 women, and 53 under torture. The highest proportions of victims were in Daraa 27%, Deir Ezzor 18%, and 14% each in Raqqa and Aleppo. The military death toll reached around 700 fighters in different control areas.

Continuous Price Increases Deepen the Economic Crisis

Amid the regime's economic decisions affecting living standards, the requirement for smart cardholders to open bank accounts to transfer support funds is significant. The Council of Ministers stated this step aligns with restructuring support towards targeted and gradual cash support. The regime is expected to abolish current subsidies on bread, fuel, electricity, water, and phone services, shifting the burden to the private sector due to its inability to meet living requirements, leading to significant price hikes and free market sales.

Under Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2024, Bashar al-Assad granted a one-time financial grant of 300,000 SYP (approximately $20) to retirees and government employees, including civil and military workers in the public sector. Given the Syrian pound's devaluation against foreign currencies, the grant is symbolic, covering only a few meals and failing to meet citizens' basic needs.

Clothing prices increased by 200% compared to last year due to rising cotton and yarn prices and the government's lack of intervention to control prices or support the clothing sector. Confectionery prices in Damascus markets also doubled compared to last Eid al-Adha. Despite the arrival of eight Iranian oil tankers loaded with crude oil and gas at Banias port in Tartus countryside, indicating continued Iranian support and sanctions breaches, the regime raised fuel prices amid a local fuel crisis. Due to rising fuel prices and shortages, increased temperatures, and the start of the harvest season, amperage companies in Damascus and its countryside raised kilowatt-hour prices in several areas.

The regime's shift towards export policies, away from self-sufficiency and market regulation, caused price increases. The regime's exports increased by 30% in the first half of this year compared to the same period in 2023. However, the number of Syrian fruit and vegetable trucks exported to Jordan dropped by 80% due to Jordanian restrictions amid anti-drug smuggling efforts.

Iran continues to expand its influence in the Syrian financial sector by opening institutions and banks. The Islamic City Bank, jointly owned by Iran and Syria with a capital of 50 billion SYP, recently opened, making it the fifth Islamic bank in Syria. Meanwhile, Russian tourism investors supervised the construction of two tourism facilities in Latakia province, with 50% completion. The number of Russian visitors to Syria reached 780,000 by the end of May, a 10% increase from the same period last year.

In Northeast Syria, the AANES published the 2024 budget details, with total revenues of $670 million and expenditures of $1.059 billion, indicating a projected $389 million deficit. Turkish airstrikes on SDF economic hubs, including energy infrastructure, caused estimated losses exceeding $500 million, contributing to economic paralysis. Given the estimated $1 billion expenditures, the region continues to face living crises at all levels, including rising prices, material shortages, and poor public services. Meanwhile, the SDF began delivering the first batch of wheat procured from Northeast Syria farmers to regime grain collection centers in southern Qamishli, transporting over 2,500 tons of wheat in 24 hours.

In North Aleppo, the Syrian-Turkish Energy Company raised household and industrial electricity prices to 3.6 and 4.1 Turkish liras per kilowatt, respectively, citing changes in Turkish electricity prices. The Syrian Interim Government set wheat prices in its areas at $220 per ton, $110 less than last season and the lowest price among influence areas: $310 per ton in Idlib and Northeast Syria and $360 in regime areas. This price is disproportionate to farmers' production costs. In Idlib, the “Salvation Government” reiterated financial transfer delivery regulations in the sent currency to organize the financial market, increase trust, and enhance control over financial policies and price regulation, reducing the need for black market currency conversions.

Introduction

Due to the escalating crises and conflicts worldwide, the growing number of individuals requiring relief and humanitarian assistance, and the significant disparity between needs and resources(1),Syrians face complex challenges and responsibilities amidst political deadlocks. This situation necessitates an awareness of the implications for the level of services provided and the number of beneficiaries within Syria, considering the deteriorating social and economic conditions for Syrians in host countries.(2)

According to the Global Humanitarian Overview report issued by OCHA for 2024, approximately 308 million people worldwide require humanitarian assistance, necessitating $48.64 billion to aid 187.8 million people in 70 countries through 36 coordinated response plans. Only 15.3% of the plan has been funded so far, with $7.42 billion in funding, which is 35% less than the $11.40 billion recorded during the same period last year. Additionally, the total reported funding amounted to $4.34 billion, which is 42% less than in 2023 ($7.44 billion). Reported funding from major donors in the first four months of 2024 has also decreased compared to 2023.

Local and Regional Implications

This reduction will have several implications for Syria on the local level, such as worsening living conditions, increased migration waves, heightened militia activity, the growth of the war economy, and involvement in illicit activities such as drug and arms trafficking. Additionally, societal violence, including theft, kidnapping, and extortion, will negatively impact local security and stability indicators.

On the regional level, economic pressures on host countries will increase, leading to a higher likelihood of these countries pushing Syrian refugees to return voluntarily or forcefully and taking measures to tighten restrictions on them. Additionally, the risk of drug trafficking in neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq) may increase, using their territories as transit points to the Gulf and Europe.

Syrian actors in the relief and development field will face several direct challenges, including:

• Severe Food Security Crisis: The reduction in humanitarian funding since 2023 to $2.1 billion (39% of needs) led the World Food Program (WFP) in mid-2023 to reduce the number of people receiving aid from 5.5 million to 3.2 million (a 40% reduction) starting in July 2023. The program announced the cessation of its general food aid across Syria in January 2024 due to severe funding shortages, marking the seventh and largest reduction since the program began its work in Syria.
• Increased Needs: According to United Nations estimates, around 16.7 million people need humanitarian assistance, up from 15.3 million in 2023, the highest number since 2011. Among them, 7.2 million people are internally displaced in scattered areas, including 2.05 million in overcrowded camps.
• Severe Funding Shortages: Only 8% of the required funds have been received, with $358 million collected out of the $4.07 billion needed by May 2024 to meet the immediate humanitarian needs of 10.8 million targeted individuals. Many local organizations in northwestern Syria have had to halt numerous service programs, lay off dozens of employees, and close offices in various towns and cities in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib.

The following table shows the gradual increase in people in need of humanitarian assistance between 2018 and 2024, in contrast to the decrease in the percentage of funding received compared to the required funding, from 62% in 2018 to 39% last year and 8% this year:

Increased Pressure on Services in Host Countries: It is expected that more than 19 million people will need assistance in 2024, including about 6.4 million refugees and 12.9 million affected members of the host community. Due to reduced funding and the need to prioritize strategically, the collective funding request for 2024 has been reduced to $4.1 billion compared to $5.8 billion in 2023 after reviewing requirements based on priority needs. As a result of the increasing funding crisis, the number of Syrian refugee families in Lebanon receiving cash assistance has been reduced to about one-third in 2024. The World Food Program in Jordan announced a reduction in its monthly food aid to 465,000 refugees in mid-July 2023 and excluded about 50,000 others from monthly assistance due to funding shortages.

The following table shows the increase in people in need of humanitarian assistance in the five host countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey) against the decrease in coverage between the required amount and the paid amount.

Deterioration of Services (Water, Sanitation, Care, Electricity, Education): The deteriorating services for displaced individuals in collective centers will increase the risk of resorting to negative coping strategies. About 2.3 million women of reproductive age, including 500,000 pregnant and lactating women, will lose access to essential reproductive and maternal healthcare. Additionally, 2.5 million out-of-school children will miss the opportunity to return to school, threatening the future of an entire generation and depriving children of their basic right to education(3).

Strategic Recommendations

Despite donor pledges during the eighth Brussels Conference for "Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region" amounting to €7.5 billion ($8.1 billion), with $3.8 billion allocated for 2024 and $1.3 billion for 2025, the importance of addressing the potential for funding cuts and reduced aid remains significant. Syrian actors in the political, humanitarian, and developmental sectors must urgently address this challenge through several policies:

• Operational Alliances: These alliances ensure organizational independence while enhancing cooperation and coordination for effective project execution, preventing activity and project duplication.
• Syrian-Designed Comprehensive Response and Recovery Plan: Syrian actors should develop a comprehensive plan as a reference for response and recovery priorities, updated annually.
• Multi-Dimensional Advocacy Policies: Alongside traditional advocacy, innovative advocacy through coalitions can enhance benefits and broaden advocacy efforts both geographically and sectorally.
• Economic Empowerment Policies: Develop statistical and information collection tools, support small and medium-sized projects, and provide vocational training to create job opportunities, thereby reducing dependence on external aid. Implement basic infrastructure projects (water, sanitation, electricity, health, education) to enhance economic recovery and improve living conditions.

Conclusion

International involvement is crucial in Syria's response and recovery efforts. However, the capabilities, networks, and experience of Syrian actors can drive the development of an executive vision for the region's requirements, transitioning them from implementers to planners and implementers simultaneously.

^([1]) The disparity between needs and requirements reached an unprecedented level of $31 billion by the end of 2023, with a total paid amount of $24.28 billion, or 43% of the required amount estimated at approximately $56 billion.

^([2]) The year 2023 ended laden with significant difficulties and challenges faced by the world, starting with the earthquake that struck Syria and Turkey in February, followed by the conflict in Sudan in April, which left 30 million people in need. Additionally, the Israeli aggression on Gaza resulted in the deadliest humanitarian crisis in the sector since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Alongside all these crises, conflicts continued in Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Yemen, Congo, Haiti, and other regions.

([3]) Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator Mr. Adam Abdelmoula Press Briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria, 22-03-2024. Link: https://2u.pw/EGrZ56mr

 Executive Summary

• The uprising in Al-Suwayda Governorate reached its eighth month by April 2024, advocating for economic improvements and political transition in Syria through the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. The protests called for the overthrow of the regime and the removal of its security hold over the city, including demands to shut down Ba'ath Party headquarters. The extent of the protests has fluctuated, expanding, and contracting in response to shifts in the dynamics of the movement in Al-Suwayda and the varying positions of spiritual and religious authorities after the first month. The three religious’ leaders, Hikmat Al-Hijri, Hamoud Al-Hannawi, and Yousef Al-Jarbou, unanimously agreed on the necessity of economic reforms. However, Sheikh Yousef Al-Jarbou's stance more closely aligned with the Assad regime's narrative in the governorate. He also led the Druze religious authority during regime events, coinciding with his regular meetings with leaders of several militias opposing the movement in the governorate.
• The protests peaked in August 2023 but gradually subsided, eventually concentrating in Karama Square in Al-Suwayda and the towns of Al-Qrayya and Salkhad. The decline can be attributed to the shift of people from the rural areas of the city towards the main squares to intensify the gatherings. Additionally, militias active in the eastern and western rural areas of the governorate resumed their involvement in drug trafficking to the Jordanian borders. These militias have threatened the movement several times, fearing that the protests might threaten their trade or that they might later be targeted by the protesters themselves.
• The disagreement among the political factions in the governorate manifested in the proposed administrative structure of Al-Suwayda. All political factions in the governorate agreed on the necessity of economic reforms. However, the suggestion by the Syrian Brigade Party and Syrian Federal Movement to federalize Al-Suwayda was a point of contention for the other factions, who viewed it as an attempt to impose a political vision on the movement that would lead to a partial political solution not encompassing other Syrian provinces.
• The anticipated scenarios for the movement fall within three main axes: The first is the proposal by the Syrian Brigade Party to implement federalization in Al-Suwayda as an administrative solution for the governorate. This solution is seen as a threat to the movement because it is associated with the experience of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northeast Syria, which opened a confrontation front with the Turkish government, as it threatens Turkish national security. Additionally, the movement is regarded as another separatist attempt in southern Syria, giving the Assad regime a pretext to use violence in the governorate. The second scenario involves the movement's ability to create shared spaces either with other regions, aiming to align local demands with national demands that extend beyond the geography of the provinces outside regime control, or even to initiate dialogue with neighboring countries concerning their security concerns, such as the production and smuggling of Captagon, particularly concerning Jordan. The third scenario sees the regime continuing to operate on a no solution basis while the effectiveness of Captagon smuggling routes in the governorate continues. This, combined with the lack of expansion of the movement, might prompt militias involved in the trade to destabilize the city's security if the movement becomes a threat to their smuggling operations.

Introduction

The uprising in Al-Suwayda Governorate continued into its eighth month by April 2024, demanding economic improvements and political transition in Syria through the implementation of Resolution 2254. The protests have called for the overthrow of the regime and an end to its security grip on the city, including demands to close the Ba'ath Party headquarters. This paper aims to examine the events in Al-Suwayda from July 2023 to March 2024, analyze the map of actors influencing the movement, understand its extension and response to security changes in the region, evaluate the role of religious authorities, and explore future directions for the field scenario in Al-Suwayda.

Changing Intensity of Protests and Multiple Factors

Since the beginning of the uprising, the extent of the protests in Al-Suwayda has varied, influenced by changing security and field events that the movement has undergone. Additionally, the varying stances of the spiritual authorities after the first month have influenced some of the movement's demands. These authorities have unanimously agreed on the necessity of economic reforms in the governorate, while their positions on the political demands related to political reform and the implementation of Resolution 2254 have differed.

Sheikh Youssef Al-Jarbou's position has closely aligned with the regime's narrative in the governorate(1). He criticized the political demands of the demonstrators as incorrect and led the Druze religious authority during the regime’s events and activities from August 2023 to February 2024. On October 12, 2023, he participated in the morning of the martyrs of the Military College in Homs.(2) Sheikh Youssef also held frequent meetings with Safwan Abu Saad, the governor of the Damascus countryside, who is originally from Suwayda, and dealt with local militias that posed a threat to the movement and protesters in the city. His dealings with the leaders of the Saif al-Haq militia, Radwan and Muhannad Mazhar, who were heavily involved in drug trafficking and security unrest, were of particular importance(3).

While Sheikhs Hamoud Al-Hannawi and Hikmat Al-Hijri's positions were closer to the popular movement, they varied in their opposition to the regime's authority in the governorate. Sheikh Hamoud Al-Hannawi participated in several protests and supported the public demands, urging people to demand their rights in a clear and bold voice. Meanwhile, Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri remained committed to his narrative that the political and economic demands of the protesters must be met, alongside his calls for local factions to protect the movement, thereby preserving civil peace and preventing the protests from turning into violent conflicts between the protesters and the regime forces in Al-Suwayda. The divergence in the positions of religious authorities, on the one hand, and the Assad regime's choice of a no-solution strategy, relying on time to diminish the movement after the protests failed to expand beyond Al-Suwayda to Daraa or other regime-controlled cities, on the other hand, led to a shift in the momentum of the protests in terms of number and spread across the villages of the governorate.

Figure (1) shows that the protests peaked in August 2023, after which the protest sites gradually receded to concentrate mainly in Karama Square in Al-Suwayda and the towns of Al-Qrayya and Salkhad. The decline is attributed to people moving from the rural areas of the city towards the main squares to intensify gatherings, especially on Fridays. Additionally, militias active in the eastern and western rural areas of the governorate returned to their activities in drug trafficking and its transfer to the Jordanian borders. These militias have threatened the movement several times, fearing that the protests might jeopardize their trade or that they might later be targeted by the demonstrators themselves.

Efforts to Organize the Movement and the Interwoven Demands

Some community elements in Al-Suwayda began organizing themselves into political entities with the onset of the Syrian revolution in 2011, but most remained inactive due to the specific conditions imposed by the city on Assad's regime behavior towards it. The regime avoided direct confrontation with local factions or religious authorities to ensure that a southern opposition pocket comprising Al-Suwayda, Daraa, and Al-Qunaitra did not form against it. Additionally, these entities did not join the traditional opposition represented initially by the Syrian National Council and later by the Syrian Coalition. However, as the movement in Al-Suwayda crystallized over several waves, the longest of which began in August 2023, some political components in the governorate became more active, and their demands became clearer, organized around three axes: the administrative structure of the governorate and its relationship with the central authority in Damascus, the nature of the required political reforms, and the extent to which the demands align with those of the 2011 revolution and international resolutions, especially Resolution 2254, which mandates a political transition in Syria.

Table (1) illustrates the key political actors in the governorate and their positions on the previously mentioned axes. It shows a consensus among political entities on the necessity of political transition, affirming that the popular movement in the governorate is part of the broader narrative of the 2011 popular movement with similar political and economic demands. However, the political disagreement among these components lies in their divergent views on Al-Suwayda's role within Syria's governance structure. The Syrian Brigade Party, established in 2021, believes that federalization is the most effective solution for political reform in Syria. This view is supported by several local political currents in the governorate, along with the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) based in Northeast Syria, which welcomes the proposal. This proposal aligns with their broader vision of implementing a federal solution in Syria and exporting it to other regions like Al-Suwayda, thus potentially strengthening the SDC narrative if it can export its model to other areas with unique ethnic or racial characteristics. (4)

The popular movement has sustained its demands for political change and necessary economic reforms, alongside efforts to disassociate the Ba'ath Party from the state apparatus in the governorate. Protesters have moved towards permanently closing the party's headquarters or even converting some into public service facilities. This is juxtaposed with a strong emphasis on the need to protect state service institutions, which should remain neutral and not become entangled or influenced by the ongoing protests.

Protesters have closed several Ba'ath Party headquarters in Al-Suwayda city and its countryside, totaling 27 headquarters by the beginning of March 2024. Ten of these were transformed into service centers for the citizens of the governorate(5)In response, the Assad regime maintained its narrative that the presence of the party's headquarters is linked to the presence of service institutions in the city, which led it to reduce the operational capacity of its service institutions as a reaction to the closure of the party's headquarters. As the popular movement continued, demonstrators gathered in front of some service institutions and closed some of them in protest against their nominal and ineffective role in the governorate(6).

Regarding the stance of political actors in the movement, they attempted to protect state institutions, emphasizing their neutrality, and ensuring they were not targeted. However, some political currents sought to create alternative service and security bodies in the city. The Syrian Brigade Party initially established a Counter-Terrorism Force led by Samer Al-Hakim, but this initiative was met with a security campaign by the regime's Military Security, which resulted in the disbanding of the force and the killing of Al-Hakim in June 2023. Subsequently, the party announced the establishment of several service offices such as a water authority, a rapid medical intervention office, and civil defense. These establishments were part of the Brigade's efforts to introduce the concept of self-administration to the movement, capitalizing on the service vacuum left by the regime's absence in the city. However, the idea of these institutions did not gain popularity among other political currents due to their rejection of a partial political solution limited to Al-Suwayda rather than extending to other Syrian provinces.

Local Scenarios within a Turbulent Regional Environment

Since its inception, the Al-Suwayda movement has been closely tied to rapidly changing regional dynamics, manifesting in three main areas: first, the trade and production of Captagon; second, the normalization process with the Assad regime; and third, the presence of Iranian forces in Syria and the increasing frequency of Israeli attacks on these forces. Future regional changes could also influence the expansion or contraction of the movement based on the positions of neighboring countries regarding the proposed scenarios. On the local level, the potential scenarios include three possibilities: the risks associated with proposing self-governance, the movement's ability to open new spaces for cooperation both internally and externally, and the potential for the movement to be dominated and redirected.

·     The First Scenario involves the Syrian Brigade Party's proposal for federalism in the city, which poses a risk to the movement by associating it with the SDF experience in Northeast Syria, which has opened a confrontation front with the Turkish government. This proposal also raises fears that the movement could be viewed as another separatist attempt in Syria, similar to the SDF's demands for an independent area, thereby strengthening its international stance in advocating for turning Syria into federations. This scenario would provide the Assad regime with a pretext to use violence in the province to assert control over Al-Suwayda under the guise of protecting Syrian territorial integrity. Previously, the Assad regime had no clear justification for using violence against the movement due to the unique demographic composition of the city and its reliance on two elements for the movement's decline. The first is linked to local groups causing security disturbances, and the second bets on time for the movement's recession and cessation if the demonstrators fail to form political forces or establish a national coordinating framework among all regions outside Assad's control.

·     The Second Scenario entails the movement's ability to create shared spaces with other areas, aiming to align local demands with national demands that transcend the geography of the provinces outside regime control. This could involve transforming economic and political demands into a unified discourse, potentially revitalizing the political process, or even initiating dialogue with neighboring countries to address their concerns. An example of this is reassuring Jordan, which considers the smuggling of Captagon from Syrian territories as one of the most significant threats to its national security and is seeking solutions to halt its flow across its borders.

·     The Third Scenario is based on the regime's reliance on a no-solution approach, while the effectiveness of Captagon smuggling routes continues in the province. With the Al-Suwayda movement not expanding beyond the governorate, local militias linked to the regime and Iran might destabilize the city's security if the movement threatens their smuggling operations. These militias are integral parts of the Captagon supply, production, and smuggling chains.

In conclusion, it is not possible to definitively predict one scenario over others without considering international variables, such as the war on Gaza and the ongoing Israeli raids on Iranian positions in Syria, as well as the perspectives of local political currents on the future of the movement and the city. The proposal for federalization within the movement would face Turkish opposition to prevent the Al-Suwayda movement from becoming a lever that the SDF might later exploit. Additionally, the way Jordan handles the Captagon issue and its potential coordination with local factions like the Men of Dignity Movement (Rijal Al-Karama) could protect the movement and open up other cooperative prospects with Jordan, potentially having economic or political dimensions in later stages. The challenge for the movement's coordinators and local factions remains in their ability to present a political front that reflects their demands and is consistent with the broader Syrian context, particularly as regional countries shift their focus in Syria to security motivations after previously supporting the movement and its political demands.

General Summary

This report provides an overview of the key events in Syria during the month of May 2024, focusing on political, security, and economic developments. It examines the developments at different levels.

• Politically, the trajectory of Arab normalization with the Assad regime remains volatile. The Arab League summit's statement and the suspension of the Arab Contact Committee reveal a more cautious Arab stance towards opening up to the Assad regime. Meanwhile, diplomatic normalization appears more stable, evidenced by Saudi Arabia appointing an ambassador to Damascus.
• Security, instability persists across Syria due to the Iranian-Israeli proxy war on Syrian soil and the presence of various militias in regime-controlled areas, along with local actor conflicts and their unstable models.
• Economically, all regions in Syria are suffering from an economic crisis exacerbated by the decisions of controlling authorities, with attempts to boost investment in northern Syria.

The Path of Arab Normalization with the Assad Regime: Challenges and Limited Progress

The path of Arab normalization with the Assad regime faces significant difficulties and challenges that the intervening parties struggle to address. Notably, the Arab Liaison Committee's meeting, intended to communicate with the regime, was canceled after Damascus failed to respond to inquiries regarding Captagon smuggling and other issues. Additionally, a meeting between the regime's foreign minister and his Jordanian counterpart, Ayman Safadi, yielded no progress on the Arab Committee's requests.

Despite Bashar al-Assad's attendance at the regular Arab summit held in Bahrain, without a scheduled speech, the final statement emphasized the necessity of resolving the Syrian crisis in accordance with Resolution 2254. This includes the transition process, ensuring Syria's security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, fulfilling the aspirations of its people, eradicating terrorism, and providing a dignified and safe environment for the voluntary return of refugees. Reflecting the limited Arab openness, the Assad regime ceded hosting the next summit to Iraq. These developments indicate a more cautious and deliberate Arab approach to normalization with the Assad regime, reassessing the implications of opening up further in light of growing concerns that additional incentives to Assad could yield counterproductive results.

Locally, within the context of formal structural changes initiated by the regime, Bashar al-Assad participated in the expanded meeting of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Baath Party. The meeting resulted in Assad's re-election as Secretary-General of the party and the election of 14 new members to the central leadership. Additionally, members of the party's Central Committee at the provincial level and the new Control and Inspection Committee were elected. However, these changes are merely organizational adjustments within the party's structure, aimed at recycling the regime's allies to maintain the Baath Party's control over Syria's political and social landscape. These steps do not seem to contribute to genuine reforms that could satisfy Syrian parties and lead to a comprehensive political solution.

In northeastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration is making efforts to fortify the home front ahead of the municipal elections scheduled for the first half of July. Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the SDF, held a series of meetings with Arab tribal sheikhs and notables in Deir Ezzor, where he acknowledged mistakes made by his forces during the pursuit of ISIS elements and pledged to release detainees and compensate those affected. This coincides with the issuance of the Autonomous Administration law on administrative divisions in preparation for local elections. The announcement of these elections has sparked significant controversy locally, regionally, and internationally. The US State Department stated that the conditions for free and fair elections in northeastern Syria are not met, while Turkey considers these elections a threat to its territorial integrity and national security. Under the new Administrative Divisions Law, northeastern Syria is now considered a single region divided into seven main districts. These laws and procedures are part of the administration's attempts to gain legal legitimacy over the region and establish a new status quo for future negotiations with other conflict parties in Syria. Additionally, these steps send messages to achieve political and field gains, raising concerns about the social, political, and legal consequences for Syrians residing in areas under the administration's control and the future of Syria in general.

Escalating Security Challenges in Syria

The security dilemma in Syria continues to worsen, with the country serving as a battleground for the Iranian-Israeli conflict. Israeli aircraft have targeted sites of Iranian militias in southern Damascus, Daraa, and Qusayr in Homs province, as well as a building managed by the regime's security forces on the outskirts of Damascus. These raids resulted in the deaths of 11 militiamen, including Syrians and Lebanese. In contrast, the "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards carried out seven attacks targeting Israeli military sites in the occupied Syrian Golan. Additionally, an explosive device detonated in Damascus' Mezzeh neighborhood, killing one-person, injuring others, and burning cars. This marks the second such explosion in the same area within two months. In southern Syria, assassinations and clashes persist. Two regime forces members were killed by explosive devices planted in their cars north of Daraa. The regime has launched repeated security campaigns in the province, ostensibly to pursue wanted individuals involved in targeted attacks. However, mutual targeting and assassinations continue, affecting regime forces and former opposition fighters. These security policies have failed to establish stability in southern Syria. Meanwhile, weekly demonstrations in as-Suwayda persist despite the regime's attempts to intimidate protesters by sending large military reinforcements.

In Idlib, popular protests against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have escalated. HTS's attempts to peacefully contain these protests by promising reforms have failed. This month, HTS forcibly dispersed a sit-in in central Idlib, with security elements assaulting protesters with hands and batons. Abu Muhammad al-Julani, HTS's commander-in-chief, justified this action by stating that HTS had warned against any disruption to public interests and rules, considering most of the protesters' demands as already met. HTS's failure to end the protests peacefully has led to the use of force in an attempt to intimidate protesters, though they seek to avoid excessive violence to prevent expanding the protest area and gaining new supporters who have remained neutral.

In northeast Syria, Turkish artillery targeted several villages near the town of Tal Tamr in al-Hasaka countryside, and the shelling extended to villages in the countryside of Manbij city. In Deir Ezzor, the SDF conducted a security screening campaign in various areas and bombed several towns and villages west of the Euphrates River under the control of regime forces and Iranian militias, resulting in civilian injuries. Additionally, the SDF launched a security operation in the city of al-Busaira, east of Deir Ezzor, which led to the death of an Iraqi ISIS leader. The number of ISIS operations in the area has declined, coinciding with increased security measures and reinforced military checkpoints.

Attacks by tribal fighters on SDF headquarters and checkpoints in Deir Ezzor also decreased significantly during the second half of May 2024. This decrease followed heavy shelling by the SDF on villages and towns near the city of Mayadeen, believed to be a haven and staging point for tribal fighters. The SDF's strategy in dealing with tribal fighters appears to have two main approaches. Locally, the SDF is attempting to re-engage with Arab tribes by increasing the frequency of meetings between SDF leaders and tribal notables, providing incentives to tribal leaders, and promising to improve services in the region. From a security perspective, the SDF is pressuring pro-regime forces and tribal fighters by bombing their gathering places and launching operations south and west of the Euphrates to incite local populations against them and increase the regime's burden in containing these fighters.

Economic Empowerment Initiatives and Challenges in Northern Syria

To highlight new patterns of humanitarian intervention and opportunities for social and economic empowerment, Syrian, Arab, and international organizations held a conference aimed at enabling investment in northern Syria. The conference recommended forming working groups to visit UN and international donor organizations and establishing an economic empowerment fund.

In northeastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration raised fuel prices: the price of diesel for agriculture reached /1,050/ SYP, heating diesel reached /1,150/ SYP, and a jar of domestic gas rose to /153,000/ SYP. Additionally, the price of a bread bundle increased from /900/ to /1,400/ SYP after the price of flour sold from mills to ovens was raised in all regions of northern and eastern Syria. In Manbij, the People's Municipality completed the first phase of equipping the industrial city, the largest of its kind in northern and eastern Syria, which will include shops and factories for the food, wood, and metal industries. The Autonomous Administration also concluded a deal with the Assad regime, obliging the supply of half a million tons of wheat at /36/ US cents per kilogram, while the administration priced the purchase of wheat from local farmers at /31/ US cents per kilogram. This deal is expected to yield financial gains for both parties: the regime will acquire wheat without incurring supply and storage costs, and the Autonomous Administration will achieve a profit rate of at least /3/ cents per kilogram of wheat, securing funds to cover the salaries of its civil and military employees.

Meanwhile, the regime government raised fuel prices: gasoline octane 90 reached /12,500/ SYP per liter, octane 95 rose to /14,368/ SYP per liter, and free diesel reached /11,996/ SYP per liter. The Economic Committee of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers called for a tax of /$25/ per imported solar panel. The Ministry of Internal Trade imposed new taxes on imported items, including white sugar and solar panels. Prices of commodities, vegetables, and fruits in Damascus increased by /70%/ compared to the same period last year, yet the regime resumed exporting vegetables and fruits to Gulf countries. The decisions to raise fuel prices and increase taxes have driven up consumer goods prices amid low purchasing power and a deteriorating economic situation, with many families relying on cash transfers from relatives abroad to meet basic living needs.

At the 8th Brussels conference, donor countries pledged /€7.5/ billion in donations, grants, and loans: /$3.8/ billion for 2024 and /$1.3/ billion for 2025. However, concerns about potential funding cuts and reduced aid highlight the urgent need for actors in political, humanitarian, relief, and development sectors to address these challenges through policies focused on economic empowerment and developing response and recovery plans aligned with new challenges.

Executive Summary

• Throughout 2023, northwestern Syria, particularly Aleppo and Idlib provinces, witnessed the implementation of 5,178 projects. The finance sector was in the lead registering 2,914 projects, followed by 413 projects in social services sector. The electricity sector accounted for 357 projects, transportation and communications for 338 projects, and water and sanitation services for 327 projects.
• Approximately 68% of these projects were conducted in rural Aleppo. Atarib was the most active locality, followed by Jarablus with 661 projects, and Idlib with 636 projects.
• Following the catastrophic earthquake that struck Syria and Turkey on February 6, 2023, local councils and organizations swiftly moved beyond the initial shock. They managed to carry out diverse projects across various sectors, demonstrating the resilience of the local community in challenging circumstances.
• Efforts were focused on social services and internal displacement sectors to address the earthquake's impact and meet the needs of displaced populations. This included reconstructing schools and hospitals and establishing new facilities to improve living conditions and integrate displaced individuals into new communities.
• The agriculture and livestock sector continues to face significant challenges due to drought, rising cost of raw materials, and the migration of farmers. These issues make agricultural activities non-viable, reduce productivity, and threaten food security.
• The industrial sector faces numerous challenges, including the lack of essential legal documents such as establishment certificates, customs declarations, and health certificates. Additionally, high raw material and energy costs, along with marketing obstacles, further complicate the situation.
• The report proposes several measures and recommendations, including expanding efforts in the finance sector by supporting medium-scale and innovative projects that can drive production, generate employment opportunities, and increase income levels. It advocates for reduced electricity rates for factories to enhance the resilience and competitiveness of local products. Furthermore, it suggests offering financial and material incentives to manufacturers, removing marketing barriers, and broadening access to financial systems to stimulate industrial production and commercial activity.

The report faces a series of technical and research challenges, such as intermittent military tensions in Idlib and rural Aleppo, which directly threaten the "early recovery" process by delaying or halting project implementation. The absence of a statistical institution capable of collecting and organizing necessary data and providing accurate figures forces researchers to rely on monitoring activities conducted by organizations and local councils, a method that may lead to discrepancies in evaluating the recovery level.

Additionally, researchers encounter challenges due to the lack of comprehensive documentation of all activities by local councils and organizations on their official platforms due to security reasons. Moreover, there is a complete absence of data covering the private sector’s activities in the area, adding complexity to understanding and evaluating the full economic situation. It is also worth mentioning the ongoing controversy surrounding the funding of early recovery activities by the international community, which perceives such funding as potentially empowering the regime and contributing to reconstruction efforts. This could lead to the regime exploiting international recovery funds and politicizing them. Furthermore, there is a notable deficiency in international funding for recovery compared to funding for humanitarian needs.

This report defines "early recovery" based on several periodic reports by Omran Center since 2019. The concept refers to the efforts and projects conducted by governance bodies and non-governmental organizations aimed at rebuilding and enhancing economic and social capacities in the aftermath of a conflict. It helps bridge the gap between the humanitarian aid phase and the reconstruction phase, all in pursuit of achieving sustainable stability in a fragmented society and reducing dependency on external assistance.

A Comprehensive View of Achievements in 2023

In 2023, northwestern Aleppo and Idlib provinces, governed respectively by the Syrian Interim Government and the "Syrian Salvation Government," witnessed the implementation of 5,178 projects, as indicated by the map below. This represents a 10% increase compared to the previous year, 2022.

The finance sector was the most active, realizing 2,914 projects, followed by the social services sector with 413 projects and the electricity sector with 357 projects. The transportation and communications sector, along with water and sanitation, also saw significant activity, with 338 and 327 projects respectively. Meanwhile, the trade sector executed a total of 292 projects.

The data shows that rural Aleppo accounted for the largest portion of executed projects, with 68% (3,518 projects), compared to 32% (1,661 projects) in Idlib. This indicates a concentrated focus on developmental efforts in rural Aleppo over Idlib.

A deeper look into the distribution of projects across various regions and districts reveals that Atarib was the most active locality, followed by the cities of Jarablus, Idlib, A'zaz, and Al-Bab, as shown in Figure 4. The geographical concentration of projects in certain areas can be attributed to multiple factors: the presence of organizations in these districts, high population density, and large displaced populations, which increase the need for humanitarian and developmental projects. Additionally, favorable conditions for implementing projects in terms of security, available infrastructure, labor force, and proximity to logistical support centers further facilitated project implementation.

Among the significant events of 2023 that impacted the "early recovery" process was the devastating earthquake on February 6, 2023, which struck 137 cities and towns in rural Aleppo and Idlib, affecting over 1.8 million people, causing the deaths of 4,540 civilians, injuring about 12,000 individuals, and leaving 67 people missing. The disaster prompted the displacement of approximately 300,000 people, predominantly children and women. The earthquake also resulted in material losses, including the destruction of 433 schools and 73 health facilities, and the complete destruction of 1,867 buildings, with 8,731 homes and buildings partially damaged, according to figures from the "Support Coordination Unit".

In response to the earthquake, prominent organizations announced the formation of a "Joint Operations Alliance" consisting of "The Syrian Forum," "The Syrian American Medical Society," and "The Syrian Civil Defense" to coordinate efforts in addressing the disaster. Additionally, the Qatar Development Fund pledged support for the construction of a comprehensive city to shelter 70,000 people in northern Syria.

Economically, the transit fees for traders entering Turkish territories increased from $2,200 to $5,000 annually, which may impose financial burdens on traders and industrialists, potentially Shrinkage industrial and commercial businesses. A commercial court was established in Sarmada, Idlib, aimed at resolving commercial disputes among traders registered with the chambers of trade, covering intellectual property, bankruptcy, disputes related to commercial papers, currency exchange, commercial remittances, and banking activities.

Local councils in rural Aleppo seek alternatives for providing power at reasonable prices amidst the increasing suffering of residents and entities from rising electricity prices. They threatened electric companies to terminate contracts and applied increasing pressure, resulting in reduced subscription fees to 2.77 Turkish lira for homes and 3.17 TL for commercial in Jarablus, Afrin, and A'zaz, down from 4.24 TL for homes and 5.75 TL for commercial.

The Ministry of Finance in the Interim Government launched the first investment conference, aiming to develop the region, contribute to improving living standards, and increase employment opportunities. The Interim Government and the "Syrian Salvation Government" set the price of durum wheat at $330 per ton and soft wheat at $285 per ton, which is $100 less than the pricing in the "PYD" area, while the price in areas controlled by the regime is $222. Lastly, fluctuations in the Turkish lira negatively affected economic life and significantly slowed down commercial activity in Idlib and rural Aleppo.

A Look at the Sectors of Early Economic Recovery

In 2023, organizations implemented 2,914 projects within the finance sector, focusing particularly on areas such as A'zaz, Jebel Saman, Jarablus, Idlib, and Al-Bab, which saw the highest number of projects. The significant emphasis on the finance sector is due to the continuous operations of the “Hayat Fund,” “Syria Recovery Trust Fund,” and other organizations involved in direct cash interventions.

The growing interest in the finance sector plays a pivotal role in stimulating the economic recovery of the area by providing the necessary liquidity and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, which in turn contributes to job creation and increases productivity. It also enhances social stability by enabling residents to improve their financial income, reduce poverty, diversify income sources, and reduce dependency on humanitarian aid and economic activities, increasing their resilience to economic shocks. Moreover, it develops the financial infrastructure of the area through the establishment of financial institutions capable of offering diverse financial services, encourages innovation, and entrepreneurship to develop emerging projects.

In the social services sector, 413 projects were implemented during 2023, marking an increase compared to previous years. This increase is primarily attributed to the urgent need to rehabilitate the health and education infrastructure severely damaged by the devastating earthquake on February 6. Organizations concentrated most of their budgets on repairing schools, hospitals, and public facilities such as bakeries, markets, and shops, which were either completely or partially damaged. New schools and hospitals were established, including Amanos University in Afrin, which encompasses several departments such as the College of Health Sciences, Nursing, Anesthesiology, Laboratory Analysis, and Radiography. This step underscores the critical importance of education in the processes of recovery and social rebuilding. Additionally, the removal of debris and damaged buildings continued, as civil defense teams executed a three-phase earthquake response plan. The first phase involved emergency response to search for survivors and retrieve the bodies of victims, clearing roads, securing risks from collapsing walls, and finally, debris removal.

357 projects were implemented within the electricity sector, particularly in Idlib, A'zaz, and Afrin. These projects included the rehabilitation of the electrical infrastructure through the maintenance of electric poles and transformers, the preparation and maintenance of medium and low voltage power lines, the installation of meters, and the extension of cables. The projects also included street and residential area lighting. Moreover, the reliance on renewable energy continued as organizations installed solar power systems for schools and hospitals, reflecting the pursuit of sustainability and the reduction of dependence on traditional energy sources.

The transportation sector saw 338 projects, with Idlib, A'zaz, Harem, Al-Bab, and Afrin being the areas with the most projects completed. The continuous focus on these projects aimed at improving the infrastructure of roads in vital areas, reflecting the importance of the road network between cities and towns. This focus plays a pivotal role in facilitating the movement of goods and individuals, enhancing the connections between communities and markets, improving access to essential services, and bolstering the ability to reach educational and healthcare services. Among the main roads paved are: the international road connecting Idlib with Bab al-Hawa, the eastern corniche road in Ma'arrat Misrin spanning 800 meters, the road between Darkush and Ain al-Zarqa, the road between Kafr Karmin and Atarib, the road between Sarmada and Harem stretching 9,500 meters, and the third Afrin bridge, which is 1,650 meters long.

Within the water and sanitation sector, 327 projects were implemented. One of the most prominent projects in this sector was the inauguration by the Syrian Interim Government of a solar energy system for drinking water pumping stations in Al-Bab. This project, costing an estimated 2 million euros, has a production capacity of 1.15 megawatts, making it the largest service project of its kind. It utilized 2,547 solar panels to serve approximately 200,000 residents in Al-Bab, supported by the “Syria Recovery Trust Fund.” The use of solar energy to operate water pumping stations represents a major effort towards transitioning to renewable energy sources and environmental sustainability.

The trade sector saw approximately 292 projects implemented, with the majority concentrated in Idlib, reflecting its significance as a major commercial hub in the area. The projects executed in this sector encompassed a range of economic and service activities, including the tender contracts issued by organizations to supply various goods and execute various services. These included the supply of water, diesel fuel, electrical and medical equipment, book printing, stationery, and communication equipment, as well as car rental and other essential services. The reliance on tenders as a mechanism for implementing these projects enhances the standards of transparency and efficiency in selecting the best offers, thereby maximizing the possible value from available resources. It also facilitates cooperation between international and local organizations and the private sector, thereby strengthening the role of partnerships in the economic recovery process.

In the internal displacement sector, 256 projects were implemented, with a focus on Idlib, Harem, Afrin, A'zaz, and Al-Bab. These areas host the largest displaced populations and have become focal points for implementing projects aimed at improving infrastructure and living conditions for the displaced. The projects executed covered various aspects of essential services within the camps, including paving roads with gravel to facilitate movement and access, extending sewage networks to ensure sanitation and public health, and renovating homes to provide safer and more comfortable shelters.

In 2023, 142 projects were carried out in the housing and construction sector, with the city of Al-Bab leading with 74 projects, as seen in previous reports, due to the common licensing granted for the construction of residential and commercial buildings. Organizations established several residential complexes aimed at improving living conditions for people residing in camps by relocating them to new buildings equipped with all essential services. These include the Al-Salam Complex, the third Al-Bonyan Residential Complex, and the villages of Rahma, Balsam, Al-Nasr, Qa'rqalbin, and Rawafid Al-Khair. The continuation of these projects is intended to alleviate the pressure on overcrowded camps and provide a relatively better living environment for the IDPs.

In the agriculture and livestock sector, 102 projects were implemented with notable support from the “Syrian Recovery Trust Fund.” This included the launch of an agricultural project aimed at supporting farmers in the cultivation of irrigated wheat over an area of 2,000 hectares, spread across towns and cities such as Al-Ghandoura, Al-Ra'i, Bza'a, Marea, and A'zaz. The Humanitarian Relief Authority provided support to 950 wheat farmers in Northern Rural Aleppo by supplying necessary agricultural inputs such as wheat seeds, superphosphate fertilizer, urea fertilizer, and diesel for irrigation, along with cash vouchers covering the costs of farming, irrigation, and harvesting. These efforts reflect a commitment to enhancing food security and supporting the local economy through the development of the agricultural sector, which is a fundamental pillar for the economic recovery of the region. It also contributes to creating job opportunities for farmers and enhancing their resilience against economic challenges. The importance of agricultural projects as drivers of economic growth and stability in rural communities is highlighted through the provision of resources and technical support to farmers, enabling them to improve their productivity and the quality of their crops, leading to self-sufficiency and reduced dependency on food imports.

In the telecommunications sector, 28 projects were implemented, including improving and expanding the telecommunications and internet infrastructure. Key projects featured the maintenance of main and subsidiary cables in the town of Binnish, with capacities of 450 lines for the main cable and 550 for the subsidiary, and the expansion of a subsidiary network for landline and internet services on Thalatheen Street in the city of Idlib. Additionally, the university communications center underwent expansions to the landline and internet networks to cover new areas such as Douar Al-Fallahin, along with extending internet cables throughout the city streets. The "Syrian Salvation Government" also launched mobile telecommunication services under the name SYRIA PHONE. This project represents a step towards enhancing communication services in Idlib. Providing strong and reliable communication networks is essential for achieving economic and social development, as it opens new prospects for education, business, and online services.

Finally, in the industrial sector, nine industrial projects were implemented in the area. Among these projects were the establishment of a factory for producing powdered infant milk in the industrial area of Al-Ra'i, a diaper production facility in Jarablus, and the first iron and profile production factory. Additionally, a cement factory in Al-Ra'i and an Indomie factory in the industrial city of Bab al-Hawa were established. Efforts were also made to complete the industrial city in A'zaz and to open the industrial city in Marea. Despite the industrial sector being a key pillar in recovery and a vital part of the economic stability strategy, which reduces dependence on imports and enhances competitiveness, the region still faces significant challenges that hinder the development of the industrial sector.

Results and Recommendations

The report addresses the efforts of early economic recovery in northwest Syria during 2023, focusing on the activities of local councils and organizations across 11 sectors. It covers improvements in sectors such as finance, agriculture, trade, and services, in addition to ongoing challenges in infrastructure and economic stability. From the data presented in the report, several conclusions related to recovery efforts in the region can be drawn, including:

• Overcoming the Earthquake's Effects: Despite the extensive destruction caused by the earthquake, the area managed to implement approximately 5,178 projects, underscoring the local community's resilience and recovery from the disaster's shock. The continuation of projects by local councils and NGOs contributes to the gradual transition from relief and humanitarian aid to early recovery. In this context, it is crucial to expand advocacy efforts to attract the attention of the international community and donors towards recovery, highlighting the importance of projects in all sectors and achieving economic and social stability in the area.
• Enhancing the Role of the Finance Sector: The finance sector played a significant role in supporting the early economic recovery process in 2023, providing job opportunities and diversifying household income sources. Financing small and medium-sized projects and providing direct financial support to families will contribute to economic independence and job creation. To ensure sustainability and optimal impact, it is essential to develop effective monitoring and evaluation systems and establish training programs to enable beneficiaries to manage their projects successfully.
• Improving Infrastructure: Projects implemented in the transportation, communications, water, and sanitation sectors played a pivotal role in supporting the area's economic recovery, particularly in road repairs and improving water supplies. However, challenges arising from population density and ongoing shelling targeting infrastructure, alongside drought issues, necessitate a more significant international effort in these sectors.
• Supporting Agriculture and Livestock: The agriculture sector faces complex challenges due to drought, rising raw material prices, labor migration, and reduced profitability of agricultural activities due to obstacles in exporting and marketing products. To address these challenges, it is crucial to support this sector by providing subsidized seeds, feed, equipment, and pesticides to reduce production costs, enhance crop marketing, integrate crops into food industries, and develop initiatives to promote them in foreign markets.
• Stimulating Industrial Growth: Providing a stable environment will attract significant investments and facilitate the operations of existing factories and workshops in the area, encouraging industrialists to relocate their operations from areas adjacent to Turkey to rural Aleppo and Idlib. This can only be achieved through reducing electricity prices, offering material and financial incentives to manufacturers, developing effective marketing and export strategies, and accessing the international financial system more extensively.
• Encouraging Small and Medium Enterprises: Given the current economic situation, it is essential to focus on developing workshops and small and medium-sized projects in the region, particularly in technical and computing fields, which are characterized by their flexibility, adaptability, and potential for marketing beyond borders.
• Addressing the Shortage of Humanitarian Aid Funds: Given the shortage of humanitarian aid funds from the international community, the region faces an urgent challenge that calls for adopting diverse and innovative financing strategies to achieve a degree of economic independence. Therefore, governance bodies and organizations should enhance investment tools, build a private sector and financial institutions, and conduct advocacy campaigns in expatriate countries to gather the necessary funding to implement economic plans.

In conclusion, the Interim Government, Local Councils and non-governmental local organizations managed the recovery phase with reasonable effectiveness in terms of resources, governance, and organization, despite the severe crises experienced in the region, especially the earthquake disaster on February 6, 2023. The implemented projects played a pivotal role in driving early economic recovery and ongoing development since the relative stabilization of the region after the years 2016 and 2018. However, there is an urgent need to develop an effective mechanism for an overall economic plan for the entire region (synchronized with other regions) that ensures the adoption of a specific economic model based on well-considered decisions and policies. This plan should address profound challenges such as the crisis of missing legal documents, water, electricity, industry, the financial environment including currency, pricing, and financial institutions, improving conditions for the displaced, and establishing a comprehensive legal framework to deal with vital issues and casesTop of Form.

The topic of early recovery is currently a focal point among UN circles and donor entities, as well as among Syrian parties, individuals, institutions, and organizations. In this context, the United Nations, through the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Damascus, announced its approach to establishing an Early Recovery Fund. This announcement has been accompanied by leaks and rumors regarding the fund, its operational mechanisms, and its funding size. Additionally, the announcement has sparked reactions and discussions among donors and Syrians alike. This situation necessitates an initial analysis of this proposal, examining the opportunities it presents and the risks it entails, ultimately leading to recommendations that could guide the fund's operations and ensure the achievement of its intended goals.

Early Recovery: A Problematic Concept and a Syrian Perspective

The concept of early recovery in post-conflict areas is highly debated within humanitarian circles, NGOs, and among donors, primarily due to the absence of a standardized recovery framework for post-conflict scenarios. This gap contrasts sharply with the well-established frameworks for post-disaster recovery. The varying perspectives and distinct demands of stakeholders on early recovery in Syria contribute to its dynamic nature, and continuously shaped by both political and humanitarian considerations throughout the stages of conflict. This puts forward a unique opportunity for Syrians to develop an approach that reflects their specific realities in a more holistic methodology.

In 2008, the United Nations Early Recovery Cluster published its initial Guidance Note on Early Recovery, defining it as "a multidimensional recovery process initiated from a humanitarian context, guided by development principles aimed at leveraging humanitarian programs to foster sustainable development opportunities. The objective is to cultivate self-reliance mechanisms, uphold national ownership, and ensure resilience throughout the post-crisis recovery phase. This process includes the restoration of all essential services such as livelihoods, shelter, governance, security, rule of law, and environmental and social dimensions, with a particular focus on the reintegration of displaced populations⁽¹⁾Also, TheGlobal Cluster for Early Recovery (GCER) offered an expanded definition, describing early recovery not merely as a phase but as “a thorough, multidimensional process that commences early in the humanitarian response. It focuses on bolstering resilience, restoring, or enhancing capacities, and addressing enduring issues that contributed to the crisis rather than exacerbating them, alongside a suite of programs designed to aid the transition from humanitarian relief to development.⁽²⁾While The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) characterized early recovery as “an approach that meets recovery needs emerging during the humanitarian phase of an emergency, where saving lives remains a critical and immediate priority. Early recovery initiatives support affected communities in safeguarding and reinstating essential systems and service delivery, building upon initial response efforts, and establishing a foundation for prolonged recovery. The outcomes of these early recovery efforts include creating robust foundations for resilience post-crisis, fostering sustainable development solutions led by national or local entities, and rebuilding community capacities⁽³⁾.

From these definitions, it is evident that Early Recovery is a multidimensional approach that builds on humanitarian response, aiming to stabilize communities and enhance their adaptive capacities. However, there is debate about the content and scope of early recovery. De Vries and Specker argue that early recovery is a period between the humanitarian phase during and immediately after a conflict and the medium to long-term development phase. While some researchers and humanitarian agencies define the first three years after the end of a conflict as the timeframe for early recovery, according to the UNDP program, early recovery can begin even before the conflict parties reach a political settlement⁽⁴⁾.

Early recovery in post-conflict situations is closely associated with the stakeholders involved in recovery and their interests. This makes the transition from conflict to peace not merely a technical approach and practice but a highly political process in which principles, priorities, and concepts vary. This variability is highly evident in the Syrian context and explains the diversity of approaches to this concept. Some argue that the early recovery process should begin once the conflict has ended, in response to attempts by the Syrian regime to initiate this process before achieving a political solution. It aims to establish peace and stabilize “state institutions” through a mix of different policies. There are at least four main threads that form the foundational concepts of “early recovery.⁽⁵⁾

• Humanitarian aid frameworks;
• Economic growth and development;
• Peacebuilding and human security;
• Governance models and state-building.

Conversely, The Operations and Policy Center (OPC) defines early recovery by comparing it to the concept of reconstruction as: “An activity that lies between the prevalent approach focused on basic humanitarian aid (food, shelter, water and sanitation services, hygiene) on one side and reconstruction on the other. Its priorities are arranged according to humanitarian needs, similar to other forms of humanitarian aid, which are planned and implemented by relief organizations, whether they are centralized under a single administrative authority like the United Nations or individual organizations.” Meanwhile, a study by The Day After (TDA) adopts the following definition for early recovery: “All the humanitarian and developmental efforts made by local and international entities to improve the economic and social conditions across the country, in addition to the efforts made in enhancing the effectiveness of institutions involved in improving these conditions. Thus, early recovery activities include supporting essential services such as health and education, projects supporting private sector work and employment opportunities, and initiatives promoting social cohesion.⁽⁶⁾

To clarify the concept, it is necessary to delineate the boundaries between early recovery and related concepts such as reconstruction and humanitarian response, which can be summarized in the table below.⁽⁷⁾

Based on the above, early recovery is considered a late stage of humanitarian intervention that commences as major military operations wind down. It increasingly depends on local communities and governance structures to manage the planning, funding, and implementation processes, with support from external actors. The primary objective of early recovery is to enhance the stability and adaptive capacity of local communities through projects that are integrated both sectorally and geographically. These projects are evaluated based on criteria of effectiveness, impact, accountability, and transparency⁽⁹⁾

The Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF): A UN Initiative with Political Content

Political negotiations among actors in the Syrian crisis, alongside the associated risks and repercussions of regional and international crises, have placed early recovery for Syria on the agendas of the United Nations and its donors. This has led to the development of a UN strategy to establish a trust fund for early recovery, although some aspects of this strategy are still being refined. Since 2013, early recovery and livelihoods have been recognized as a distinct cluster within the Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP). From that year until 2023, the total funds requested for these projects amounted to approximately $1.691 billion, of which $420.5 million, or 24.8% of the total required, has been funded.

Funding for early recovery and livelihood projects between 2013-2023 has been limited by Western countries and the United States. They have adhered to the three "Nos": NO normalization with the Syrian regime, NO lifting of sanctions, and NO engagement in reconstruction without a political transition according to UN resolutions. This stance likely stems from their desire to continue pressuring the regime to advance the political negotiation process toward a resolution. This is in conjunction with existing humanitarian response mechanisms, exemplified by the cross-border aid mechanism established in 2014 under UN Security Council Resolution 2156.

Since 2020, discussions on early recovery have shifted due to a decrease in major military operations, the impact of political negotiations among actors in the Syrian crisis through various pathways and initiatives, and objective considerations related to the growing humanitarian needs amidst declining funding for the Syrian crisis. Moscow exerted pressure to modify the cross-border aid mechanism, initially reducing it to two crossings (Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam/Resolution 2504), and later to just one (Bab al-Hawa/Resolution 2533), with a focus on early recovery projects as defined by Security Council Resolutions 2585/July 2021, 2642/July 2022, and 2672/January 2023. These resolutions identified early recovery sectors including water and sanitation, healthcare, education, shelter, and electricity, providing early recovery efforts with a legal framework and UN legitimacy. Since 2021, attempts at normalization with the Syrian regime have gained momentum, characterized by the "step-by-step" approach, which was conceptualized by some think tanks and supported by Jordan and UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen, where early recovery was one of its focal points⁽¹¹⁾

The following determinants and objectives laid the groundwork for the UN proposal of the Early Recovery Trust Fund:

• Exploring solutions to a deadlock in the political process, especially as the Constitutional Committee meetings stalled since 2022, and the UN's interest in testing an economic-humanitarian approach to achieve a political breakthrough and advance the stalled negotiation process;
• Managing challenges of the Syrian crisis, particularly with the suspension of the cross-border aid mechanism since July 2023, and declining funding for humanitarian response at a time when humanitarian needs are expected to rise (UN estimates that 16.7 million people in Syria will need assistance in 2024), possibly linked to changing donor priorities under the pressure of regional and international crises;

The relaxed stance of the US administration towards Arab efforts to normalize and communicate with the Syrian regime, and the exceptions granted from sanctions (June 2021, May 2022, February 2023), and earlier flexibility with Russian demands to include early recovery in Security Council resolutions, which provided leeway for Arab initiatives towards Damascus, indicating the possibility of funding early recovery projects if Damascus complies with specific steps.⁽¹²⁾

Humanitarian diplomacy to overcome sanctions and activate the Arab role: This was evident in the aftermath of the February 2023 earthquake and the diplomacy of disasters through the role of the UAE as a mediator, achieving a bilateral agreement between the UN and the Syrian regime to introduce UN aid through border crossings with Turkey outside the UN mandate⁽¹³⁾as well as the UAE's use of the earthquake disaster to circumvent sanctions imposed on the regime and send aid to it, thereby laying the groundwork for proposing a secure and legitimate mechanism under a UN umbrella for Arab donors to support early recovery projects, away from the constraints of US and European sanctions, as indicated by the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Syria, Adam Abdelmoula⁽¹⁴⁾

• Conversations led by Martin Griffiths, Deputy Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, with the Syrian regime post the February 2023 earthquake framed the UN proposal for the Early Recovery Trust Fund initiative, culminating in a decision by the UN Secretary-General in June 2023, directing the UN team in Syria to prepare a five-year early recovery program, including a clear plan for securing its funding. The war on Gaza and concerns about its implications for regional stability, specifically Syria, the regime's stance towards it, and what can be relied upon from the Early Recovery Trust Fund to influence the relationship between the regime and its allies, particularly Iran, were factors that paved the way for the UN proposal, overcoming any US or Western opposition.

The draft conceptual note for the UN’s ERTF defined it as an additional mechanism alongside existing ones (Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF), Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF)). The objective of ERTG would be to secure funding outside the humanitarian response plan for early recovery projects over five years (until 2028) based on the following priorities that would help build the adaptive capacity of local communities: health and nutrition, education, water services and sanitation facilities, livelihoods, and electricity. The fund consists of a steering committee, a technical committee, and a secretariat initially based in Beirut, with the Resident Coordinator and the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Syria leading and coordinating the overall management of the fund in consultation with donor entities and participating organizations. As for funding the fund, governments, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and private sector organizations were identified as contributors to this fund, with several sources indicating that the initial ceiling of the fund would be $500 million over five years, noting a lack of enthusiasm from the United States and Europeans to fund this initiative. However, many points remain subject to questioning, especially regarding the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank in managing this fund, the possibility of increasing the funding ceiling in the future, the stance of Gulf countries towards this fund, as well as the role of the Syrian regime in this fund, and the fair distribution of early recovery projects across influence zones.

ERTF: Identifying Risks and the Need for Guiding Principles and Standardized Frameworks

ERTF offers significant opportunities but also encompasses considerable risks, necessitating the implementation of guiding principles and standard frameworks for fund governance to ensure its effective contribution to achieving stability and advancing the political negotiation process. Concerns raised by numerous Syrian experts, organizations and political bodies, intersect with those by some donors regarding the fund's operation and its expected outcomes. These concerns stem from the UN’s previous experiences in Syria, marked by diminished transparency and manipulation by the Syrian regime to further its own interests.

The opportunities and risks of the fund can be summarized in the following table:

Strategies to Ensure Effective Implementation of ERTF

United Nations:

• Govern and manage the ERTF in a wise, neutral manner and seriously consider a neutral location for the fund, ensuring that projects cover all geographical areas of Syria without restrictions and guarantee the involvement and utilization of Syrian organizations’ capacities in the process, including monitoring, guiding, and implementing.

Syrian Organizations:

• Enhance the capacities of Syrian organizations to respond to early recovery projects, and incorporating this even in their humanitarian response.
• Ensure the voice of Syrian organizations in early recovery through: 1) Launching advocacy campaigns in major capitals at all levels to prevent the Syrian regime from monopolizing the process and redirecting it towards its interests, 2) Organizing workshops and events to discuss early recovery and formulate a common ground on the issue, 3) Developing an index to classify regions based on their needs and readiness for inclusion in early recovery projects, with continuous updates and sharing results with relevant entities, 4) Integrating the roles of Syrian organizations concerning early recovery, and their efforts to build alliances across influence zones to ensure a positive impact on this process.

Donors:

• Avoid granting the Syrian regime free gains without extracting substantial concessions that enhance stability and advance the political negotiation process.
• Bind the United Nations to the following guiding principles for early recovery projects: 1) Aimed at supporting the stability and adaptability of local communities, 2) Capable of connecting influence zones and activating national value chains, 3) Implementing early recovery projects in a decentralized manner that considers the local context of each region, 4) Ensuring that external actors facilitate and support the process, not lead it, enhancing local ownership and engagement.
• Emphasize to donors that while the Early Recovery Fund is an important mechanism to support stabilization efforts, it is insufficient on its own, and the continuity of other response mechanisms for the Syrian crisis must be maintained.

^([1])UNDP Policy on Early Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, 22 August 2008. https://bit.ly/31aEU66

^([2]) Global Cluster for Early Recovery (GCER), United Nations Development Programme, https://shorturl.at/ntMR1

^([3]) Strategic Framework for Early Recovery, Risk Reduction, and Resilience (ER4), USAID'S BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, October 2022, https://shorturl.at/jqtQ5

^([4]) Dr. Salam Saeed, Early Economic Recovery in Syria: Challenges and Priorities, in the book Economic Recovery in Syria: Actors Map and Evaluation of Current Policies, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 25.09.2019. https://shorturl.at/eCDJN

^([5])Osama Al-Qadi, Correcting Perceptions. OSHA and "Early Recovery"!", Syria TV, 26.04.2021. https://shorturl.at/cfg79

^([6]) Sami Akil, Karam El Shaar, Early recovery and reconstruction in Syria between reality and politics, 07.02.2022. https://shorturl.at/ABL57

^([7]) Zaki Mahshi, Mohammed Al-Sattouf, The impact of early recovery and reconstruction projects on housing, land, and property rights in Syria. 30.01.2024. https://shorturl.at/lrzNS

^([8]) A workshop hosted by the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, featuring Syrian experts, took place in Istanbul on April 16, 2023.

^([9]) See Reference 8

^([10]) Financial Tracking Service – OCHA. Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan. https://shorturl.at/rzPY7

^([11]) Like, A Path to Conflict Transformation in Syria. A Framework for a Phased Approach. Carter center. Jan 2021. https://bit.ly/3ZDEe8o, and d Raphael Parens and Yaneer Bar Yam. Step by Step to Peace in Syria. New England Complex Systems Institute. 09 Feb 2016. https://bit.ly/3kjb4v1

^([12]) Ibrahim Hamidi, Al-Majalla publishes the Jordanian Initiative for Syria... Three phases end with the exit of Iran and Hezbollah, Al-Majalla, June 25, 2023, https://shorturl.at/vEFV9

^([13]) Laila Bassam, Ghaida Ghantous, Maya Gebeily and Tom Perry. Exclusive: Assad approved Syria quake aid with a UAE nudge, sources say. Reuters. 23.02.2023. https://shorturl.at/cmGT5

^([14]) Muwaffaq Mohammed, extends for 5 years and includes projects including electricity, and is financed through a special fund. And enthusiasm for the contribution of Gulf countries ... Abdel Mawla to Al-Watan: Before the summer, we will launch an early recovery program, Al-Watan, 31.03.2024. https://shorturl.at/djFPZ

^([15]) See Reference 8